New Stryker Faring Poorly in Field

New Stryker Faring Poorly in Field
Military.com | By Christian Lowe | January 30, 2008

BAQUBAH, Iraq - The newest version of the Army’s popular Stryker combat vehicle is garnering poor reviews here from Soldiers assigned to man its tank-like hull.

The General Dynamics Corp.-built Mobile Gun System looks like a typical eight-wheeled Stryker, except for a massive 105mm gun mounted on its roof. The gun fires three different types of projectiles, including explosive rounds, tank-busters and a "canister round" that ejects hundreds of steel pellets similar to a shotgun shell.

But while the system looks good on paper and the Army’s all for it, Soldiers with the 4th Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment -- one of the first units to receive the new vehicle for their deployment to Iraq -- don’t have a lot of good things to say about it.

"I wish would just blow mine up so I could be done with it," said Spec. Kyle Handrahan, 22, of Anaheim, Calif., a tanker assigned to Alpha Company, 4/9’s MGS platoon.

"It’s a piece," another MGS platoon member chimed in. "Nothing works on it."


Rest of article at: http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,160981,00.html?wh=wh



uhc comment: Ouch! 2003 document --> http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_rpt/stryker_reality_of_war.pdf

~snip~

The many problems of the basic Stryker vehicle have been documented elsewhere (they include the fact that the basic Stryker is too heavy to be C-130 deployed for any tactically useful distance and has off-road mobility problems). In all, the Army intends to establish six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams at a cost in excess of $1.5 plus billion a brigade. These brigades will contain a total of c.2,100 (2,131 is the actual advertised number) Strykers in all of which c.200 are targeted to be Stryker Mobile Gun Systems. The average cost of a Stryker variant is listed at in excess of $3 million per unit in the latest budget. The true cost of the MGS variant, including all the additional development work involved, is not known. The true cost of all the various ancillary expenses relating to the Stryker, such as the $700 million being invested in Hawaii and $1.2 billion being invested in Alaska to support one of the new Stryker Brigades are also not known in total but the overall impact on the Army, when ALL Stryker related costs are factored
in is very substantial.

The first SBCT is targeted to be operationally capable in the Summer of 2003 (significantly later than originally envisioned), yet, will be still be fielded without the essential MGS variant and without the 120mm mounted mortar variant (The Stryker chassis cannot withstand the recoil of the Army’s standard 120mm mortar so is having to be fitted with a special Israeli mortar which incorporates a recoil system, is heavier and cannot be dismounted from its vehicle. The Army’s currently fielded M113 operates the standard 120mm
mortar, either mounted or dismounted without difficulty, and is C-130 deployable). This means the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team will be woefully
short of firepower and the infantry will lack adequate support and protection. None of the Stryker variants are armored beyond 14.5mm protection and all, as
matters stand, are vulnerable to RPG fire (the weapons most likely to be encountered on the battlefield as shown in Mogadishu and more recently in
Afghanistan) let alone the large ballistic windows around the wheel wells and other areas that are penetrable by advanced small arms.

~snip~

The Stryker story is symptomatic of some serious problems within the Officer Corps of the Army, and particularly with the culture and mores of more senior officers.

To make billions of $$ for bush-cheney's friends by looting the treasury.

was proposed, bid, and awarded prior to November 2000....while I don't doubt that they are all friends, the program management that sought a newer, lighter infantry vehicle than the Bradley happened throughout the 1990s.