URGENT Call for DU Action on Calif Battle with Diebold/ES&S June 16!

CALL FOR ACTION FROM DUERS ON CALIFORNIA'S BATTLE WITH DIEBOLD & ES&S JUNE 16!

URGENT! Blast the media re: CA showdown June 16 with Diebold & ES&S!

Contact CA legislators! Raise a ruckus!

DUers, we have an uphill battle to save California from being Bushited. Two terrible things have happened here: 1) The unusual Recall election in which Time magazine and Larry King chose a governor for California. 2) The 'black ops' job that was done on Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, a popularly elected Democrat, who had sued Diebold and decertified their machines prior to the 2004 election--driven from office on trivial, unproven charges--and replaced with a Schwarzenegger APPOINTEE, Bruce McPherson. McPherson has stacked his team with partisan Republican and electronic voting machine company operatives.

Everything is now in place for a Bush Cartel takeover of California, with a key component of that takeover being the certification of Diebold and ES&S DREs (touchscreens) and central vote tabulators--the matter before the CA Voting Systems and Procedures Panel (VSPP) next week, Thursday, June 16, in Sacramento. (VSPP advises the Sec of State, who implements policy and advises the legislature.)

The California Election Protection Network (CEPN) is organizing speakers and a citizen movement against secret, proprietary programming code and other diabolical schemes to steal our elections, as perpetrated primarily by these electronic voting machine companies, Diebold and ES&S.

We want to SPOTLIGHT this Panel (VSPP). THIS IS WHERE THE GREAT BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY IS TAKING PLACE--at the local/state level, with citizens fighting back against the privatization of our elections, and where the decisions are being made to TURN OUR ELECTIONS OVER TO PRIVATE COMPANIES THAT ARE RUN BY BUSH PARTISANS.

SHOW THEM THAT THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING!

NO to Diebold and ES&S! Banish them from California and all US elections!
NO to secret, private, proprietary vote counting!
NO to election systems that most voters do not understand!
NO to unverifiable elections!
NO to elections without paper ballots!
NO to rightwing operatives and Bushites telling us who we voted for!

Please see these threads for the details of the VSPP hearing, and for talking points with the media

See post #48 for my letter to the VSPP at the thread below
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x375744

Here's the threat that started it all (Amaryllis)
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x374848

...AND BLAST THE MEDIA!

Also contact CA state legislators!

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Media Blaster (it's easy to use) at
http://www.independentmediasource.com/voteintegrity2_12.htm

Also contact local radio stations and newspapers, especially in CA.

CA legislators:

Assembly direct email links: http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset7text.htm

Senate and Assembly fax nos. & links to web sites: http://www.cawa.org/legcont.htm

Senate EMAILS: http://www.sen.ca.gov/~newsen/senators/senemail.htp

Senator.Aanestad@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Ackerman@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Alarcón@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Alquist@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Ashburn@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Battin@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Bowen@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Campbell@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Cedillo@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Chesbro@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Cox@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Denham@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Ducheny@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Dunn@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Dutton@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Escutia@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Figueroa@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Florez@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Hollingsworth@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Kehoe@sen.ca.gov

Senator.Kuehl@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Lowenthal@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Machado@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Maldonado@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Margett@sen.ca.gov
Senator.McClintock@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Migden@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Morrow@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Murray@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Ortiz@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Perata@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Poochigian@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Romero@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Runner@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Scott@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Simitian@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Soto@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Speier@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Torlakson@sen.ca.gov
Senator.Vincent@sen.ca.gov

Some CA Senators don't have public email addresses. To go to Senate web pages:
http://www.sen.ca.gov/~newsen/senators/senators.htp

N/T

:kick:

To get more copies of this, go to:

http://election-reform.us/petition_pr.html

Petition to the California Secretary of State
As Diebold has misled the State of California many times in the past and has provided uncertified software for use in elections, and as the use of Diebold equipment has disenfranchised voters by forcing late opening of polls in the March, 2004 election, and as Diebold's proposed paper trail is costly, unsuitable for recounts, and does not protect the confidentiality of the voters because it preserves the order in which ballots were cast,

Be it resolved that in order to protect the integrity of elections in California, restore citizen confidence in the electoral system, and provide transparency to the electoral system, the Secretary of State must not certify Diebold Election Systems for use in California. Further, as authorized by section 192104.5 (a) (3) of the California Elections Code, the Secretary of State must ban Diebold from doing any elections-related business in the state for three years.

In addition, counties with existing Diebold equipment should evaluate alternatives for compliance with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and the California Elections Code rather than solely negotiating upgrades to existing Diebold systems.

Name City County Zip Code e-mail (print clearly)
















For more information, or to sign on-line, and for how to help, go to http://election-reform.us/
Bring printed petitions to the VSPP hearing or return petitions to:
Voting Systems and Procedures Panel (VSPP)
Office of the California Secretary of State
Attn. Bruce McDannold
FAX (916) 653-3214 - Tel. (916) 657-2166,
or mail to: 1500 11th St, 5th Floor, Sacramento, CA 95814
or email to: Bruce McDannold at bmcdanno@ss.ca.gov

is something different?

...comment into the record for the June 16 VSPP hearing.

That deadline is past. People can now go to the hearing and speak--but they can't provide written comment any more (if they can't attend).

So, now the goal is PUBLICITY. Getting a spotlight on this hearing. Alerting legislators. Putting public pressure on.

Most people are woefully ignorant about electronic voting, and who is making these decisions, and where and how and what it means.

This is an opportunity to educate--as well as to let the bad guys know that we are watching them (and to bolster the good guys).

The two targets of the publicity are...

the news media, and

California state legislators.

Even a tiny news story--say, that the VSPP was well attended--would be educational, if it appeared in a big news outlet. Alternative media may provide more than that.

As for CA legislators, they hold the ultimate power over election rules, and the CA legislature is overwhelmingly Democratic (2 to 1). These Democratic leaders absolutely need educating on election fraud/election reform. And they need to be pressured. Many of them seem to be oblivious to the fact that "the fix is in" on elections. These need to be pounded on the head. And some of them are corrupt--but might still bow to public pressure. (And some are neither oblivious nor corrupt--they are good people.)

Personally, I wouldn't bother with the Republicans. But others might feel that some of them are fair-minded and persuadable on election reform.

Anyone who attends the panel hearing on the 16th and signs in to make a spoken comment, can also hand over any written statement you wish to present the panel.

There is no guarantee they will read it, but you will have made the public gesture.

A transcript is published of all spoken remarks at the hearing.

There is no public record maintained or distributed of written commentary submitted to the VSPP, whether or not you got it in by the June 9 deadline.

The June 9 deadline meant that any written comment in by that date would be copied to each of the VSP panel members. There is no guarantee they will read it, and in any event, there is no archive of written comments submitted.

This is not to discourage anyone from submitting written material on the 16th. The more, the better.

This is to clarify, the only surviving official record will be the transcript of spoken testimony.

It is very important that as many people as can possibly make it, show up prepared to deliver a hard-hitting 2-minute speech, backed up with whatever documentation you wish to present.

--Dan Ashby
Voter Rights Task Force,
California Election Protection Network
correspond via dan@redefeatbush.com

We have only a week to put the spotlight on this very important hearing in California--as to whether or not Diebold and ES&S will get free rein here, under the new Secretary of State, a Schwarzenegger APPOINTEE!

This is where the battle for our democracy is taking place--at the state/local level on election reform!

Shout it out! Educate! Pressure! Focus! Turn on the spotlight! Don't let them get away with this! Get Diebold and ES&S out of California! Strengthen the election rules--don't weaken them! End privatization of elections NOW!

Transparent elections NOW!

You can help promote this VSPP action June 16th by e-mailing to your lists a .PDF flyer written by CEPN and posted at

http://election-justice.us/June16hearing.pdf

This site is functioning as our de facto web organizing node for the entire state at present, and is hosting a variety of valuable documents, facts, and talking points you may browse, copy, download, and distribute any way you know how.

http://election-reform.us/talking_points.html

There's also a Decertify Diebold petition:

http://election-reform.us/petition.html

More material is being added all the time. The site has been up less than two weeks but the guy building just retired this week and he's pouring his time into the project now.

The latest updates added just yesterday include the CA staff reports on the vendor systems up for review--which were just released by the state, belatedly, because a newspaper article in the Bay Area yesterday blew the whistle on the state's failure to provide legally required advance public information prior to these certification hearings.

News link:
http://www.insidebayarea.com/dailyreview/localnews/ci_2794606

Don't be mislead by the article title. These Diebold and ES&S systems are not going to be approved without a big fight from us.

Please circulate the links.

Thank you.

I cannot attend the hearing because I'm going into the hospital that day. So I thought I would provide suggestions for those who can't go:

Blast the media!
Blast state legislators!
And any others you can think of!

For those new to these developments, go here first:

http://election-reform.us

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I wasn't aware that the shites are not providing any record of written in-put. That is incredible!

But glad to hear that spoken comment will be transcribed! (Can't wait to read that transcription!)

Patriots, if you live in California (or even if you don't) and can get to this hearing, DO SO! THIS IS IT! THIS IS THE BIG ONE! We MUST turn this around!

(Sorry for that previous misplaced kick)
I hope this one was put in the right place for the desired effect.

From the newly formed National Lawyers Council that Dean announced today? There is supposed to be a lawyer/group of lawyers as a liaison for each state.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=377176&mesg_id=377176

may be some lawyers on the California situation already. The California Election Protection Network (CNEP) and the folks at http://election-reform.us are pretty feisty.

a June 9 deadline for getting written comments into the official packets sent to VSPP members. This thread is about blasting media, CA legislators and others--and is especially for those who cannot attend the hearing but wish to help.

...today. I will post here a list of Democratic state senators and assemblypeople. The Senate list above contains both Dems and Repubs.

Dems have a 2 to 1 majority in the CA state legislator--an advantage that Schwarzenegger intends to destroy with the worst of the Diebold and ES&S voting machines, and with another unusual, untimely, and expensive "special election," this one to 'redistrict' the state and to force a draconian budget down our throats, pushing the cost of Schwarzenegger/Bush pal Kenneth Lay's $9 billion theft in California (the Enron crimes) onto the poorest people in our state.

But the Dems seem oblivious to the danger that Diebold and ES&S voting machines pose. Some of them colluded in the destruction of our vigilant Sec of State Kevin Shelley, who had sued Diebold and decertified their touchscreen voting machines prior to the 2004 election. They need to be educated and castigated for their negligence, collusion and/or stupidity.

The Sec of State's office is now run by a Schwarzenegger patsy appointee--and the fix is clearly in. With Shelley out of the way, Diebold and ES&S are back, lobbying for their touchscreens and central tabulators, determined to gain complete control of CA elections on behalf of the Bush Cartel.

We have an uphill battle to cast them out. DUers can help by contacting media, CA legislators and others (and by attending the June 16 Sacto VSPP meeting if you possibly can!).

I'll also post a media blast message here this morning. I'm thinking the subject line should be:

A Stalinist voting system for California? Sacto, June 16. You'd better be there.

Hi Peace Patriot
Thanks for keeping us alert to this looming danger. How to get the CA senators to pay enough attention to get informed, and ask the right kinds of questions is the real issue here. Since I don't live in CA, I want to pass on this link to an interview done prior to Nov 2 by our local wishtv team 8. The info is not new to those already informed and converted, but the authority of the expert interviewed, Prof. Eugene Spafford, one of the most senior and recognized international leaders in the field of information security, may command attention on the part of some legislators. Another plus of the interview is that the info is laid out in very simple, non technical language, but the dangers to democracy made very clear. Here is the link for you to check out:
http://www.wishtv.com/global/story.asp?s=1649501&ClientType=Printable

Here's the California Election Protection Network (CPEN) schedule for the day:

9:00 am: Citizens convene in front of the Secretary of State Building for a meeting.

10:00 am: The VSPP hearing.* (--probably will go on all day)

The Secretary of State Building
1500 11th St., 1st Floor Auditorium
Sacramento, CA 95814

*In the event of a postponement or cancellation of the hearing, citizens will meet out front and go to the legislature for lobbying.

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More contact info:

For info on CITIZEN RALLY and updates on VSPP agenda:

Marc Keenberg: hiway61abe@hotmail.com
Sherry Healy: sherry@califelectprotect.net

The California Election Protection Network (CEPN) has information in pdf form at:

http://www.dfa-marin.org/June16HearingPressRelease.pdf

Notify VSPP of intention to speak or present information, call Bruce McDannold, at (916) 657-2166, or email bmcdanno@ss.ca.gov

Write to:
Voting Systems and Procedures Panel (VSPP)
Office of the California Secretary of State
Attn. Bruce McDannold
FAX (916) 653-3214 - Tel. (916) 657-2166,
or mail to: 1500 11th St, 5th Floor, Sacramento, CA 95814
or email to: Bruce McDannold at bmcdanno@ss.ca.gov

Is that not true? You have info for contacting McDannold about that in advance.

Peace Patriot, am I actually going to get to meet you? And Junkyarddogg, you too? That would be great.

with job and 6-hr drive for me to Sacto, can't get there. (Op is not mortally serious, but will take all day.) I'm blasting media and legisl's this morning.

You can sign up to speak there, I believe. But not sure. The public notice says contact McDannold if you wish to speak. He'll probably put your name on a list, to be checked off at the door. If you don't contact him, you might not get to speak. His tel. and email are posted above.

In reply to my email:
"We do not take advance sign-ups for speakers at the VSPP meetings. If you wish to speak at the upcoming VSP meeting on June 16, please complete a speaker request card upon your arrival."

...notice. It says to contact him if you intend to speak. Perhaps this is just to give him an idea of how many (i.e., auditorium vs. small meeting room)--but since it's on the official notice, you'd think it was a requirement for speaking, and that they were creating a list.

But anyway, it's good news for those who just show up and want to speak, and didn't know any of this.

This is a report/study done by Jody Holder on Diebold's Certification Problems:


DIEBOLD CERTIFICATION ISSUES

Today I reviewed the new reports on the SoS website: Executive Summary Addendum by Steve Freeman on the proposed Diebold TSx voting system, Staff Review and Analysis. It is par for the course that because of the actions by the Elections Division there is very little time to do a thorough job analyzing these new reports that were not posted for public viewing until June 10, one day after the deadline for written comments that would be including in the packet that will be distributed to the VSP panel members prior to the hearing. Please notice that the staff report was issued June 6 and could have been posted earlier. Also Steve Freeman's Addendum was issued June 7, also prior to the deadline. I have questions why these reports were not posted until after the written comment deadline. One note regarding the submittal of written comment to the panel by June 9. In the past I have made copies of my written comments and points to be made during my oral comments and given those copies to the individual panel members prior to my presentation. I would recommend doing that before your own presentation, and giving a copy to Bruce McDannold for inclusion in the record. If you did submit written comments I would ask to see a copy of the presentation packet being given to the panel and confirming a copy of your written comments are in there. Under California Open Meetings laws you have a right to view the packet of information being presented to the panel members for their discussion. I also have not had time to go through the ES & S information. I hope someone in a county using or planning on using their system will investigate that too.
I have not had time to organize these various issues and points so please use them as you will in your own research, presentations, or analysis. These are various items that should be investigated further. On one of the last points is very important so please go through to the end.

The staff report was issued June 6, yet Steve Freeman's Addendum was not issued until June 7. That has created some problems for the staff report. I will refer to each report as follows:
Staff Review and Analysis: SRA
Steve Freeman's Executive Summary: SFES

The official Procedures for approval of a voting system for use in California require a complete Application to be submitted before examination may begin. This was not done, and still has not been done. Among the items that are REQUIRED prior to examination beginning are:
NASED approved ITA certificate stating that the item follows FEC guidelines. Currently HAVA requires that the "voting system" in totality meet 2002 Voting System Standards (2002 VSS). California's Election Code 19250 (a) requires that after January 1, 2005 the SoS may not approve a DRE unless the "system" has received "federal qualification" and includes an accessible VVPAT. In subsection (d) it then defines what "federal qualification" means. The system must have been certified by means of qualification testing as required by the FEC, EAC, and HAVA. Both HAVA and NASED require that any "voting systems" tested and certified in 2005 must qualify to 2002 VSS. Both reports refer to various "components" having met 2002 VSS qualification but also state that the "system" as a whole only is qualified to 1990 VSS. That is against both federal law, state law, and the SoS Procedures.
The SRA, p. 6 claims that GEMS 1.18.22 has completed federal qualification testing to 2002 VSS. Yet the NASED website list of Qualified Voting Systems does not state that. The referenced Qualification Numbers cited by the SRA contain some components that have been qualified to 2002 VSS, but the system is qualified to 1990 VSS, and no where does it show GEMS 1.18.22 qualifying to 2002 VSS. In fact the updated list of Diebold "voting systems" shows that not one of them has qualified as a "system" except to 1990 standards. Remember, state and federal law, etc. refer to "voting systems", not individual components.
In the SRA p. 15 item 15 the staff declares that copies of the qualification testing reports have been received and are on file. Yet the SFES reports (page 4 top) that the final test reports for GEMS version 1.18.22 have not been received from either the hardware nor software ITAs. Steve Freeman even concludes his summary by referring to making his recommendations conditional "pending receipt of the ITA reports". This is the exact same sequence of events that occurred in October and November, 2003 when Diebold kept promising the reports and qualification numbers would shortly be issued. Even the elections staff themselves assured the VSP panel that everything was qualified and the number would be issued at any moment. Nearly two years later and the same tactics are still being utilized to get a system California approved.

NASED approved testing reports of all tests conducted. As referenced above, these have not been received yet (as of June 7, 2005).

California Procedures for use of the System (Note: Final Draft Procedures must be received at least 45 days prior to the VSP Panel meeting in which the item will be considered). The Procedures were not received until the week before last. The VSP panel should not be hearing this Agenda Item until at least 45 days after receipt of the Final Draft Procedures.

Other issues:

Barcode on the paper receipt: I have asked Bruce McDannold for clairification because I have come across the same information both in a previous email and now in this staff report. He claims to not be aware of this issue. The paper record is required by state law to be used for the 1% MANUAL audit and for any recount. Yet in the SRA, p. 4 they refer to the barcode on the VVPAT "for easier tabulation in an audit after the election". I would like to have clarification on this issue. State law requires that all paper records of votes be manually counted during the audit and any recounts. Reading a barcode to speed up the process would be against both state and federal law. This also raises the problem of what is on the barcode. Both reports discuss the issue of preserving the secrecy of the ballot. They addressed that by removing from the 'printed portion" of the VVPAT the ballot serial number. Yet in an email exchange it is inferred that the ballot serial number may be contained in the information in the barcode. If that is the case then in any audit or recount an individual ballot serial number could be determined and an individual voter identified.

Accessibility: In the SFES p. 2 he asks for "public comment" on the adequacy of the magnification qualities of the AVPM. I also have serious questions whether this system meets the requirements of federal and state law, including the January 21, 2005 Standards for AVVPAT.

Public Comment: We now can see what the SoS's Elections Division considers "Public Comment". See p. 21 of the SRA, section VI. On April 6 an "open house" was held at the SoS headquarters for INVITED representatives of the accessibility community, county election officials, members of the Technical Advisory Board. These invited members of the "public" subsequently wrote comments that were then submitted with this report (but they were not part of the report online). One point I would like to point out as an example of the bizarre arguments promulgated by some in the disabled community, and cited as a "major issue" raised in the comments was the claim that the "voter verified paper trail cannot be read or verified by someone who is blind". Neither is the screen image of the ballot either, so what. With their logic all of society should be disabled equally for us all to be equal. So we all should be reduced to the least common denominator of ability so we cannot do something that everyone as a whole cannot do. Extremists like this do the disabled community a serious disservice. Of more important concern as an issue is that several comments pointed out how the TSx does not meet the requirements of HAVA, i.e. curbside voting, insertion of the Smart Card, etc.

Federal Qualification: The SRA, p. 9 Item 6 refers to the "system" having successfully completed federal qualification testing. It claims that GEMS 1.18.22 meets the 2002 VSS. There is no evidence that it does. The Qualification Number itself is based upon 1990 VSS. The report refers to some components not yet qualified to 2002 VSS but does not identify them. This system also appears to be in violation of both NASED rules and HAVA and state law. All systems tested and issued a qualifying number in 2005 are required to be qualified in total to 2002 VSS. In fact, the NASED April, 2005 Addendum states: "After January 1, 2005, any revisions which do not make the voting system totally compliant with the 2002 VSS BECOME NON-QUALIFIED under the national testing program." (emphasis added) I am unsure how the state and NASED is bypassing both the requirements of HAVA, NASED's own advisories, and California law.

Security considerations: On the bottom of p. 8 of the SRA is the section about the system being secure from fraud or manipulation. The only changes appear to deal with the Supervisor and Administrator cards. Even those changes are not complete as reported by by the SRA and the SFES. Look at the previous staf report that was issued earlier, and the Steve Freeman original report on the security. They use the same language as on p. 9 of the SRA: "In all other aspects, the system is at least as secure as the previously certified Diebold systems". That does not comfort me. We know that the previous Diebold systems are not secure, as evidenced by the Compuware Report, etc.
The election's staff seems to think that the important aspect to a voter verified ballot is "public confidence" that our vote is "accurately recorded" (p. 10 Item 10). No, it is that our vote is accurately recorded and then accurately counted and reported. An effective manual audit of the computerized tabulating system is the only way that public confidence can be increased that our votes are accurately recorded and counted.

Important paragraph that needs further clarification and analysis: SRA p. 20, Item V. The staff appears to have inserted this paragraph in an effort to be able to use the TSx machines that were illegally sold and delivered to San Joaquin/ San Diego/ Kern County in 2003, prior to their being approved for use in California. They refer to a "non-AccuView configuration" that doesn't include the AVPAT. First I would point out that neither in the federal qualification testing, nor in state testing, nor in the Application itself is there any reference to a "non-AccuView configuration". This paragraph appears to be a disingenuous way of getting the illegal TSx machines already in place to be used for the Special Election. It is noteworthy that the Staff Report refers to the June 15, 2004 AVVPAT standards, NOT the January 21,2005 Standards. The January 21, 2005 Standards "shall be effective beginning January 1, 2005 for all DRE voting systems certified on or after that date and beginning January 1, 2006, for all DRE voting systems...". They are trying to grandfather a voting system that has already been "de-certified" because it failed to meet the requirements of state law. This Application from Diebold calls the TSx with the AccuView printer a NEW system. State law forbade the counties from purchasing or contracting for a voting system that was not state approved. They did both in the spring of 2003, long before the conditional certification. that certification was rescinded because Diebold lied to the state. If this Application and voting system is certified for use in California it will be as a new system certified in 2005. that means it must be used as a whole, including the AccuView. I would challenge the Elections Division to come up with any legal authority to grandfather in a previously de-certified system. THIS IS A MAJOR ISSUE. WE MAY SEE EFFORTS BY KERN, SAN JOAQUIN, AND SAN DIEGO COUNTIES TO USE THEIR TSx MACHINES FOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION IN NOVEMBER, WITHOUT A PAPER TRAIL.
I have read the Decertification Directive and can find no reference to the possibility of the TSx system conditionally approved on November 20, 2003 being given a "second chance". The burden is upon the Elections Division staff to cite any authority that under either AVVPAT Standards or the Decertification Directive that the TSx systems used in the March, 2004 election can be used during 2005 to conduct elections. In fact, a careful reading of the April 30, 2004 Decertification Directive states explicitly that the Diebold TSx system currently deployed may not be used:

This is completely opposite with what the staff has stated as justification for using the TSx without a printer the rest of this year.
1. It is why Diebold submitted this Application for the TSx with printer as a NEW voting system.
2. The Directive states that NO NEW VOTING SYSTEM may be used in California without a AVVPAT.
3. Number 4 specifically states that the TSx is not included.
4. The January, 2005 AVVPAT Standards REQUIRE that a new voting system MUST HAVE a AVVPAT for certification. That means that the existing TSx machines in San Joaquin, Kern, and San Diego Counties will not become automatically approved if the applied for new system is certified. They must be identical to the new system to be approved for use.

As is apparent, there are serious deficiencies in the reports, as well as in the transparency of the entire certification process by the SoS. The elections officials from Kern, San Joaquin, and San Diego County will be at the meeting pleading their case once again, just like they did in October and November, 2003. At that time they chose expediency over the interests of their voters. They ignored state law and contracted for, and accepted delivery of voting systems before they were state approved. Now they will once again claim that the November Special Election means they have to have approval of their deficient systems now. We must fight that effort and expose their incompetence and abdication of their duty towards the citizens of their counties.
Jody Holder

:patriot:

To: All media

Date: June 15, 2005

Re: California Voting Systems and Procedures Panel hearing June 16: Diebold and ES&S


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Secret, proprietary programming code counting all our votes? Bush partisans owning and controlling our voting systems?

As Joseph Stalin said: “Those who cast votes decide nothing; those who count the votes decide everything.”

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California election reform activists are mobilizing for the Secretary of State advisory panel meeting, June 16, in Sacramento, at which the Diebold and ES&S electronic voting machine companies will request “certification” for their latest dubious wares: unreliable, insecure, hackable and fraud-prone touchscreen voting machines and central tabulators, previous versions of which were banned in California by our former, highly vigilant Secretary of State Kevin Shelley.

Will Schwarzenegger appointee Bruce McPherson be as tough on the companies as Shelley was? That is one of the questions that reporters and investigators should be asking, as his advisory group, the Voting Systems and Procedures Panel, (VSPP) meets Thursday, June 16, starting at 10:00 am, in the first floor Auditorium of the Secretary of State Building (1500 11th St., in Sacramento, CA 95814), to consider new Diebold and ES&S voting systems.

The California Election Protection Network (CEPN), which consists of many different election reform groups, will meet in front of the Secretary of State building at 9:00 am, to discuss speakers and strategy.

Contacts:
MARC KEENBERG: hiway61abe@hotmail.com
SHERRY HEALY: sherry@califelectprotect.net
http://www.califelectprotect.net//June16HearingPressRelease.pdf

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The new “privatization” of our elections, brought on by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)--which encourages but does not require conversion to electronic systems—is causing great alarm among citizens and voters. The companies involved—several with close connections to the Bush regime—require that the programming code they use to record and tabulate votes be kept as a “trade secret.” Few voters understand how their votes are counted, and not even our election officials are privy to the code. This is one of many grave problems with the new electronic voting systems. How can our elections be transparent with secret programming code?

Further, these electronic systems are highly insecure and vulnerable to hacking.

I urge all newspeople and other interested parties to get up to speed on this matter now, because it is the most explosive political issue of our lifetime. U.S. news media folk, Scoop.com in New Zealand is “scooping” you! (See the “Scoop” section, below.)

Here are some primer documents that I highly recommend:

"Myth Breakers: Facts About Electronic Elections" (2nd edition): http://www.votersunite.org

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Easy demo of how insecure voting machines are, by Republican hacker Chuck Herrin:
http://www.chuckherrin.com/hackthevote.htm

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Johns Hopkins report on insecurity of electronic voting: "Analysis of Electronic Voting System"
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00196.htm#5
by Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, and Aviel D. Rubin of the Information Security Institute, Johns Hopkins University, and Dan S. Wallach, Department of Computer Science, Rice University - July 23, 2003

From the Abstract:
"Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts.// "We highlight several issues including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network threats, and poor software development processes. For example, common voters, without any insider privileges, can cast unlimited votes without being detected by any mechanisms within the voting terminal. Furthermore, we show that even the most serious of our outsider attacks could have been discovered without the source code. In the face of such attacks, the usual worries about insider threats are not the only concerns; outsiders can do the damage. That said, we demonstrate that the insider threat is also quite considerable. We conclude that, as a society, we must carefully consider the risks inherent in electronic voting, as it places our very democracy at risk."

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"Emerging Scandal on MD Voting Machine Performance"
"MD Election Group Calls for Independent Investigation and De-Certification of Machines (TruevoteMD.org); All MD Diebold Machines on Lockdown, Under Investigation for Widespread Statewide Election Day 2004 Failures
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/3/17/02212/3566

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Florida: 130,000 to 230,000 phantom votes for Bush--paper vs. electronic voting—in Florida's 3 biggest Democratic counties (Miami-Dade, Brower and Palm Beach); calls for investigation:
http://ucdata.berkeley.edu
Report issued 11/18/04, by Dr. Michael Haut, & U.C. Berkeley Quantitative Methods Research Team; Haut is a nationally-known expert on statistical methods and member of the National Academy of Sciences and the U.C. Berkeley Survey Research Center

"UC Berkeley Research Team Sounds 'Smoke Alarm' for Florida E-Vote Count
Statistical Analysis - the Sole Method for Tracking E-Voting - Shows Irregularities May Have Awarded 130,000 - 260,000 or More Excess Votes to Bush in Florida
Research Team Calls for Investigation"
Press release: http://www.commondreams.org/news2004/1118-14.htm

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"The Corrupted Election" (2/15/05) by Dr. Steven Freeman and Dr. Josh Mitteldorf
http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/1970

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“The United States of Ukraine?: Exit Polls Leave Little Doubt that in a Free and Fair Election John Kerry Would Have Won both the Electoral College and the Popular Vote”
by Ron Baiman - December 19, 2004
http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/19/2004/997

Baiman: "I conclude that, based on the best exit sample data currently available, neither the national popular vote, or many of the certified state election results, are credible and should not be regarded as a true reflection of the intent of national electorate, or of many state voters, until a complete and thorough investigation…."

Dr. Ron Baiman: Economist/Statistician - senior research specialist, Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois at Chicago; teaches at the University of Chicago.

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The Scoop:

Republican connected control over the major election systems companies in the United States has been thoroughly researched.

“Bob Urosevich, CEO of Diebold Election Systems is also the founder of ES&S, a competing voting machine company. Together these two companies are responsible for tallying around 80% of votes cast in the United States. Also significant, from what we can determine about the architecture of the software, is that its basic structure was specifically a creation of Mr Urosevich's company I-Mark.”

For more background on Diebold Systems connections to the Republican Party see:

Diebold - The Face Of Modern Ballot Tampering
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0211/S00081.htm

Senate Ethics Director Resigns; Senator Hagel Admits Owning Voting Machine Company
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0301/S00166.htm

Inside A U.S. Election Vote Counting Program
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00065.htm

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CEPN

See:

http://election-reform.us/
http://election-reform.us/background.html
http://www.califelectprotect.net//June16HearingPressRelease.pdf

CEPN Steering Committee:

Judy Bertelsen
Carolyn Fowler
Ferris Gluck
Anna Givens
Don Goldmacher
Jenny Hammond
Sherry Healy
Karen Indreland
Marc Keenberg
Mimi Kennedy
Cheryl Lilienstein
Sarah Rath
Sherry Reson
Eve Roberson
Maureen Smith
Marcy Winograd

CEPN includes reps from the following:

51st AD Delegate LA CA DEM PARTY
51CapitalMarch
Blackboxvoting.org
CA 6th Assembly District, Executive Committee
CA 77 Assembly District Democratic Committee
CitizenAct
City of Alameda Democratic
Code Pink
Democracy for America of Los Angeles
Democracy for America-Marin
Democracy for America, San Francisco
Dean Democrats of Silicon Valley
Election Board LA County Central Committee
GrassrootsWest.org
Left.org
New Frontier Democratic Club
Ojai Democrats
Progressive Democrats of America
Progressive Democrats of Sonoma County
Progressive Democrats, Los Angeles
San Diego for Democracy/DfA
Sonoma County Democratic Central Committee
Southern California Grassroots
United for Secure Elections
Ventura County Progressives
VOTERR
Voting Rights Task Force
Paul Wellstone Democratic Forum - L.A.
Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club - East Bay

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VSPP contact info.:

Voting Systems and Procedures Panel (VSPP)
Contact: Bruce McDannold, at (916) 657-2166, or email bmcdanno@ss.ca.gov
Office of the California Secretary of State

FAX (916) 653-3214 - Tel. (916) 657-2166,
1500 11th St, 5th Floor, Sacramento, CA 95814