Addicted to Religion

Agnosticism
The theory that man does not have the knowledge to determine whether a god exists; the suspension of judgment due to a lack of knowledge.

Atheism
A lack of faith in a god, supernatural being, or deity. This is a neutral position in regard to the question, "Does god exist?" It does not affirm any belief in god's non-existence despite many people's claims.

What is Atheism?:

The more common understanding of atheism among atheists is "not believing in any gods." No claims or denials are made — an atheist is a person who is not a theist. Sometimes this broader understanding is called "weak" or "implicit" atheism. There is also a narrower sort of atheism, sometimes called "strong" or "explicit" atheism. Here, the atheist explicitly denies the existence of any gods — making a strong claim which will deserve support at some point.

Who Are Atheists? What Do Atheists Believe?:

There are a lot of misunderstandings about who atheists are, what they believe, and what they don’t believe. People become atheists for many different reasons. Being an atheist isn’t a choice or act of will — like theism, it’s a consequence of what one knows and how one reasons. Atheists are not all angry, they aren’t in denial about gods, and they aren’t atheists to avoid taking responsibility for their acts. It’s not necessary to be afraid of hell and there are advantages to being an atheist.

What is the Definition of Atheism?:

Atheism, broadly defined, it is the absence of belief in the existence of any gods. Christians insist that atheism means the denial of the existence of any gods; the absence of belief in any gods is, for some strange reason, often ignored. At best it might be mistakenly referred to as agnosticism, which is actually the position that knowledge of gods is not possible. Dictionaries and other specialized references make it clear, though, that atheism can have a much broader definition.

The technical problems of defining "atheism" may be divided into two categories: (1) etymological and (2) epistemological. (For the purpose of this discussion, I shall accept the common definition of "theism" as "belief in a god or gods.")

1. It is sometimes claimed that the chief etymological problem in defining "atheism" is how to construe the prefix "a." Should we regard it as a term of privation meaning "without," or should we regard it as a term of negation meaning "no"?

If we choose the privative meaning of "without," then "a-theism" will mean "without-theism" -- i.e., "without (or lacking) belief in a god or gods." This clearly supports the definition of atheism as the absence of theistic belief.

What if we construe the prefix "a" negatively to mean "no"? This has been preferred by those who wish to define atheism as the outright denial of God's existence. But consider: even the negative sense of "a" doesn't, by itself, give us this definition. "A-theism," with the negative "a," translates into "no-belief in a god or gods." Here again, we have an essentially privative definition -- atheism as the absence of theistic belief.

I suggest, therefore, that the real problem in defining "atheism" lies, not in the meaning of the prefix "a," but in determining precisely where that prefix should be inserted.

Atheism as outright denial can be achieved only if the negative "a" is used, not to qualify the entire meaning of "theism," but only part of it -- i.e., "a-theism" means "belief in no god or gods." In this interpretation, atheism is construed, not as the absence of a belief, but as a particular kind of belief.

The case for atheism as a kind of belief -- the belief in the nonexistence of God -- was championed by no less a figure than J.M. Robertson, the great historian of freethought. Robertson argued that any "ism," including atheism, implies that we are dealing with a positive belief or doctrine, not a simple privation. Contrary to Robertson's view, "-ism" can mean something other than a doctrine or belief; it can mean "a state or condition" as well. Thus, the privative definition of atheism is still possible. Atheism as the absence of belief can denote an "ism" -- a state of mind in which theistic belief is absent.

2. Linguistic arguments over the correct definition of "atheism" will solve little, because -- as philosophers like to remind us -- questions of word-meaning are ultimately determined by conventional usage, not by the decrees of linguistic "experts." But conventional usage does not solve the problem either, for we may ask: whose usage? During the McCarthy era, for example, atheism was commonly linked to communism. What, then, were noncommunistic atheists to do? Should they have stepped forward and defied conventional usage, thereby incurring the wrath of McCarthy, his goons, and philosophers?

Those philosophers who rely solely on "conventional usage" should recall that "atheism" has been used throughout history as a term of opprobrium, a veritable smear word. Indeed, until the eighteenth century, an "atheist" could be anyone who disagreed with one's own religious convictions -- a person who denied the divinity of Roman emperors, or who disbelieved in witchcraft, or who denied the Trinity, or who rejected infant baptism, or who maintained that philosophers should be free to seek the truth, wherever it may lead them.

Perhaps atheists can find refuge from the tyranny of "conventional meaning" in what philosophers call "technical, definitions." Thus, biologists are permitted to offer their own definition of "life," for example, without being overly concerned whether laymen (the conventional majority) agree with, or even know of, their definition. Similarly, professed atheists may have the epistemological right to define atheism, in the technical sense, as the "absence of theistic belief," even if most laymen (i.e., theists) disagree with that definition.

Or perhaps atheists can fall back on the rule of fundamentality, which says that a definition should identify the fundamental, or essential, attribute of the concept being defined. Obviously, the absence of theistic belief is more fundamental than the denial of theism, for the latter is a subset of the former. (One who denies the existence of God also lacks belief, but the reverse is not necessarily true: one who lacks belief in God does not necessarily deny its existence.)

According to this reasoning, one who denies God's existence is a legitimate atheist, but he subscribes to a particular species of atheism. If, however, we construe atheism as the denial of God's existence, then the person who merely lacks theistic belief is not a real atheist, but an imposter. This exclusion by definition, it seems to me, is ungracious, and it shows ignorance of what important atheists have argued for many years.

Implicit atheism is conveniently ignored by those theists who represent atheism as a positive belief rather than the absence of belief. While this may appear to be a subtle distinction, it has important consequences.

If one presents a positive belief (i.e., an assertion which one claims to be true), one has the obligation to present evidence in its favor. The burden of proof lies with the person who asserts the truth of a proposition. If the evidence is not forthcoming, if there are not sufficient grounds for accepting the proposition, it should not be believed. The theist who asserts the existence of a god assumes the responsibility of demonstrating the truth of this assertion; if he fails in this task, theism should not be accepted as true.

Some believers attempt to escape the responsibility of providing evidence by shifting this responsibility onto atheism. Atheism, which is represented as a rival belief to theism, allegedly cannot demonstrate the nonexistence of a god, so it is claimed that the atheist is no better off than the theist. This is also the favorite argument of the agnostic, who claims to reject theism and atheism on the basis that neither position can provide demonstration.

When atheism is recognized as the absence of theism, the preceding maneuver falls to the ground. Proof is applicable only in the case of a positive belief. To demand proof of the atheist, the religionist must represent atheism as a positive belief requiring substantiation. When the atheist is seen as a person who lacks belief in a god, it becomes clear that he is not obligated to "prove" anything. The atheist qua atheist does not believe anything requiring demonstration; the designation of "atheist" tells us, not what he believes to be true, but what he does not believe to be true. If others wish for him to accept the existence of a god, it is their responsibility to argue for the truth of theism -- but the atheist is not similarly required to argue for the truth of atheism.

It is crucial to distinguish between atheism as such and the many beliefs which an atheist may hold. All atheists do adopt some positive beliefs, but the concept of atheism does not encompass these beliefs. Atheism refers only to the element of nonbelief in a god, and since there is no content here, no positive beliefs, the demand for proof cannot apply.

Atheism is not necessarily the end product of a chain of reasoning. The term "atheist" tells us that one does not believe in a god, but it does not specify why. Regardless of the cause of one's nonbelief, if one does not believe in a god, one is atheistic.

Theism must be learned and accepted. If it is never learned, it cannot be accepted -- and man will remain implicitly atheistic. If theism is learned but rejected anyway, man will be explicitly atheistic -- which brings us to the second kind of atheism.

(b) An explicit atheist is one who rejects belief in a god. This deliberate rejection of theism presupposes familiarity with theistic beliefs and is sometimes characterized as anti-theism.