PROPOSED: VOTER'S CHOICE, version 1.1

VOTER's CHOICE

Give voters choice in how they vote:

1. Hand counted paper ballots (handle absentee and provisional ballots using the same processes and procedures)

OR

2. Vote digitally, by machine (any type)
a. A paper receipt accompanies all digital voting, is confirmed by the voter, retained by the precinct, and used to provide a total precinct vote total (to determine the total number of precinct voters) and to compare to digital data records under dispute. This acts to limit the total number of data records in the state's master vote open-sourced database.
b. The state maintains a denormalized master vote database (that is counted) with public read-only access via the Internet, phone system, and local kiosks. Election equipment vendors are contracted to populate the master vote database under an accuracy-based performance contract. Equipment vendors are reduced to commodity providers, a sure appeal to career election officials.
c. Digital voters are offered a random ballot identifier used to look up and verify the accuracy of the voter's digital ballot (the voter's data record that is counted)
d. From election day +1 and for 10 succeeding days, voters have the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their vote and contest any discrepancy.
e. The public has read-only access to the master vote database enabling anyone to tabulate the vote.

This system eliminates the attraction to digitally manipulate the vote, provides complete transparency, and offers protection to concerned voters who have the option of complete vote anonymity by voting via VVPB.

State election officials escape the controversy, manage paper ballots (VVPB, absentee, provisional) in one consistent manner, can offer voters a variety of voting machines (allowing custom input devices for various differing handicaps), and reduce their responsibility to maintaining and securing one simple master denormalized vote database.

Security concerns aside, this system enables Internet voting (handled like any other digital voting contracts - i.e., populate master vote database accurately) since input methods become largely irrelevant.

Election officials are free year-to-year to select any variety of input devices (cheapest, most entertaining, etc.).

edited:typos

they cannot win that way. It will take a voter revolt to change the Diebold system of overt theft.

irrelevant!

VOTERS CHOICE, version 1.2

Give voters choice in how they vote:

1. Hand counted paper ballots (handle absentee and provisional ballots using the same processes and procedures)

OR

2. Vote digitally, by machine (any type)
a. A paper receipt accompanies all digital voting, is confirmed by the voter, retained by the precinct, and used to provide a total precinct vote total (to determine the total number of precinct voters) and to compare to digital data records under dispute. This acts to limit the total number of data records in the state's master vote open-sourced database.
b. The state maintains county-level denormalized master vote databases (that are counted) with public read-only access via the Internet, phone system, and local kiosks. Election equipment vendors are contracted to populate the county-level master vote databases under an accuracy-based performance contract. Equipment vendors are reduced to commodity providers, a sure appeal to career election officials.
c. Digital voters are offered a random ballot identifier used to look up and verify the accuracy of the voter's digital ballot (the voter's data record that is counted)
d. From election day +1, for 10 days, voters have the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their vote and contest any discrepancy
e. If a voter disputes the accuracy of that voter's data record, the paper receipt is pulled (using the voter-supplied ballot identifier) and compared to the voter's digital data record, with the paper receipt taking precedence.
f. The public has read-only access to the master vote database enabling anyone to tabulate the votes

This system eliminates the attraction to digitally manipulate the vote, provides complete transparency (no hidden ballots, no secret counting), and offers protection to concerned/vulnerable voters who have the option of complete vote anonymity by voting via VVPB.

State election officials escape the controversy, manage paper ballots (VVPB, absentee, provisional) in one consistent manner, can offer voters a variety of voting machines (allowing custom input devices for various differing handicaps), and reduce their responsibility to maintaining and securing one simple master denormalized vote database.

Security issues aside, this system ostensibly enables Internet voting (handled like other digital voting contracts - i.e., populate master vote database accurately) since input methods become largely irrelevant.

Election officials are free year-to-year to select any variety of input devices (cheapest, most entertaining, etc.).

Fraud cannot hide in this system because the ballots that are counted are visible and voter-verifiable, and the tabulation of votes is public, accessible, and verifiable. ANY inaccuracy falls on the voting equipment/service providers with loss of contracts becoming their economic incentive for accuracy. Election officials maintain a hand counted paper ballot system (accommodating VVPB, absentee, and provisional ballots) and a simple denormalized database system that stores digital vote data records in denormalized form and tabulates votes. All else can be safely contracted to voting service providers who are subject to minimum service delivery performance requirements (% of reported and verified inaccuracies per 1000 voters) by which their businesses will succeed or fail. Voters have choice as to how they vote, paper or machines, can verify the accuracy of their votes, have recourse to dispute and correct any inaccuracies in their digital ballots, and have read-only mirrored access to independently tabulate votes.

DETAILS TO FLESH OUT:
* Hand counted paper ballot system design
* Recording hand counted paper ballots in the master vote databases
* Posting & reporting mechanism for precincts' count of voters
* Open-sourced master vote database system design and configuration
* Database system security design
* System auditing processes and procedures
* Independent voting system supervision and monitoring processes for political parties and citizens
* Vendor voting service contract provisions and requirements

Comments?