Recap of Diebold hearings from last Monday

In response to SFEXPAT's earlier post, here from CEP is a report:
Diebold in CA: Machinations Behind Closed Doors

November 21, 2005.

Sacramento. Today was an exhilarating day in Sacramento. Deja
vu of the last Diebold hearing, this new attempt to certify Diebold wares
once again raised the near-unanimous ire of concerned citizens. The
passion and dedication of the people attending was palpable. To witness
more than 125 citizens, journeying great distances--on short notice
and on a short holiday week--who all came together to defend the
integrity of our democratic processes, was to witness the real "Patriot
Act."

Without the dedication and vigilance of these activists, other
concerned citizens would never have known that behind closed doors,
the machinery of the Secretary of State’s office was in high gear
ready to certify Diebold.

Testing Diebold

Diebold suffered some setbacks earlier this year trying to meet
the new state requirement for a voter verified paper audit trail. In
its initial test this summer, the AccuView printer attachment to
the TSx model touch screen voting machine had a staggering 30%
performance failure rate. Diebold made adjustments, resubmitted, and
reportedly passed a second test in September, clearing the way for
rectifying the Tsp machines in four counties where they've been suspended
since spring 2004.

Test Results: Passing With a Weak Thumb’s Up

California's official voting equipment certification tester,
Steve Freeman, issued a slightly qualified "thumbs up" for Diebold.
Freeman applied his stamp of approval despite the fact that he did not
run tests on the specific security holes revealed by computer
security experts Avi Rubin, Herbert Thompson and Harry Hursti, which
Blackboxvoting.org later applied in demonstrations of undetected
vote-switching conducted under simulated election conditions.
As one election official (who asked not to be identified) said of the
State’s passing grade on the testing results, “Isn’t it like examining
a patient for small pox and proudly announcing that their teeth
are clean?”

Aces Up Sleeves?

Jim March of Blackboxvoting.org provided the most riveting and
colorful overview of the various new ways recording and tabulation can
be hacked on Diebold equipment. His gift for explaining technical
intricacies kept the audience on the edge of their seats. After
detailing uncorrected software and hardware defects in Diebold
voting systems that remain standing invitations to vote fraud, March
noted Diebold continued refusal to release its source code for
testing, or to identify the authors responsible March concluded his remarks
with this advice to public officials promoting the use of Diebold voting
machines, "If you don't want to be accused of cheating at
cards, don't let aces fall out of your sleeves at every step."

The Seven Reason NOT to Certify Diebold

Numerous members of the California Election Protection Network
(CEPN) delivered spoken testimony. The CEPN also entered into the
record their press advisory titled “Seven Reason NOT to Certify Diebold.”
-see below.


SB370: Cart Before the Horse

Michelle Gabriel of the Voting Rights Task Force and CEPN,
raised an excellent point about the recent passage of SB370.
(SB370 will allow voters to read their hard earned and soon to
be required accessible voter verified paper trail upon the event
an audit.) Yet to satisfy the impending SB370 Gabriel something
to the effect of, No one has yet bothered to test under real life
conditions, whether it's practical, or even possible to do an audit
using Diebold's AccuView printer and its roller-fed, thermal-paper tape.
Let’s test this equipment for all its required tasks BEFORE certifying
it, because the Secretary of State’s Office has NO right to risk the
security of our next election with untested election machines.

Diebold Groups Surprising About-Face

In a surprise about-face, all of the disabled groups represented
at Monday's hearing went on record against certifying the Diebold
equipment, stating that it simply does not meet their specific
needs. Over the past two years many disabled groups have lobbied and
litigated forcefully for the adoption of Diebold-type voting systems.
There has been much speculation about the motives behind such pro-Diebold
efforts, considering that the Diebold campaigning began AFTER Diebold
made a six-figure contribution to the largest national association of
the blind.

Disabled Groups & HAVA

The reversal by disability groups at Monday's hearing is very
significant, because the most forceful influence driving county
elections officials to the purchase of DRE (touch screen)
voting machines like the Diebold TsX has been the threat of lawsuits
brought by the disabled against election officials resisting the switch
to DRE voting systems. There is a pervasive misconception, actively
promoted by DRE vendors and supporters, that the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires touch screen (DRE) voting systems as the only suitable
means to address disabled voting needs. HAVA merely requires that voting
systems enable disabled persons to vote independently, and there are
non-computerized voting solutions that meet this condition.
http://www.votersunite.org/info/accessibility.asp > Further, last
year a federal court decision clearly stated that the rights of the
disabled cannot come at the expense of the majority of voters. < See [br />http://evotingcase.notlong.com ]

HAVA: “Use it or Lose it”

The major threat driving voting system purchasing decisions has
been the HAVA funds’ “Use it or Lose it” deadline, set for the
stroke of midnight at the end of this year. County elections officials
who have found the voting equipment options offered them unacceptable,
given the confusion about which federal standards may eventually be
required, wish to avoid hasty purchases they may later regret. Many would
prefer to forego the one-time federal funding bonanza and wait for
better voting systems to be developed under clear federal standards.

HAVA & DOJ Enforcement

But now a new pressure is being applied to force purchase decisions
for DRE equipment. At the time of last summer’s second Carter-Baker
Commission, which addressed the public's eroding confidence in our
voting systems, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a statement
announcing that state election departments that failed to make
arrangements for equipment upgrades effective by Jan. 1, 2006
would be visited by Department of Justice (DOJ) investigators. Marin
County election official Madelyn DeJusto recently said, “And when you
get a visit from them they don’t go away.”

Hold on HAVA

Megan Matson of Mainstreet Moms Operation Blue (MOB) < http://www.themmob.com > eloquently presented her organization’s idea for a “Hold on HAVA” campaign, in solidarity with the National Alliance of County Officials (NACO). This national elections official organization seeks to extend the HAVA deadline for two years.
In a recent impassioned plea to members of Congress, NACO explained that they have no “crystal ball” to see what equipment will be certified. Further, the Election Assistance Commission--the four-person panel charged with supervising the enactment of HAVA--is months behind its own deadlines for setting these standards.

The “No Hearing Hearing”

Much has already been written about the peculiar nature of
today's certification hearing http://tinyurl.com/c6g4v > The
hastily assembled delegation of Election Division officials before whom
the citizens spoke on Monday has no decision-making role. Those officers
do not even have an advisory role in this certification decision. Under
former Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, there had been a Voting Systems and Procedures Panel expressly charged with advising the Secretary of State.
No longer. Those sitting in chairs on stage Monday were props in a show of minimal compliance with the certification procedure's hearing requirement. Our good citizens who pleaded for election integrity can only hope that perhaps Secretary McPherson or someone he designates may possibly read and consider any of their remarks before issuing a decision on Diebold certification. California Sen. Koretz (Dem) is the first legislator to question this break with previously established protocol for seriously considering citizen comment.

Media Coverage of Today’s Events?

Given the nearly total blackout in the mainstream press on questions
raised by recent elections, citizen activists were heartened to
see an unprecedented turnout by the news media for Monday's voting
system certification hearing. Longtime Sacramento media consultant
Cress Vellucci exclaimed, “I’ve never seen this much media show up
for this kind of event.” TV camera crews were dispatched by two local
NPR television affiliates and Sacramento's Channel 3. Radio reporters from
KQED, KPFA, KPFK and a CNN affiliate recorded and conducted interviews
during the demonstration. Writers were assigned by the AP wire,
Stockton Press, Oakland Tribune, Sacramento Bee, and Sacramento
Reporter.

Where’s the Media on Election Integrity?

Curiously, to date, not a single news agency of national
stature has even mentioned the highly critical 117-page report issued by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of October 12, 2005,
which catalogs widespread electronic voting failures and warns of
continuing, unattended security risks in the nation's voting systems.
http://tinyurl.com/bv6f6 >

New Opportunities for Coverage

The first articles breaking the events of earlier today have sidestepped
the issues of Diebold voting systems' insufficiencies and the company's
history of election law violations, choosing instead to feature the State's contention that the systems have the passed the requisite tests.

Where in the World is Bruce?

The integrity of California elections is now in the lap of Governor
Schwarzenegger's appointed Secretary of State Bruce McPherson (Rep).
He did not bother to descend from his upstairs office to hear the
testimony of citizens in the auditorium. But two others interested in
his job--State Sen. Debra Bowen (Dem) and Forrest Hill (Grn)were both
present and keenly attentive to the Diebold hearing issues.

What’s Next Behind Closed Doors? “Good Night and Good Luck”

What’s Next will take place Behind Closed Doors: There is a closed
meeting next week in Sacramento, to be held at the Hyatt Regency on
November 27-28. < See, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_vst_summit.htm >
Its stated agenda is to discuss the conditions of certification and “best
practices." Some of the invited officials are known to be those who have openly flouted election code and zealously supported relaxed election integrity standards. Yet, on balance, no one was invited from our steering committee, despite the fact that we are a non-partisan organization of over 25 groups across California
dedicated to election integrity. We have been tipped off by an election insider
that we are blacklisted from participating in this summit. While we would like
to believe that it is a misunderstanding only time will tell. In the meantime,
we do have rejection letters from Bruce McDannold of McPherson's office stating
that we cannot attend, but that we may rest assured that our views will be represented. We wonder how Bruce McDannold can make that
assurance? After reviewing the summit's agenda, we know that there are three
attendees, computer scientists, who share our concerns. But they speak from a computer expert perspective--not ours.

We Can Do It Right!

If the Secretary of State is indeed blacklisting the CEPN, an organization
who has demonstrated its desire, ability and knowledge in the discussion
voting integrity, we respectfully ask for reconsideration. Democracy is at a critical juncture: At the November 27-28 Summit California will determine its future election practices for years to come, and attendance by our informed
citizens is not only desirable, but necessary.

__________________________________________




Seven Reasons NOT to Certify Diebold

1. The GEMS Defect
Reported by BOE Harris and Dr. Herbert Thompson, and
independently
confirmed by the security consultant firm Compuware on
commission from
the state of Ohio, the GEMS Defect concerns the central vote
tabulating
database that accumulates all the precinct and absentee votes
for all
Diebold optical scan and touch-screen voting systems. Despite
assurances by Diebold, records obtained by Black Box Voting
show that
this issue has not been resolved in either California or Ohio,
or
apparently any of the other 1,200 jurisdictions that use
Diebold. A
critical set of Compuware documents confirming this was
suppressed by
Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell.

Votergate the Movie available for free download < [br />http://www.votergate.tv ] contains footage from a national TV
broadcast
of Bev Harris instructing Howard Dean how to hack GEMS and
untraceably
alter vote tallies in under two minutes. Additional
vulnerabilities
have since been found and publicized at
http://www.blackboxvoting.org.

"By successfully directing Canvas at
the GEMS
modem interface, the team was able to remotely upload, download
and
execute files with full system administrator privileges. All
that was
required was a valid phone number for the GEMS server."
--Trusted Agent Report, Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting
System,January 20,
2004
Prepared for the Maryland General Assembly by: RABA Innovative
Solution Cell (RiSC)

2. Stuffing the Electronic Ballot Box with Diebold Memory
Cards
Finnish computer expert Harry Hursti, in cooperation with the
elections administration of Leon County, Florida, has
demonstrated in
real-world voting conditions that executable code on the memory
cards
integral to the operation of Diebold optical scanners and
touchscreens
can be quickly manipulated to change vote counts without
detection.
Brief account:
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/
5921.html?1117238594#POST6997
Full report: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf

California's voting systems testing consultant Steve Freeman
has
confirmed that Diebold's proprietary programming language
AccuBasic
writes "report files used to configure AccuVote-OS and
AccuVote-TS
report contents and printing in precinct count mode. They are
actually
loaded into the memory cards for the AV-OS and AV-TS where
their logic
is executed.
. . . The risk occurs in the opportunity to replace the
verified file
with some other .abo file . . . or by replacing the current
code with
rewritten code performing other operations."
Commenting on Freeman's report, Black Box Voting notes that it
is
possible to insert fraudulent code onto the memory cards that
is
date-specific, so that it will pass Logic & Accuracy testing
pre- or
post-election but trigger pre-planned manipulations on election
day.
Invoking California Election Code 19202, Black Box Voting
formally
requested Secretary of State McPherson to conduct a replication
of the
Hursti memory card exploits for the Diebold touchscreen and
optical
scan systems. Six months later, California still has not
performed this
test.

3. Inauditable Absentee Ballots on Diebold Optical Scanners
Just prior to the recent statewide election, technical experts
assigned by the Libertarian Party to inspect Diebold systems in
San
Joaquin, Marin, and Alameda counties found that in the Diebold
"central
count" optical scanners, "a critical paper audit component is
missing
for all absentee and mail-in ballots, and also for recounts."
Diebold's central count scanners are unable to write backup
data to
memory storage, instead passing all vote counting directly to
the
notoriously insecure GEMS tabulator. No "poll tapes" or
secondary
source of data is retained, and there is no way to check
whether the
GEMS security defect was exploited without obtaining the GEMS
vote data
files. Diebold refuses to release these files.

4. The Secretary of State's Own Tech Advisors Are Warning
Against
Diebold
Below are excerpts from a technical review commissioned by
Secretary
McPherson concerning the AVVPAT printer module added to the TSx
machines. The report, titled "Analysis of Volume Testing of the
AccuVote TSx/AccuView" is available at
http://ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/
vstaab_volume_test_report.pdf

p. 7: "... It is possible that these failures are a sign of a
large
number of other latent software defects."
"... this issue warrants further investigation before any
modified
versions of the TSx are certified."
"The fundamental barrier to analysis of these software errors
is the
lack of access to source code ... we have no way to perform
such an
independent evaluation. This is a very unsatisfying position
to be in."
p. 8: "We believe these failures constitute one of the
strongest
arguments for the State of California to take possession of, or
otherwise arrange for unfettered access to, the full source
code and
binary executables for all electronic voting machines." ...
there is no
way to know whether the defects have been fixed satisfactorily
(as
opposed to just hidden), or whether they represent symptoms of
more
serious architectural flaws, without access to the source."

5. The Federal and State Voting System Certification Process
is
Broken
Two testing labs in Huntsville, Alabama --Ciber Labs, run by
Shawn
Southworth, and a Wyle Labs office supervised by Jim
Dearman--are
responsible for repeatedly certifying defective voting machines
that
violate Federal Election Commission (FEC) standards.

The limited functionality testing performed by these federally
contracted "independent testing authorities" (that derive at
least a
third of their funding directly from the voting system vendors
they are
inspecting) and by California's consultant Steve Freeman, does
not test
for the known security vulnerabilities of the Diebold voting
systems,
including Dr. Herbert Thompson's VBA script attack, and
Hursti's
electronic ballot box stuffing and memory card swapping
techniques.

Diebold Software Comes with a Criminal Pedigree

6. Convicted Computer Embezzler Authored GEMS Software
Jeff Dean was Senior Vice-President of Global Election Systems
when it
was bought by Diebold in 2002. Even though he had been
convicted of 23
counts of felony theft in the first degree, Jeff Dean was
retained as
a consultant by Diebold and was largely responsible for
programming the
optical scanning software now used in most of the United
States.
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0312/S00191.htm
http://www.chuckherrin.com/HackthevoteFAQ.htm#how
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/bbv_chapter-8.pdf

Diebold consultant Jeff Dean was convicted of planting back
doors in
his software and using a "high degree of sophistication" to
evade
detection over a period of 2 years.
http://www.chuckherrin.com/HackthevoteFAQ.htm#how
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/bbv_chapter-8.pdf

DIEBOLD CONTINUES TO PERJURE AND VIOLATE ELECTION LAWS

7. Records obtained by Black Box Voting show that Diebold
executives lied to the Arizona Secretary of State, the Cuyahoga
County
Board of Elections, and to hundreds of elections officials
throughout
the U.S. about the existence of specific defects. Most famously
of all,
Diebold lied to the State of California in 2003 about illegally
installing uncertified voting software in all 17 counties in
which
Diebold had contracts.
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ks_dre_papers/
diebold_report_april20_final.pdf

CALIFORNIA ELECTION PROTECTION NETWORK
a non partisan organization of over 25 groups across California
coming together to achieve their mutual election integrity
goals
http://www.califelectprotect.net
Portions of this paper reprinted with acknowledegment and links
to
http://www.blackboxvoting.org
__________________________________________



Noveneber 21, 2005

The Honorable Bruce McPherson
California Secretary of State
1500 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

FAX916-653-3214

Dear Secretary McPherson:

I am writing to express my concern about the hearing to
determine
whether Diebold should be recertified. I believe that the
voters of
California are entitled to be able to choose their
representatives with
the confidence that their votes are recorded and counted
accurately. It
is the duty of the Secretary, as the chief elections officer of
the
state, to make sure that voting systems are approved in the
interests
of California, not the voting system

It has been brought to my attention that you have disbanded the
Voting
Systems Panel (VSP) a panel of advisors, which has historically
conducted hearings on voting systems used in the state. It is
of great
concern that the VSP has been disbanded without hearings about
what
will replace it and without any type of due process.

I am respectfully requesting that you reverse your decision to
abandon
established procedures and to allow people to provide
meaningful input
on the voting systems approve for use in the state.

In light of this concern I also respectfully request you
postpone any
decisions to re-certify Diebold for use in the state. Without
adequate
public input as to whether Diebold has met all the requirements
to be
certified for use in the state, I believe that it is premature
to move
forward at this time with the re-certification.

There as still many reasons to have reservation about making
such a
hasty decision without proper input from all interested
parties.
.
It is my understanding that Diebold failed to comply with the
April 30,
2004 decertification orders and cannot permit a meaningful
recount. The
proprietary closed source code complexity, secrecy and
protection
status of the software of the Diebold system precludes and
prevents any
meaningful legal thorough forensic analysis and recount of any
election
run on Diebold equipment. There have been many numerous
litigation
filings against Diebold, and the discovery process for forensic
examination of Diebold software is nothing but an extension of
the
basic recount procedure.

It is for these reasons that I request that you delay
recertifying
Diebold at this time.

Sincerely,

PaulKoretz

______________________________________




To: McDannold, Bruce

Subject: Request for Invitation to Voting Systems Testing
Summit

Dear Mr. McPherson and Mr. McDannold,

I am writing to request an invitation to the November
28-29 Voting Systems Testing Summit.

I am a member of the Steering Committee of the
California Election Protection Network and have been
working on Election Protecion issues since March of
2004.

I believe the Summit you are holding is a much needed
event and will be invaluable toward better informing
people of the concerns/vision/solutions regarding our
voting systems in California and most likely the
nation.

Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to
hearing back from you soon.

Sincerely,

XXXXXXX
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -


California Election Protection Network

E: Request for Invitation to Voting Systems Testing Summit

Date:
Thu, 10 Nov 2005 20:30:21 -0800

From:
"McDannold, Bruce"

To:



Thank you for your interest in the Summit on voting system
testing. We
invited elections
officials from across the country to participate, since this is
a
Summit designed specifically
to discuss state-level testing of voting machines and to
develop a best
practices document
on that specific subject. We've had a very good response;
registrations are filling up fast
so we are having to limit attendance to those already invited.
The
panels and panelists
reflect the widest array of credible views, from outright
skeptics to
industry. Interested
parties are encouraged to contribute written documents to the
Summit to
be reviewed as
part of the final recommendations for testing to the states.
They
should send their written
input to VotingSystemComment@ss.ca.gov.

For being one of those dedicated citizens, and reporting back the doings in Sacto. My own personal opinion is a strong initiative, as a Left "wedge".