E-Voting Machines Short Circuit Election Transparency, But the Danger is Even Worse Than You May Realize
Guest Blogged by Michael Dean
The software most likely to steal elections is the BALLOT DEFINITION SOFTWARE loaded onto paper-based optical-scan and DRE (usually, touch-screen) voting machines in county elections offices across the U.S. just before the machines are sealed with security tape and transported to election polling locations.
And yet, the frightening reality is that there is little or no oversight of that software itself, nor of the people --- usually sub-contractors, who could be anyone from a non-U.S. citizen, to a criminal, to a political party operative --- who program that ballot definition software. Moreover, there is little or no testing of such software, despite the fact that it stores the ballot positions for all candidates and initiatives on every ballot, on every voting machine, and tallies the votes for all of them on election day.
For all of the concerns about election fraud, via the electronic voting systems in use across the nation today, and the eye on the source code for the software itself, few seem to have their eye on the ballot definition software, which can --- even on e-voting systems where the hardware, and main program software has been tested, certified, and audited --- succeed in flipping an election without detection, either by error, or on purpose.
Concerned yet? Read on...
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5971Thanks to the author!
And, pardon Brad, but it's about time! :spank: :D :hi:
Here's an oldie but a goodie.
How to STEAL an Election -- for real!
by Bill Bored
Nov-14-05
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He wrote: "Both candidates’ party affiliations were listed correctly on the ballots used by voters." Proving that even voter-verified paper ballots don't mean shit unless they are audited or recounted by hand.
Unlike the hack we've seen on TV, in this real-world case, the precinct totals would have matched the central tabulator totals. And no one had to take apart any memory cards or reinvent the wheel to make this happen. It's just a feature of the software -- your tax dollars at work.
Now this is just a local judges' race in some place called Cumberland County, PA. But imagine if exactly the same thing happened in just the right counties in a few swing states to select Shrub in 2004, or even in 2000.
Somehow, this one was caught; the paper ballots were recounted. But for every one of these that are caught, there are probably a dozen more that aren't.
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http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=203&topic_id=401378