"It's going to get nasty..get ready...<smear tactics> is the only thing they can run on. They don't have any ideas." Posted by CraigHinTenn
Neither ideas nor smear tactics are needed, CraigHinTenn. Those strategies would be transparent, but with results non-guaranteed. There is another, less detectable alternative for actually promoting a candidate's success (one that's
currently being confronted in San Diego, CA in a challenge to the legitimacy of an election that saw decertified electronic voting equipment being used.)
Election Fraud == *Co's Ace-in-the-Hole in Tennessee and 16 other "High Risk" rated jurisdictions.
from
Malfunction And Malfeasance - A Report On The Electronic Voting Machine Debacle by Common Cause:IV. State DRE Use and the Risk of Compromised ElectionsAs the November election nears, 37 states will be using DREs either in every precinct, in certain counties, or as an alternative to other voting technologies in various polling places. Because these machines have been known to malfunction and also present
significant security concerns, jurisdictions using these machines are at high risk of a compromised election due to DRE failure.
However, this risk is mitigated in some states and counties because the state has either: 1) passed a law requiring that all voting systems produce a paper record that a voter can verify and mandating an audit comparing machine tallies to hand counts of the paper records, or 2) purchased equipment that automatically produces a paper record, although the state has made no formal requirement.
CHART A shows the
status of each state regarding the use of DREs and which, if any, security safeguards are in place.
CHART B characterizes states on a
risk level from 1 to 3.
- A state is considered a low risk state if they do not use DREs but instead use another voting system. A state is also considered low risk if the state uses DREs but the DREs produce a voter verified paper ballot that will be counted in an audit.
- A state is considered medium risk if the voting systems produce a paper record but no audit is required. In these states, there will be paper record back ups if machines malfunction, but because there is no audit required, there is no systemic way to detect whether the machines are systematically adding, dropping or switching votes due to programming errors or malicious code.
- A state is considered HIGH RISK if the DREs are in use but they do not produce a paper record at all. In these states, votes will simply be lost if machines malfunction or votes are compromised due to programming errors or malicious code.
CHART C shows states in which Common Cause recommends that voters choose to vote by absentee ballot if their polling place only uses DREs. These are states with no-fault absentee voting laws in place.
17 HIGH RISK Jurisdictions (
ibid. p19, CHART B State-By-State Voter Risk Assessment):
Arkansas <YES>
Delaware
District of Colombia
Florida <YES> -- 2006? 5/25/06: Nelson (D) 56% Harris (R) 26%
Georgia <YES> (
Max Cleland "surprise" 12% reversal, 2002, in this HIGH RISK state)
Iowa <YES>
Indiana
Kansas <YES>
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland <YES> -- 2006? 4/18/06: Cardin (D) 45% Steele (R) 35%
New Jersey <YES> -- 2006? 6/15/06: Menendez (D) 43% Kean (R) 36%.
Pennsylvania -- 2006? 6/15/06: Santorum (R) 40% Casey (D) 49%
South Carolina
Tennessee -- 2006? 6/13/06: Corker (R) 46% Ford (D) 42%
Texas
Virginia -- 2006? 6/17/06: Allen (R) 51% Webb (D) 41%
With control of the House and Senate at stake, wherever races in November are expected to be close, precautions should be taken especially in
states at risk. If one projects Democrat candidate Ford can "eek out" a victory in
High-Risk Tennessee, then consider what happened in 2002 in
High-Risk Georgia, where Democrat Max Cleland led by 5% just days before election (...and heed, too, what Bush speaks on July 7):
"In November 2002, popular Georgia Democratic Senator Max Cleland led by 5 percentage points prior to the election – the first ever conducted entirely on touch-screen voting machines. But then a mysterious swing of 12 percent on election day led to his defeat." slide 8:
ELECTION FRAUD 2004 "We will hold the House (of Representatives) and the Senate," Bush said in the first formal, solo news conference he has held outside of Washington. "I'm looking forward to these elections. I think you'll be surprised..." July 7, 2006
(Pretty upbeat for the leader with a
falling approval rating of 36%.)
Has the name "Bush" been linked to Election fraud?
- 2005: Gov Jeb Bush pushes through legislation in Florida making it illegal to re-count original paper ballots for purposes of testing the accuracy of machines used for vote counting during elections. The significance? Feb 17, 2006 VSTAAB finding #3:
• Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots.
(Thus, brother Jeb -- Prez Chimp's choice for next POTUS -- has legislated means in Florida for covering up election fraud via DREs and Optical scanners. A true patriot and defender of Democracy...like brother like brother.)
- 2006, June 1 Robert F, Kennedy, Jr: "...evidence shows Ohio Sec. of State J. Kenneth Blackwell was 'certainly in on' the scheme, and there are indications that the effort went all the way up to the White House."
(FIRST RFK JR. VOTING MACHINE WHISTLEBLOWER LAWSUIT NOW FILED IN FEDERAL COURT! NEW DETAILS! BLOGGED by Brad on 7/12/2006)
(Mike Papantonio on the Mike Malloy Show (mp3))
(Of course, elections in November presumes no preemptive "emergency measures" initiated by Neocons-behind-Bush, intent on controlling power for 20 consecutive years...through means respectful
neither of structures of democracy nor the Constitution: "“One of the steps...is a permanent Republican government, in the sense of fifty-five Republican senators and a thirty-vote margin in the House and a Republican President for twenty years in a row. That’s when you can do to the left what the left did to us in the thirties and the forties.” Grover Norquist, on how to accomplish the one-party rule)
Where DREs and optical scanners are foolishly being used instead of paper ballots...and without mandated provisions for paper trails and automatic audits -- as is the case with Tennessee and elsewhere -- the Brennan Center for Justice'
Full Report and
Executive Summary recommends:
SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
There are a number of steps that jurisdictions can take to address the vulnerabilities identified in the Security Report and make their voting systems significantly more secure. We recommend adoption of the following security measures:
1. Conduct automatic routine audits comparing voter verified paper records to the electronic record following every election. A voter verified paper record accompanied by a solid automatic routine audit of those records can go a long way toward making the least difficult attacks much more difficult.
2. Perform “parallel testing” (selection of voting machines at random and testing them as realistically as possible on Election Day.) For paperless DREs, in particular, parallel testing will help jurisdictions detect software-based attacks, as well as subtle software bugs that may not be discovered during inspection and other testing.
3. Ban use of voting machines with wireless components. All three voting systems are more vulnerable to attack if they have wireless components.
4. Use a transparent and random selection process for all auditing procedures. For any auditing to be effective (and to ensure that the public is confident in such procedures), jurisdictions must develop and implement transparent and random selection procedures.
5. Ensure decentralized programming and voting system administration. Where a single entity, such as a vendor or state or national consultant, performs key tasks for multiple jurisdictions, attacks against statewide elections become easier.
6. Institute clear and effective procedures for addressing evidence of fraud or error. Both automatic routine audits and parallel testing are of questionable security value without effective procedures for action where evidence of machine malfunction and/or fraud is discovered. Detection of fraud without an appropriate response will not prevent attacks from succeeding.
Fortunately, these steps are not particularly complicated or cumbersome. For the most part, they do not involve significant changes in system architecture. Unfortunately, few jurisdictions have implemented any of these security recommendations.
How To's:
Parallel Elections by IndyOpSee, too:
How to Preempt a "November Surprise"
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