Complaints about motivation of believers and complaints about justice delayed

1. Motivation of believers

It is said that believers do good out of selfish desire for future rewards and that believers avoid doing evil out of fear of future consequences. This is said to be unacceptable motivation. It is said that goodness should be its own reward and that believers shouldn't be working for their own personal salvation.

2. Justice delayed

It is said that it's not good enough to quench a thirst for justice in a future life after death. It is said that injustice today creates victims and that delays in justice are a denial of justice. In other words, compensation in a future life after death isn't good enough.

There seems to be a contradiction in the implicit demands associated with the complaints. If God removes complaint #2 by quickly providing rewards and punishments, then complaint #1 would be significantly intensified.

Both scenarios can be answered by an emphasis on doing what is right because it is right. In scenario 1 you don't do something because you think god will reward you in heaven or it will keep you out of hell. You do it because it is the right thing to do. If it's not the right thing to do, then you don't do it. In scenario 2, you stop the injustice right now because it is the right thing to do. You don't deal with the injustice because you think doing so will get you into heaven.

This is the life we have--act like a good egg during this life. If that's not good enough for god, then fuck him.

but God waits until judgment day.

#1 is about the motivations of people; #2 is about what a god feels is worth doing about human life.

I said: "If God removes complaint #2 by quickly providing rewards and punishments, then complaint #1 would be significantly intensified."

Why do you think there is a contradiction in the implicit demands?

When I said 'that' I meant the contradiction you claimed in your OP, unsurprisingly.

From a practical point of view, it seems very unlikely that both demands could be fulfilled.

An example of the general idea might help:

Suppose a student spends thirty hours per week studying physics, and has a C minus average in physics courses. You could command such a student to study physics no more than fifteen hours per week, to maintain the same course load, and to achieve at least an A minus average in physics courses.

Maybe it's possible for that student to fulfill all your demands, but there is a missing ingredient that would have to come from somewhere. Other things being equal, cutting in half the number of hours per week devoted to studying physics will tend to lower rather than increase the student's physics grades.

Boojatta gets frustrated when he is unable to reconcile myth and reality.

And if the evidence for is sufficient then it is in fact arguable that the issue may be true.

For each piece of evidence, does that piece get either permanently classified as evidence supporting the claim or permanently classified as evidence countering the claim? Alternatively, might the same piece of evidence have different classifications depending on its role within a given framework of connected hypotheses?

...Boojatta rarely makes sense.

elsewhere, other problems will indeed be caused elsewhere.

On the other hand, this God is supposed to be infinite and very very clever, and probably capable of solving one problem without screwing something else up.

You know, like not claiming burning people for eternity is somehow "justice" as it holds about as much water Teh Lord zapping people at random and calling it "justice" (if she were to do that).

In other words, the person bothered by 1 & 2 can just be pointing out that this God isn't providing justice at all, not saying that Teh Lord oughta put an instant feedback electroshock dogcollar on people.