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Let's not lose sight of the original quandary in hasty application of logic to the legendary. > 1- Since it can be reduced to proving a negative, there can be not > logical proof of an absolute being
Re: "can be not logical", I should ask you if you mean that as written, or meant to type "can not be logical". The differences between the two are subtle but non-trivial. What you typed is a positive statement of the existence of a certain type of proof, which I am not ready at this point to admit follows from the arguments thus far, regardless of its truth value. What I think you may have meant (and which clearly follows from your premise) is a negative statement concerning the existence of the other type of proof, with which I agree. For the purposes of this reply, I will hope for a mistype and assume the latter.
In the original post, I wasn't suggesting a strict logical proof, nor even a strongly scientific one, in the sense that it would necessarily endure rigorous peer review and repeatability. Rather, I was looking for a minimal set of observations which would enable me to say, "Gee, that's a divine being," or better yet, "That's a Zeus-like being, rather than an Apollo-like being." A complete enumeration of human mythos would be (a)outside the scope of a forum thread, and (b)outside the overall mission of the atheism forum itself, but I trust you can discern what I mean anyway.
In the absence of the possibility of the existence of such an observational set, one might well be able to construct an argument that empirical atheism is non-falsifiable. On this, I think we can also agree. It is the basis of the mental experiment, and the crux of what I take to be your logical protest -- if protest is the right word.
> 2- There can be an infinity of subjective proofs of an absolute being, > as there can be an infinity of subjective proofs that the tree in my > window really exists.
There may be an infinity of subjective proofs, or there may only be a finite set of subjective proofs. The quantity is not really in question at the moment, if it is nonzero. Keep in mind, I'm not asking for universal standards of divine evidence, or even my own, which I admit up front may not even exist! Same applies to yours, of course. However, I have seen what I would take to be some pretty convincing criteria mentioned even in this thread, so that brings us to...
> What you are asking for amounts to a theory of the existence of an absolute being.
In my less-than-absolute words, we want a set of criteria such that if an entity meets them, an observer could subjectively infer the entity is of a specific sort -- in this case, divine.
> A theory is such only if it can be proven wrong, which amounts to proving > that an absolute being does not exist, which is logically impossible.
I think you are misconstruing what falsifiability would be in this situation. Relating to everyday experience, let's say one day I have a theory that all trees have leaves. "If I see a tree, it has leaves (or needles)." Later, I see a tree that doesn't have leaves -- e.g., a deciduous tree in midwinter is still a tree. There, it's falsified. We can construct falsifiable theories about trees. Right?
Let's apply falsifiability to subjective descriptions of divinity. "If there is a god, it will reside on Mount Olympus, hurl lightning bolts when angered, occasionally take the form of a swan to mate with mortals (it's a God Thing, ya know?), and have a troubled-yet-stable marriage." OK, that's a falsifiable theory about a divine being. It's not a particularly complete or compelling theory, but it's falsifiable in the same way the "trees have leaves" theory is falsifiable. All we need is an appearance of Vishnu or Anubis or YHWH or any other non-Zeus-like deity in order to do so. Ergo, we can construct falsifiable theories about divine beings.
So if your theory of godhead is something like, "A god is omniscient, omnipotent, and ultimately benevolent," that might well be falsified by an encounter with Zeus -- who is (according to legend, at least) none of the above.
One could reasonably raise the objection that I was actually asking for the opposite theoretical sense, i.e. a description that leads to specificity. "If an entity is omniscient, omnipotent, and ultimately benevolent, it is a god." How is this falsifiable? Precisely the same way as before: by the existence of one or more omniscient, omnipotent, ultimately benevolent being(s) that are not divine. The hyper-advanced space aliens from drhilarius' subthread come to mind -- and herein rests the heart of the question. What, if any, are your necessary and/or sufficient subjective criteria, and are they amenable to at least this kind of imagination-based falsifiability?
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