HR 811 - Have You Read it? Or is someone reading it for you?

Apparently, many folks haven't bothered to read the bill, so I am posting it here.
PLEASE read it.

If you see flaws, and can offer specific replacement language, please post it.
We can try to get this to Millender McDonald or sympathetic congressmen, and also get
it to Senator Diane Feinstein, who is writing the senate bil:

H.R.811
Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 (Introduced in House)

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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007'.

SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT.

(a) Ballot Verification and Audit Capacity-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:

`(2) BALLOT VERIFICATION AND AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(A) IN GENERAL-

`(i) The voting system shall require the use of or produce an individual voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted. For purposes of this clause, examples of such a ballot include a paper ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being counted by hand or read by an optical scanner or other similar device, a paper ballot prepared by the voter to be mailed to an election official (whether from a domestic or overseas location), a paper ballot created through the use of a ballot marking device or system, or a paper ballot produced by a touch screen or other electronic voting machine, so long as in each case the voter is permitted to verify the ballot in a paper form in accordance with this subparagraph.

`(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to correct any error made by the system in the voter-verified paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in accordance with subparagraph (B)(i).

`(iii) The voting system shall not preserve the voter-verifiable paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible, at any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with the record of the voter's vote.

`(B) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(i) The permanent voter-verified paper ballot produced in accordance with subparagraph (A) shall be preserved--

`(I) in the case of votes cast at the polling place on the date of the election, within the polling place in the manner or method in which all other paper ballots are preserved within such polling place;

`(II) in the case of votes cast at the polling place prior to the date of the election or cast by mail, in a manner which is consistent with the manner employed by the jurisdiction for preserving such ballots in general; or

`(III) in the absence of either such manner or method, in a manner which is consistent with the manner employed by the jurisdiction for preserving paper ballots in general.

`(ii) Each paper ballot produced pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be suitable for a manual audit equivalent to that of a paper ballot voting system.

`(iii) In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual permanent paper ballots produced pursuant to subparagraph (A), and subject to subparagraph (D), the individual permanent paper ballots shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast and shall be used as the official ballots for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used.

`(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR VOTES CAST BY ABSENT MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS- In the case of votes cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the ballots cast by such voters shall serve as the permanent paper ballot under subparagraph (A) in accordance with protocols established by the Commission, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense after notice and opportunity for public comment, which preserve the privacy of the voter and are consistent with the requirements of such Act and this Act, except that to the extent that such protocols permit the use of electronic mail in the delivery or submission of such ballots, paragraph (11) shall not apply with respect to the delivery or submission of the ballots.

`(D) SPECIAL RULE FOR TREATMENT OF DISPUTES WHEN PAPER BALLOTS HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO BE COMPROMISED- In the event of any inconsistency between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual permanent paper ballots produced pursuant to subparagraph (A), any person seeking to show that the electronic vote tally should be given preference in determining the official count for the election shall be required to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the paper ballots have been compromised (by damage or mischief or otherwise) and that a sufficient number of the ballots have been so compromised that the result of the election would be changed. For purposes of the previous sentence, the paper ballots associated with each voting machine shall be considered on a voting-machine-by-voting-machine basis, and only the sets of paper ballots deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered in the calculation of whether or not the election would be changed due to the compromised paper ballots.'.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT CLARIFYING APPLICABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE ACCESSIBILITY- Section 301(a)(4) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(4)) is amended by inserting `(including the paper ballots required to be produced under paragraph (2) and the notice required under paragraph (8))' after `voting system'.

(3) OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS- Section 301(a)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(1)) is amended--

(A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking `counted' and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)';

(B) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking `counted' and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)';

(C) in subparagraph (A)(iii), as amended by paragraph (2), by striking `counted' each place it appears and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)'; and

(D) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking `counted' and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)'.

(b) Accessibility and Ballot Verification for Individuals With Disabilities-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 301(a)(3)(B) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows:

`(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least one voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place; and

`(ii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that--

`(I) allows the voter to privately and independently verify the content of the permanent paper ballot through the conversion of the printed content into accessible media, and

`(II) ensures that the entire process of ballot verification and vote casting is equipped for individuals with disabilities.'.

(2) SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT OF STUDY, TESTING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS-

(A) STUDY AND REPORTING- Subtitle C of title II of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15381 et seq.) is amended--

(i) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; and

(ii) by inserting after section 246 the following new section:

`SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS.

`(a) Study and Report- The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall study, test, and develop best practices to enhance the accessibility of ballot verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which the mechanisms are used. In carrying out this section, the Director shall specifically investigate existing and potential methods or devices that will assist such individuals and voters in creating voter-verified paper ballots and in reading or transmitting the information printed or marked on such ballots back to such individuals and voters.

`(b) Deadline- The Director shall complete the requirements of subsection (a) not later than January 1, 2010.

`(c) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $1,000,000, to remain available until expended.'.

(B) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of contents of such Act is amended--

(i) by redesignating the item relating to section 247 as relating to section 248; and

(ii) by inserting after the item relating to section 246 the following new item:

`Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible voter verification mechanisms.'.

(3) CLARIFICATION OF ACCESSIBILITY STANDARDS UNDER VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDANCE- In adopting any voluntary guidance under subtitle B of title III of the Help America Vote Act with respect to the accessibility of the ballot verification requirements for individuals with disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission shall include and apply the same accessibility standards applicable under the voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting systems under such subtitle.

(c) Additional Voting System Requirements-

(1) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED- Section 301(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

`(7) INSTRUCTION OF ELECTION OFFICIALS- Each State shall ensure that all election officials are instructed on the right of any individual who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, other disability, or inability to read or write to be given assistance by a person chosen by that individual under section 208 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

`(8) INSTRUCTION REMINDING VOTERS OF IMPORTANCE OF VERIFYING PAPER BALLOT-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The appropriate election official at each polling place shall cause to be placed in a prominent location in the polling place a notice containing the following statement, in boldface type, large font, and using only upper-case letters: `THE PAPER BALLOT REPRESENTING YOUR VOTE SHALL SERVE AS THE VOTE OF RECORD IN ALL RECOUNTS AND AUDITS. DO NOT LEAVE THE VOTING BOOTH UNTIL YOU HAVE CONFIRMED THAT IT ACCURATELY RECORDS YOUR VOTE'.

`(B) SYSTEMS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES- All voting systems equipped for individuals with disabilities shall transmit by accessible media the statement referred to in subparagraph (A), as well as an explanation of the verification process described in paragraph (3)(B)(ii).

`(9) PROHIBITION OF USE OF UNDISCLOSED SOFTWARE IN VOTING SYSTEMS- No voting system used in an election for Federal office shall at any time contain or use any software not certified by the State for use in the election or any software undisclosed to the State in the certification process. The appropriate election official shall disclose, in electronic form, the source code, object code, and executable representation of the voting system software and firmware to the Commission, including ballot programming files, and the Commission shall make that source code, object code, executable representation, and ballot programming files available for inspection promptly upon request to any person.

`(10) PROHIBITION OF USE OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES IN VOTING SYSTEMS- No voting system shall contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, remote, wide area, or concealed communication device at all.

`(11) PROHIBITING CONNECTION OF SYSTEM OR TRANSMISSION OF SYSTEM INFORMATION OVER THE INTERNET- No component of any voting device upon which votes are cast shall be connected to the Internet at any time.

`(12) SECURITY STANDARDS FOR VOTING SYSTEMS USED IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS-

`(A) IN GENERAL- No voting system may be used in an election for Federal office unless the manufacturer of such system and the election officials using such system meet the applicable requirements described in subparagraph (B).

`(B) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED- The requirements described in this subparagraph are as follows:

`(i) The manufacturer and the election officials shall document the secure chain of custody for the handling of all software, hardware, vote storage media, and ballots used in connection with voting systems, and shall make the information available upon request to the Commission.

`(ii) The manufacturer of the software used in the operation of the system shall provide the appropriate election official with updated information regarding the identification of each individual who participated in the writing of the software, including specific information regarding whether the individual has ever been convicted of a crime involving election, accounting, or computer security fraud.

`(iii) The manufacturer shall provide the appropriate election official with the information necessary for the official to provide information to the Commission under paragraph (9).

`(iv) After the appropriate election official has certified the source code, object code, and executable representation of the voting system software for use in an election, the manufacturer may not--

`(I) alter such codes and representation; or

`(II) insert or use in the voting system any software not certified by the State for use in the election.

`(v) The appropriate election official shall ensure that all voting machines and related supplies to be used in the election shall remain secured within storage facilities arranged for by the election official, and shall not be removed from such facilities until such time as they are to be delivered to the relevant polling place and secured at the polling place until used in the election.

`(vi) The manufacturer shall meet standards established by the Commission to prevent the existence or appearance of any conflict of interest with respect to candidates for public office and political parties, including standards to ensure that the manufacturer's officers and directors do not hold positions of authority in any political party or in any partisan political campaign, and shall certify to the Commission not later than January 31 of each even-numbered year that it meets the standards established under this clause.

`(vii) At the request of the Commission, the appropriate election official shall submit information to the Commission regarding the State's compliance with this subparagraph.

`(13) DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR BALLOTS-

`(A) DURABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PAPER BALLOTS- All voter-verified paper ballots required to be used under this Act (including the emergency paper ballots used under paragraph (14)) shall be marked, printed, or recorded on durable paper of archival quality capable of withstanding multiple counts and recounts without compromising the fundamental integrity of the ballots, and capable of retaining the information marked, printed, or recorded on them for the full duration of the retention and preservation period called for by title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (42 U.S.C. 1974 et seq.) or under applicable State law, whichever is longer.

`(B) READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR MACHINE-MARKED OR PRINTED PAPER BALLOTS- All voter-verified paper ballots marked or printed through the use of a marking or printing device shall be clearly readable by the naked eye and by a scanner or other device equipped for voters with disabilities.

`(14) PROHIBITING TURNING INDIVIDUALS AWAY FROM POLLING PLACES BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS WITH OR SHORTAGES OF EQUIPMENT, BALLOTS, OR SUPPLIES-

`(A) ENSURING ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES- Each State shall ensure that the voting systems it uses to conduct elections for Federal office are designed in a manner that ensures that no voter will be unable to cast a ballot at a polling place due to a shortage or failure of voting equipment, ballots, or necessary supplies.

`(B) USE OF EMERGENCY PAPER BALLOTS IN CASE OF SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE- In the event of the failure of voting equipment or other circumstance at a polling place that causes a delay, any individual who is waiting at the polling place to cast a ballot in an election for Federal office and who would be delayed due to such failure or other circumstance shall be advised immediately of the individual's right to use an emergency paper ballot, and upon request shall be provided with an emergency paper ballot for the election and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot. Any emergency paper ballot which is cast by an individual under this subparagraph shall be counted and otherwise treated as a regular ballot and not as a provisional ballot, unless the individual casting the ballot would have otherwise been required to cast a provisional ballot if the voting equipment at the polling place had not failed.'.

(2) REQUIRING LABORATORIES TO MEET STANDARDS PROHIBITING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AS CONDITION OF ACCREDITATION FOR TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEM HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE-

(A) IN GENERAL- Section 231(b) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15371(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

`(3) PROHIBITING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST; ENSURING AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS-

`(A) IN GENERAL- A laboratory may not be accredited by the Commission for purposes of this section unless--

`(i) the laboratory certifies that the only compensation it receives for the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of the manufacturer's voting system hardware and software is the payment made from the Testing Escrow Account under paragraph (4);

`(ii) the laboratory meets the standards applicable to the manufacturers of voting systems under section 301(a)(11)(B)(vi), together with such standards as the Commission shall establish (after notice and opportunity for public comment) to prevent the existence or appearance of any conflict of interest in the testing carried out by the laboratory under this section, including standards to ensure that the laboratory does not have a financial interest in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of voting system hardware and software, and is sufficiently independent from other persons with such an interest;

`(iii) the laboratory certifies that it will permit an expert designated by the Commission to observe any testing the laboratory carries out under this section; and

`(iv) the laboratory, upon completion of any testing carried out under this section, discloses the test protocols, results, and all communication between the laboratory and the manufacturer to the Commission.

`(B) AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS- Upon receipt of information under subparagraph (A), the Commission shall make the information available promptly to election officials and the public.

`(4) PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING TESTING; PAYMENT OF USER FEES FOR COMPENSATION OF ACCREDITED LABORATORIES-

`(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF ESCROW ACCOUNT- The Commission shall establish an escrow account (to be known as the `Testing Escrow Account') for making payments to accredited laboratories for the costs of the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software.

`(B) SCHEDULE OF FEES- In consultation with the accredited laboratories, the Commission shall establish and regularly update a schedule of fees for the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software, based on the reasonable costs expected to be incurred by the accredited laboratories in carrying out the testing for various types of hardware and software.

`(C) REQUESTS AND PAYMENTS BY MANUFACTURERS- A manufacturer of voting system hardware and software may not have the hardware or software tested by an accredited laboratory under this section unless--

`(i) the manufacturer submits a detailed request for the testing to the Commission; and

`(ii) the manufacturer pays to the Commission, for deposit into the Testing Escrow Account established under subparagraph (A), the applicable fee under the schedule established and in effect under subparagraph (B).

`(D) SELECTION OF LABORATORY- Upon receiving a request for testing and the payment from a manufacturer required under subparagraph (C), the Commission shall select at random, from all laboratories which are accredited under this section to carry out the specific testing requested by the manufacturer, an accredited laboratory to carry out the testing.

`(E) PAYMENTS TO LABORATORIES- Upon receiving a certification from a laboratory selected to carry out testing pursuant to subparagraph (D) that the testing is completed, along with a copy of the results of the test as required under paragraph (3)(A)(iii), the Commission shall make a payment to the laboratory from the Testing Escrow Account established under subparagraph (A) in an amount equal to the applicable fee paid by the manufacturer under subparagraph (C)(ii).

`(5) DISSEMINATION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ACCREDITED LABORATORIES-

`(A) INFORMATION ON TESTING- Upon completion of the testing of a voting system under this section, the Commission shall promptly disseminate to the public the identification of the laboratory which carried out the testing.

`(B) LABORATORIES WITH ACCREDITATION REVOKED OR SUSPENDED- If the Commission revokes, terminates, or suspends the accreditation of a laboratory under this section, the Commission shall promptly notify Congress, the chief State election official of each State, and the public.'.

(B) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS- Section 231 of such Act (42 U.S.C.

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/~c110gKjf7M:e3571:

with a point-by-point comparison to the previous version (HR 550).

Shall I post it for you when he has it ready?



ON EDIT: The source of my snark is my state rep - who was going to introduce a decent verified voting bill, but who now says we can't get the county clerks to adopt VVPB systems - so he is going FULL BORE for vote-by-mail. :puke:

Isn't that what laws do - make mandates? Mitch sure as h*ll operates from that assumption - or is mitch going to back down from his proposal to privatize DMVs because the local DMV heads won't go along with being privatized?

I am so very disappointed to hear this. Vote-by-mail - as in a statewide system of only voting by mail? No fraud possible there... :eyes:

There is no way that an unfunded mandate for new equipment will pass.

He is hopeful - as am I - that HR 811 (with a few changes) will pass and provide the $$ and tough standards necessary to force our backwards state to make progress.

We are one of only 15 states left nationwide that do not have voter-verified paper ballots statewide.

Hopefully our state won't be state 49 or so to join the voter-verified paper ballots world.

I have tons of stuff about Vote BY Mail that you can get your
activists to use to fight it if you want.

Go to www.ncvoter.net

about halfway down page in middle is a google search box -
type in "vote by mail"

"If you see flaws, and can offer specific replacement language, please post it."

I would SO like some sensible discussion of this. The loud gigantic font screaming was NOT the sort of discussion and analysis I was hoping for.

http://www.bluejersey.net/showDiary.do?diaryId=3976

And

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=467249&mesg_id=467249

Previous discussion and posting of Hr 811

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x467148

Contact info for Congresswoman Juanita Millender-McDonald who chairs the Committee on House Administration (CHA) looks like she is in control of any future rewrites of HR 811. And I have been told she is not anti-DRE.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x467290

On edit

Oh sorry, KNR.

I can't find anything on their website in any case...

:(

Other organizations which have come out publicly AGAINST this bill include:
Open Voting Consortium, VoterAction.org/ Demos, Bradblog, VotersUnite,VoteTrustUSA

I think that is *wrong*...

This is my post:


Additionally, krose, I was not aware that VoteTrust (0.00 / 0)
had come out against HR 811. Have they changed their position?

Impeach, Indict.

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by: FogerRox @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 21:11:09 PM EST

< Parent | Reply >

format often trips me up. :blush:

krose posted incorrect information and you corrected it...

:hi:

Someone said that John Gideon of VotersUnite and VTUSA had 'declined to support' HR811. To get from there to "VTUSA is against" HR811 is just a few small (and incorrect) steps.

But I can't even confirm John Gideon's position.

:evilgrin:

Not a peep about HR811 on VTUSA's site is hardly an endorsement.

I think they're :yoiks:

VTUSA's mission is to be a "national network serving state-based organizations," so it probably behooves them to spend some time consulting before staking out a position. (There could be some other reasons, as well.)

There were folks who knew months ago that they were going to oppose the new Holt bill, and they only had to wait to find out what specifically they were opposed to. It doesn't seem that anyone was similarly committed to support the new Holt bill no matter what (nor should there have been). Now things will get more interesting.

Yes, Open Voting Consortium is flatly against HR 811,
they want more time to get their voting machine developed.

I like OVC, but I am just saying what the reason is.

I believe the other organizations are not AGAINST HR 811
as a whole, or as a concept, but that they have problems with
parts of the bill, and if those problems are not resolved, then
they will be against the bill.

Its not accurate to say they are AGAINST the bill.

They want good legislation, and they could support hR 811
if the flaws are fixed.

What the HELL does "coming out against hr 811" mean,
that was interpreted wildly.

They want corrections or they don't support it.

they are working on the flaws that got in it.

Here's what I did today - I tried to look at HR 811 as if
it were our paper ballot law in NC, while it was in committee.

I tried to imagine things I DIDN'T WANT IN IT, AND LOOK FOR THEM.

Did alot of "control f" and typing in key words like Precincts or audits.

I have found one flaw that can be fixed fairly easily.

I have emailed the problematical section,
copied the 2 sections of NC law that it would not mix well with,
and emailed it to VTUSA directors.

I explained the problem, and since it was a technical issue,
it should be readily fixable.

We went through 30 revisions of NC law before we got it passed, and
it took 8 months after introduction, and it was in a study committee for
3 months (Kelvin Mace was on that committee) getting written.

to come to the floor for a vote this month, or next. Right?

Roger,

If folks will cite the section of HR 811 by number and particular
language that is messed up,

and

suggest proper language

and also cite their state's language or rules that it affects

we can put it all together.

We have to make it easy to read.

**How do you make text "red" on DU messages?

He wrote:

Well, here is what the legislation actually says:

As I understand the rules of English, the last part of that (the part Holt quoted) is subordinate to the first part ("In the event..."). I don't know whether the wordsmithers were burning the midnight oil and lost track of what was modifying what, but at best the language is pretty darn unclear.

It's excellent to learn that Holt is committed to manual audits, if that is what he is saying here, but I still need to see statutory language that makes that unambiguous. This may be my single biggest concern about the bill.

Or HR 550.

It's a sad day in America when the authors/sponsors don't even read their own bills!

Go to <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.00811:>

There are 183 Co-Sponsors already, probably none of whom have read the damn thing.

No wonder no one reads the darn thing. Its work!

H.R.811
Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 (Introduced in House)

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SEC. 4. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION.

(a) In General- Section 210 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15330) is amended by striking `each of the fiscal years 2003 through 2005' and inserting `each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 2003'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY MANUAL AUDITS BY HAND COUNT.

(a) Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards- Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new subtitle:

`Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards

`SEC. 321. ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTION AUDIT BOARDS.

`(a) Establishment- Not later than 60 days before the date of each election for Federal office held in the State, the chief auditor of each State shall appoint an Election Audit Board to administer, without advance notice to the precincts selected, random hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots required to be produced and preserved pursuant to section 301(a)(2) for each such election held in the State (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office held at the same time as such election).

`(b) Composition-

`(1) IN GENERAL- Each political party in the State with a candidate in any of the regularly scheduled elections for Federal office held in the State whose candidates in the most recent regularly scheduled general elections in the State received at least 5% of the aggregate number of all votes cast in such elections, together with any independent candidate who received at least 5% of the aggregate number of all votes cast in the most recent regularly scheduled general elections in the State, shall select a qualified individual for appointment to the Election Audit Board of the State.

`(2) UNAFFILIATED MEMBERS- In addition to the individuals serving on the Board pursuant to paragraph (1), the chief auditor of the State shall appoint qualified individuals who are not nominated by any political party or candidate and who are not employees or agents of any political party or candidate to serve on the Board. The number of individuals appointed pursuant to this paragraph shall be sufficient to ensure that the total number of individuals serving on the Board is an odd number not less than 7.

`(3) QUALIFICATIONS- An individual is qualified to be appointed to the Board if the individual has professional experience in carrying out audits on an impartial basis, and does not have any conflict of interest with the manufacturer or vendor of any voting system which was used in any of the elections that will be audited by the Board.

`(4) DIVERSITY IN APPOINTMENTS- In making appointments to the Board, the chief auditor of the State shall (to the greatest extent practicable) ensure that the members of the Board reflect the demographic composition of the voting age population of the State.

`(c) Special Rule For Runoff and Special Elections-

`(1) RUNOFF ELECTIONS- If a runoff election for Federal office is held in the State, the Election Audit Board which was appointed for the initial election which resulted in the runoff election shall serve as the Election Audit Board with respect to the runoff election.

`(2) SPECIAL ELECTIONS- If a special election for Federal office is held in the State (other than a special election held on the same date as the date of a regularly scheduled election for Federal office), the Election Audit Board which was appointed for the most recent regularly scheduled election for Federal office in the State shall serve as the Election Audit Board with respect to the special election.

`(d) Chief Auditor Defined- In this subsection, the `chief auditor' of a State is an official of the State government, who, as designated by the Attorney General of the State and certified by the Attorney General of the State to the Commission, is responsible for conducting annual audits of the operations of the government of the State under the laws or constitution of the State, except that in no case may an individual serve as the chief auditor of a State under this subsection if the individual is the chief State election official.

`SEC. 322. NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED UNDER AUDIT.

`(a) In General- Except as provided in subsection (b), the number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to a hand count administered by the Election Audit Board of a State under this subtitle with respect to an election shall be determined as follows:

`(1) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is less than 1 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in 10 percent of all precincts (or equivalent locations) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election for Federal office).

`(2) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is greater than or equal to 1 percent but less than 2 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in 5 percent of all precincts (or equivalent locations) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election for Federal office).

`(3) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is equal to or greater than 2 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in 3 percent of all precincts (or equivalent locations) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election for Federal office).

`(b) Use of Alternative Mechanism- Notwithstanding subsection (a), a State may adopt and apply an alternative mechanism to determine the number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to the hand counts required under this subtitle with respect to an election, so long as the National Institute of Standards and Technology determines that the alternative mechanism will be at least as effective in ensuring the accuracy of the election results and as transparent as the procedure under subsection (a).

`SEC. 323. PROCESS FOR ADMINISTERING AUDITS.

`(a) In General- The Election Audit Board of a State shall administer an audit under this section of the results of an election in accordance with the following procedures:

`(1) Within 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial vote count in each precinct in the State, the Board shall determine and then announce the precincts in the State in which it will administer the audits.

`(2) With respect to votes cast at the precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of the election (other than provisional ballots described in paragraph (3)), the Board shall administer the hand count of the votes on the paper voter-verified ballots required to be produced and preserved under section 301(a)(2)(A) and the comparison of the count of the votes on those ballots with the final unofficial count of such votes as announced by the State.

`(3) With respect to votes cast other than at the precinct on the date of the election (other than votes cast before the date of the election described in paragraph (2)) or votes cast by provisional ballot on the date of the election which are certified and counted by the State on or after the date of the election, including votes cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the Board shall administer the hand count of the applicable voter-verified ballots required to be produced and preserved under section 301(a)(2)(A) and section 301(a)(2)(B) and compare the count it administers with the count of such votes as announced by the State.

`(b) Special Rule in Case of Delay in Reporting Absentee Vote Count- In the case of a State in which, under State law, the final count of absentee and provisional votes is not announced until after the expiration of the 7-day period which begins on the date of the election, the Election Audit Board shall initiate the process described in subsection (a) for administering the audit not later than 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial vote count for the votes cast at the precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of the election, and shall initiate the administration of the audit of the absentee and provisional votes pursuant to subsection (a)(3) not later than 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial count of such votes.

`(c) Additional Audits if Cause Shown-

`(1) IN GENERAL- If the Election Audit Board finds that any of the hand counts administered under this section do not match the final unofficial tally of the results of an election, the Board shall administer hand counts under this section of such additional precincts (or equivalent jurisdictions) as the Board considers appropriate to resolve any concerns resulting from the audit and ensure the accuracy of the results.

`(2) ESTABLISHMENT AND PUBLICATION OF PROCEDURES GOVERNING ADDITIONAL AUDITS- Not later than January 1, 2008, each State shall establish and publish procedures for carrying out the additional audits under this subsection, including the means by which the State shall resolve any concerns resulting from the audit with finality and ensure the accuracy of the results.

`(d) Public Observation of Audits- Each audit conducted under this section shall be conducted in a manner that allows public observation of the entire process.

`SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS.

`(a) In General- Except as provided in subsection (c), the selection of the precincts in the State in which the Election Audit Board of the State shall administer the hand counts under this subtitle shall be made by the Board on an entirely random basis using a uniform distribution in which all precincts in a State have an equal chance of being selected, in accordance with such procedures as the Commission determines appropriate, except that--

`(1) at least one precinct shall be selected at random in each county; and

`(2) the Commission shall publish the procedures in the Federal Register prior to the selection of the precincts.

`(b) Public Selection- The random selection of precincts under subsection (a) shall be conducted in public, at a time and place announced in advance.

`(c) Mandatory Selection of Precincts Established Specifically For Absentee Ballots- If a State establishes a separate precinct for purposes of counting the absentee ballots cast in an election and treats all absentee ballots as having been cast in that precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots sortable by precinct, the State shall include that precinct among the precincts in the State in which the Election Audit Board shall administer the hand counts under this subtitle.

`SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS.

`(a) Submission to Commission- As soon as practicable after the completion of an audit under this subtitle, the Election Audit Board of a State shall submit to the Commission the results of the audit, and shall include in the submission a comparison of the results of the election in the precinct as determined by the Board under the audit and the final unofficial vote count in the precinct as announced by the State, as well as a list of any discrepancies discovered between the initial, subsequent, and final hand counts administered by the Board and such final unofficial vote count and any explanation for such discrepancies, broken down by the categories of votes described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 323(a).

`(b) Publication by Commission- Immediately after receiving the submission of the results of an audit from the Election Audit Board of a State under subsection (a), the Commission shall publicly announce and publish the information contained in the submission.

`(c) Delay in Certification of Results by State-

`(1) PROHIBITING CERTIFICATION UNTIL COMPLETION OF AUDITS- No State may certify the results of any election which is subject to an audit under this subtitle prior to the completion of the audit and the announcement and submission of the results of the audit to the Commission for publication of the information required under this section.

`(2) DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF AUDITS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS- In the case of an election for electors for President and Vice President which is subject to an audit under this subtitle, the State shall complete the audits and announce and submit the results to the Commission for publication of the information required under this section in time for the State to certify the results of the election and provide for the final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of such electors prior to the deadline described in section 6 of title 3, United States Code.

`SEC. 326. PAYMENTS TO STATES.

`(a) Payments For Costs of Conducting Audits- In accordance with the requirements and procedures of this section, the Commission shall make a payment to a State to cover the costs incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections that are the subject of the audits conducted under this subtitle.

`(b) Certification of Compliance and Anticipated Costs-

`(1) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED- In order to receive a payment under this section, a State shall submit to the Commission, in such form as the Commission may require, a statement containing--

`(A) a certification that the State will conduct the audits required under this subtitle in accordance with all of the requirements of this subtitle;

`(B) a notice of the reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections involved; and

`(C) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require.

`(2) AMOUNT OF PAYMENT- The amount of a payment made to a State under this section shall be equal to the reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections involved, as set forth in the statement submitted under paragraph (1) a notice submitted by the State to the Commission (in such form and containing such information as the Commission may require).

`(3) TIMING OF NOTICE- The State may not submit a notice under paragraph (1) until candidates have been selected to appear on the ballot for all of the elections for Federal office which will be the subject of the audits involved.

`(c) Timing of Payments- The Commission shall make the payment required under this section to a State not later than 30 days after receiving the notice submitted by the State under subsection (b).

`(d) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2008 and each succeeding fiscal year such sums as may be necessary for payments under this section.

`SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC RECOUNT UNDER STATE LAW.

`This subtitle does not apply to any election for which a recount is required automatically under State law because of the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election. Nothing in the previous sentence may be construed to waive the application of any other provision of this Act to any election (including the ballot verification and audit capacity requirements of section 301(a)(2)).

`SEC. 328. EFFECTIVE DATE.

`This subtitle shall apply with respect to elections for Federal office beginning with the regularly scheduled general elections held in November 2008.'.

(b) Availability of Enforcement Under Help America Vote Act of 2002- Section 401 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15511), as amended by section 3, is amended--

(1) in subsection (a), by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: `, or the requirements of subtitle C of title III.';

(2) in subsection (b)(1), by striking `section 303' and inserting `section 303, or subtitle C of title III,'; and

(3) in subsection (c)--

(A) by striking `subtitle A' and inserting `subtitles A or C', and

(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: `, or the requirements of subtitle C of title III.'.

(c) Clerical Amendment- The table of contents of such Act is amended by adding at the end of the item relating to title III the following:

`Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards

`Sec. 321. Establishment of Election Audit Boards.

`Sec. 322. Number of ballots counted under audit.

`Sec. 323. Process for administering audits.

`Sec. 324. Selection of precincts.

`Sec. 325. Publication of results.

`Sec. 326. Payments to States.

`Sec. 327. Exception for elections subject to automatic recount within 24 hours under State law.

`Sec. 328. Effective date.'.

SEC. 6. REPEAL OF EXEMPTION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION FROM CERTAIN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) In General- Section 205 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15325) is amended by striking subsection (e).

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to contracts entered into by the Election Assistance Commission on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Except as otherwise provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to elections for Federal office occurring during 2008 and each succeeding year.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This seems really, really weak. If action resulting from a failed audit depends on the Board, then there is no audit of the Board itself. It could simply declare itself satisfied with no further recount, couldn't it?

Ideally, I'd like to see a mandatory full hand recount of any race found to be miscounted in any audited precinct. But at the very least, a there should be a mandatory recount of a new sample of a size adequate to determine with a high degree of confidence that the error rate was not sufficient to overturn the result.

I'd like to see a mandatory full hand recount of any race found to be miscounted in any audited precinct.

Absolutely.

But at the very least, a there should be a mandatory recount of a new sample of a size adequate to determine with a high degree of confidence that the error rate was not sufficient to overturn the result.

Negative. How many new samples are we to take? How long is this process going go on for? If the Hand count Audit doesn't match, you hand count the entire race. End of Story. I would offer that whatever Audit/recount/count process is mandated, it needs to be completed in a reasonable amount of time, preferably within 24 hours of election day, 36 hrs at most.

also re the time. I do think speed is essential, because of the chain of custody issue. Actually, I'd like to see some language about chain of custody in the bill (I might have missed it though)

The point is, what do you do if the count DOES match, but the sample isn't big enough to find the fraud?

Answer, you certify an incorrect outcome. The wrong candidate gets elected. And there's no other trigger for a recount anywhere in this bill, even with a margin of 0 Votes!

Can you say "Florida 2000?"

The experts were not listened to about audits or even about basic security. This is why there is no ban on Internet connections to GEMS servers and the like.

The bill was "Rushed" and no one knows why. And like the Bushies, they will NEVER, EVER admit that they made a MISTAKE.

The issues are complex and subtle. There are NO hand recounts required except under State laws or if there is a discrepancy found in an audit. And of course the audits themselves may be too small for such a discrepancy to be found. The discrepancy is not even defined as you say.

There is no ban on Internet connections to voting systems, except the machines on which votes are actually cast, which is not the larger threat.

There are problems with the Accessibility language which requires printed content to be "converted." What does this mean for low-tech solutions such as VotePad, or even the Automark which only reads back op scan bubbles? Will they be banned in favor of DREs or text scanners?

I can not overemphasize how important it is to contact members of the House Admin Committee and Dianne Feinstein's office in the Senate and tell them to amend this bill in the House and improve it the Senate. It has almost 200 co-sponsors already who have probably not even read it. There will be more as the lobbying is quietly continuing.

Section 323 says "do not match", SO if the Audit and the official count "do not match", something is supposed to happen. THe trigger is "do not match", but the event the trigger is supposed to create is so friggin vague, I don't know what to say about it.

I think Michelle Mulder wrote the "do not match" bit. I know (we talked Aug '05) that she was aware of the need for an explicit trigger event, & " do not match" is as good sa it gets. But the crap about the local "Board" gets to decide what happens, is just bullshit.

AS far as no ban on net connection for tabulators.... 811 does "suggest" the precinct level needs to compare their numbers to the state numbers. ANd again no real mention of what should happen if they "do not match".

There is one thing about HR 811 that I am certain about, it looks like 2 different people wrote it. Having meet Congressman Holt's legal council, Michelle Mulder, I think she wrote the parts that come across as well crafted, while someone else. maybe an aid to Pelosi.... wrote the vague parts. I have received emails from others that get the same sense I do.

For instance, section 322 is fairly solid, thats the guts of he "Holt Audit". Whether you agree section 322 gives us what we need or not, it is well written compared to.... lets say section 327, which Paul has so eloquently vivisected.

But also not enough cooks.

Advice was seldom solicited and drafts of the bill were not widely shared.

Although there was participation from activists, it was a very small number compared to previous bills. Not enough to look at all the angles. And the final draft was only released just before the bill was introduced making it impossible to fix anything.

So now we have to have amendments, mark-ups, Senate clones, etc.

That's all part of the process but we could have started it with something a lot better than we did.

And please stop calling Election Management Servers "tabulators." That's not what this is about. It's about corruption of election definitions BEFORE an election via the Internet. A precinct canvass will NOT find this. Only a real audit can, and that doesn't even include denial of service attacks.

:D

<http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x466243>

It's very important to read the bill in this context.

Thanks for posing it!

It's also commonly known as HAVA Section 301.

If we start with things like that, then it also makes sense that in order to interpret what statutory language means, one should have a law degree. I don't know if WYVBC has one or not.

Thanks for promoting discussion, but no thanks for in effect silencing people when they haven't read the WHOLE bill.

THere are strong reasons why just knowing that it is a paper trail/audit bill is QUITE enough to come to a firm conclusion as to its merits, if one has investigated the dynamics of papertrail/audit schemes before -- making it clear that reading the entire thing is not a condition precedent to an informed opinion.

Others, upon merely hearing "it's still a paper trail bill" have heard all they need to hear. On the other hand, People who do or might support audits will need to read all the details of the bill and evaluate them to see if if fits the bill.

:eyes:

Encouraging people to get informed is not silencing them.

We have enough trouble with folks that can't read english that I ain't worried anyone lacking a law degree.

our bill was changed 30 times while in committee.

Some of us met in person (if at the state capitol)
or via email to discuss changes we READ in the revisions.

Had we NOT READ it, then our state would have allowed
voting machines that print internally, and not
paper ballots or "trails"(not that we wanted trails).

But then, if no one reads the bill, they can just
let someone else tell them what to think about it.

REading HAVA, for example, you'd swear that paper balloting systems of various sorts were grandfathered in. Reading HAVA along with the leading elections case in the country, Bush v Gore, (plus some facts in Ohio) and you'd come to the conclusion like the 6th circuit did in Stewart v Blackwell that DREs are constitutional and punchcards and central count optical scans are not constitutional.

If a lawyer, reading HAVA, predicted that, you'd certainly want to tell the guy that he can't read English!

Also not sure that HAVA had anything to do with Stewart v. Blackwell. Wasn't that an equal protection case?

Why would anyone recommend that election activists make "informed" opinions without being informed?

Strange.

is, that I had the impression HAVA was primarily to improve accessibility and improve independence for people with disabilities to cast a vote. I never understood HAVA to require that every voter must use one and the same system, albeit that punch card and lever systems were to be phased out. And I mean systems that are for people with disabilities and people with no disabilities.
As a result, subsequently, HAVA played on the convenience level of the election officals, who understandably jumped on, and installed the machines for all to use.

Would it not therefore, simply be improved by inserting language that any voter has a right to request a paper ballot to be manually filled out, which must be provided? This, in effect gives power back to the voter, allowing the voter to bypass whatever system is used.

Isn't it also, that because HAVA leaves the definition of a ballot to the individual states, while mandating other elements of election systems, it provided an invitation to this mess.

on edit: to add (current)

§ 15481. Voting systems standards

(6) Uniform definition of what constitutes a vote
Each State shall adopt uniform and nondiscriminatory standards that define what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for each category of voting system used in the State.

(b) Voting system defined
In this section, the term “voting system” means—
(1) the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used—

(A) to define ballots;
(B) to cast and count votes;
(C) to report or display election results; and
(D) to maintain and produce any audit trail information; and
(2) the practices and associated documentation used—
(A) to identify system components and versions of such components;
(B) to test the system during its development and maintenance;
(C) to maintain records of system errors and defects;
(D) to determine specific system changes to be made to a system after the initial qualification of the system; and
(E) to make available any materials to the voter (such as notices, instructions, forms, or paper ballots).

"I had the impression HAVA was primarily to improve accessibility and improve independence for people with disabilities to cast a vote."

YOu are right, that was suposed to be the big selling point. But... 2 names.

...that the voter must experience a delay before getting such a ballot, and also, there is no requirement to remove a faulty DRE from service.

If you want those kind of amendments, you have to ask for them now.

prior to the election, which was made to fizzle away by the GOP?

I will check on that language...perhaps it can be recycled...to the House as an amendment as you say.