-The version of DRE software and OS software (most likely Windows CE or Embedded Windows XP) on the machines.
-Where the DRE machine stores copies of the ballots and totals; likely places include a hard drive, a PCMCIA device ("PC card"), and nonvolitile RAM (NVRAM). Also needed is the data storage format; MS-Access, text files, or a custom binary format.
-The phone number of the central tallying place.
-Any encryption methods used to transmit the data. A copy of any encryption keys would be even better. It is likely that the keys are pre-encoded on the per-precinct tallying devices before leaving the factory, otherwise the central tabulation machine would be unable to verify the correct identity of any reporting machines. On the other hand, if the county tabulator has no such list, all the better for our attacker.
See Step 2 here-
http://www.cs.duke.edu/~justin/voting/PrezNader.html