New Blackwell Directive Raises Concern

Can you say Gov Blackwell?-AUGH!!!!!!

http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/electionsvoter/directives/2006/Dir2006-36.pdf
>
>J. KENNETH BLACKWELL
>Ohio Secretary of State
>180 E. Broad Street, 16th Floor, Columbus OH 43215
>614.466.2655 / Toll Free: 877.767.6446 / Fax: 614.644.0649
>e-mail: blackwell@sos.state.oh.us
>www.sos.state.oh.us
>Directive 2006-36
>February 22, 2006
>ALL COUNTY BOARDS OF ELECTIONS IMPLEMENTING DIEBOLD DRE’S
>TO: Members, Directors & Deputy Directors
>Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machine Key Card Management
>Diebold’s DRE’s use special security encryption, or keys, on voting system access cards to
>perform management and voter functions. These cards include supervisor, administration and
>voter access cards. To ensure that the highest level of security for the election process is
>achieved, keys will be changed prior to the primary election. The Office of the Secretary of
>State (SOS) of Ohio will be responsible for managing and completing the change process.
>Management of security keys requires the use of special equipment that allows a user who has
>appropriate security access to change the key(s) on security, supervisor and administration cards.
>By changing the keys on these cards, passwords used to prevent unauthorized access into a DRE
>are changed.
>Keys on voter access cards are changed by Boards of Elections through use of the encoders.
>PROCESS
>To accomplish this task:
>ï All security, supervisor and administration cards (except those used for training
>purposes) must be sent to SOS by February 28, 2006. It is imperative that keys
>for all cards within a county be kept in sync (contain the same keys and thereby
>passwords for DRE’s). Failure to do so will result in confusion and unusable
>cards at polling locations.
>ï Cards should be bundled in groups of 20 for ease of counting.
>ï Each county must complete and submit an inventory control sheet (Exhibit A)
>with the cards.
>ï SOS staff will complete updates/changes to keys and cards will be returned to the
>county of origin on or before the write-in candidate filing deadline in order to
>allow counties time to use cards for logic and accuracy testing as well as meet
>training needs.
>ï New passwords will be communicated separately via email to the SOS email
>account provided to your county on your SOS provided workstation.
>DRE’s will be updated with the new keys/passwords when the newly updated
>administration cards are used during logic and accuracy testing.
>Directive 2006-36 Key Card Management Page 2 of 3
>IMPORTANT POINTS TO REMEMBER
>Training and Demonstration Voting Systems
>Some DRE’s may be used for training and demonstration purposes. This equipment should be
>clearly labeled and kept separate from DRE’s used for elections. Before training and
>demonstration units can be utilized for an actual election, they must undergo logic and accuracy
>testing.
>Cards for Training and Demonstration Equipment
>Supervisor and administration cards that are used for training staff, poll workers and the general
>public should be clearly labeled and kept separate from those used for elections. Keys on these
>cards should not be changed from the default setting of 111111 for ease of training.
>Sincerely,
>J. Kenneth Blackwell

I actually emailed Petro concerning the aweful things Blackwell has accused him of and told him to go to www.freepress.org and read up on how Blackwell steals elections and how Blackwell IS a criminal and should be in prison. Nothing like a catfight between two Repubs!

who contested the election. That said : LET THEM FIGHT IT OUT! Petro doesn't have a chance in heaven in the primary unless he confronts the corrupt election system at the hands of Blackwell.

And he's not in jail why?

As a computer professional, and one who has been intimately involved in the e-voting issue (original webmaster of VerifiedVoting.org), I don't see a problem with this message. Looks like a normal security procedure to me.

From what we have seen, I have no reason to believe that Blackwell or anyone else that will hack the vote with these machines needs to mess with the cards mentioned in this memo.

Do you see something I'm missing?

the larger question......

The same thing happens every day in other states using these machines. Is that why no one is concerned that a DEM SoS "programs" these cards in Georgia?

Isn't this being a bit hypocritical?

By making this about Blackwell and not about the machines and their ease of manipulation you sacrifice all crediblity!

From my perspective, if you DON'T include Blackwell in any discussion of election fraud in Ohio, you lose all credibility with me.

If John Kerry were Ohio SoS, you wouldn't be the least bit concerned about this process..........

Things that make you go hmmmmmmm......

Blackwell is a lousy SoS, a lousy gubenatorial candidate, a very bad idea for Ohio.

But his candidacy has NOTHING to do with electronic voting. And unless you separate the two, you have no credibility.

I had to check in and see what was happening...

Now, who would have thunk it? :grr:

CAPITAL NOTES
Thursday, March 02, 2006


State tries to allay fears on voting - machine security

Some county elections officials are raising security concerns about a state requirement regarding new electronic touchscreen voting devices from Diebold. The state says those worries are unfounded.

At issue are the access cards needed to activate the Diebold machines that will be used in 47 of Ohio’s 88 counties starting with the May primary.

Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell last week issued a directive to the counties requiring them to send their access cards to his office before the primary so the security codes can be changed. The cards then would be returned to the counties.

Some officials are concerned about shipping costs and whether there could be a security risk when the cards are out of elections officials’ control during transit.

<snip>

http://www.dispatch.com/news/news.php?story=dispatch/2006/03/02/20060302-E6-01.html

:mad:

Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Doug Jones has a lot of credibility as a computer scientist election authority. I corrwsponded with him in Dec. 04 about punch cards and whether they can be culled and replaced in a situation like what happened in Warren County and he wrote:

On Dec 7, 2004, at 5:25 PM, Susan wrote:

> Warren County Ohio decides on Oct. 25 to bar the press
> from watching the tallying of votes and decides to use
> a Homeland Security threat as an excuse to bar the
> press. They do not publicize this and the press
> including an AP reporter show up on Nov. 2 but are
> not allowed entry.

At this point, you're up a creek without a paddle. Any time
that observers are barred from the tally room, so that only
insiders have access to the evidence, you've got a setup where
anything can happen.

> If some person or persons decided to switch Kerry
> votes into the Bush column by tampering with Triad
> Governmental Systems vote counting software

They could tamper with the ballots themselves at this point!
The entire situation is entirely unacceptable.

Doug Jones
jones@cs.uiowa.edu

I say trust your gut. Firmware can be used to run malicous programs.

Doug Jones web site
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/

FYI Doug Jones is the professor who gave Arnebeck an affidavit regarding Hocking County & Triad.

:yourock:

Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a
memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have
the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election
results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the the results are incorrect
cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots.

"Memory cards" are the storage devices which contain the ballots and votes.

The cards discussed here are the access cards which control access to the voting machines - the supervisor, administrator and voter access cards.

New passwords will be communicated separately via email to the SOS email
>account provided to your county on your SOS provided workstation.