Electronic Vote Counting: Where Did We Go Wrong?
By Howard Stanislevic, VoteTrustUSA E-Voter Education Project
November 21, 2006
Recent discussions with other researchers in the election auditing field led me to a paper published over 30 years ago that shows just how "far" we've come in ensuring the integrity of our elections.
In 1975 while working for the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), Roy G. Saltman, authored a paper entitled, "Effective Use of Computing Technology in Vote-Tallying." In Appendix B of that seminal work, "Mathematical Considerations and Implications in the Selection of Recount Quantities", Saltman described a methodology for determining sample sizes to be used in independent audits of electronic vote counting systems which include optical scanners, punch card readers and touchscreen or pushbutton direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines with voter-verified paper audit trails.
Among other things, Saltman reported that regulations covering recounts in different states varied, as they do today. Some typical recount regulations were:
(1) a manual recount could be demanded by any candidate willing to pay for it;
(2) a full manual recount was automatic if the candidates' totals differed by a very small percentage of the vote and;
(3) a fixed percentage of precincts were manually recounted regardless of the apparent vote separation (margin) between the candidates.
He also pointed out that the then current law in the state of California which called for a fixed audit percentage of only 1% of the state's precincts was inadequate, stating that, "recount percentages should increase as the opposing vote totals approach equality." In other words, narrower reported margins of victory require larger audits. Yet the 1% law is still on the books today and until recently, did not even include absentee ballots!
more at:
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2067&Itemid=26