Can an SoS legally disseminate information known to be false?

The recent Diebold certification decision comes after the touch screen and optical scan systems have met the most rigorous federal and state standards.

In addition, both the independent panel of experts from the University of California and the federally-approved Independent Testing Authorities have indicated that the Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan and the AccuVote TSX systems can safely be used for our elections, with the additional security and use procedures we have in place in California.

The independent panel of experts from the University of California that you go on to cite have stated, unambiguously, that the machines DO NOT meet federal standards.

From their report:

"Interpreted code is contrary to standards: Interpreted code in general is prohibited by the 2002 FEC Voluntary Voting System Standards, and also by the successor standard, the EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines due to take effect in two years. In order for the Diebold software architecture to be in compliance, it would appear that either the AccuBasic language and interpreter have to be removed, or the standard will have to be changed."

Thank you for your e-mail regarding Diebold's OS and TSX equipment and its certification with conditions for the 2006 elections.

Secretary McPherson shares your concern that we have only the most secure, reliable voting systems, and he is committed to ensuring the accuracy and integrity of every vote cast. That is why he has established the most stringent requirements for voting systems in the nation.

The recent Diebold certification decision comes after the touch screen and optical scan systems have met the most rigorous federal and state standards. In addition, both the independent panel of experts from the University of California and the federally-approved Independent Testing Authorities have indicated that the Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan and the AccuVote TSX systems can safely be used for our elections, with the additional security and use procedures we have in place in California. These stringent use procedures and security measures include requirements that the elections official reset the encryption key prior to programming any units; that each memory card have a permanent serial number assigned to it and be programmed in a secured facility under the supervision of the registrar of voters/registrar of voter’s staff; and that each unit be sealed with a serialized, tamper-evident seal. These security measures must be in place before the June 2006 election. For a more complete list of these enhanced security and use requirements, please visit our website at <http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_vs.htm>

Secretary McPherson has established clearly articulated expectations and standards required of voting systems and their vendors so that all who wish to be considered for use in California now know, for the first time, exactly what will be expected of them.

The Secretary remains committed to ensuring the reliability and accuracy of every vote, and that is precisely why he has set such high performance criteria to ensure that the integrity of the vote has been protected. With these qualifications for our voting systems, we believe voters can have confidence in the electoral process and the equipment used to capture their votes.

Thank you again for your feedback and for taking the time to share your thoughts.

Sincerely,
Elections Web Mail Representative

Dear Bruce,

Thanks for your response to my email.

I am still troubled by a particular aspect of Diebold's status. Your email to me states, "The recent Diebold certification decision comes after the touch screen and optical scan systems have met the most rigorous federal and state standards."

The independent panel of experts from the University of California that you go on to cite have stated, unambiguously, that the machines DO NOT meet federal standards.

From their report:

"Interpreted code is contrary to standards: Interpreted code in general is prohibited by the 2002 FEC Voluntary Voting System Standards, and also by the successor standard, the EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines due to take effect in two years. In order for the Diebold software architecture to be in compliance, it would appear that either the AccuBasic language and interpreter have to be removed, or the standard will have to be changed."

It seems you should have known that, and that you should not have claimed otherwise in your email.

xx