Hart eSlate gets 2002 VVS certifiaction

Now there are 3 DREs that might be HAVA complaint.

http://www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDQualifiedVotingSystems12.03to8.05.pdf

Keep up the good work Foger. You are the man when it comes to 2002 certification.

If you find a machine that has a full-face ballot, VVPATs cut into sheets, and is 2002 certified, let me know. That's the only way it can be used in the state of NY without a lawsuit (assuming our State BoE is stupid enough to approve one that doesn't conform to the LAW).

cut & drop printer
Full face
2002 certs

Though the printer they showed at the demo was a prototype

I think I remember that this Hart DRE is a full face--- but dunno about a printer

Tablet-sized, 9 lbs (around 25 lbs with its case/desk/booth) and it is not really a touchscreen... it uses a wheel to select and scroll on the screen, hence its nickname the "dial-a-vote".

They claim they have a printer, but I never saw it. One Hart rep I talked to said "just between you and me I think this Voter Verified Paper thing is a passing fad. Will make the voters feel better but it is NOT necessary."

Yeah, riiiigght.... :eyes:

And we have a statue by that name. Of course, some people think it's in Joyzy!

First, impeach bush! NOW!
Second, here's a Feb '05 note from Kip Humphrey of HERH and 51CapitolMarch fame regarding this brand. I was interested because Hamilton County Ohio listed this as their preferred machine before the "paper trail" issue arose. Ham Cty now prefers some opscan system.

Kip relates his experience below.** This occurs when
a straight-party ticket can be voted...allowed in TX, not here in OH. Whether Hart has other exploits programmed is unknown. However, when a top-of-the-ticket race records a win for party A, and down-ticket races show strong wins for party B, a suspicion exists that the top race was stolen. This occured here where
a Dem OH Supreme Court judge pulled much stronger than Kerry. Although judges' races are not party-ID'd here, this is a strange anomaly.

** " I can describe to you the exploit employed on the Hart Intercivic eSlate during the 2004 election (the machine my family and I voted on here in Houston last November). The exploit involved the "Vote Democratic Slate" option. When selected, no vote registered for John Kerry. The algorithm incorporated a variable that alternately assigned the presidential vote either to no one, to George Bush, or to David Cobb (the green party candidate) using a mathematical formula designed to
keep undervotes below 10%. To complete the exploit, when the ballot opened for review, it opened at the very bottom. In order to discover the incorrect presidential vote assignment, voters had to scroll all the way up to the top of the ballot (here in Texas about 5 pages). The scroll wheel was calibrated such that it took about 23 full rotations to scroll back to the top. Additionally, if the voter corrected the vote for Kerry, the correction did not 'stick' the first time requiring the voter to correct it twice, scrolling through the entire ballot 3 times to ensure a vote for Kerry registered.

My problem with all this is: someone programmed Hart equipment to function this way. This fact should eliminate all Hart voting equipment from any serious consideration. By the way, this exploit was reported to VerifiedVoting.org's EIRS (election incident reporting system) in EIGHT states - all reports in counties running Hart Intercivic eSlates.

Now, in a more general sense, any electronic-based voting system that does not employ processing safeguards and a paper trail are likely to be manipulated based on the record so far. I have worked up a solution for the Oregon voting system I will be happy to forward to you tomorrow. This solution incorporates process controls that will work to keep most
voting systems safe, secure, accurate, and reliable."