Ouch. Salon article critical of Dems who backed the Bhutto deal in Pakistan

Most Dems no better than Bush on Pakistan

The Bush administration's bungling in Pakistan and Afghanistan has led to a resurgent Taliban and al-Qaida and loss of U.S. influence in the region. But Democrats did little to stop it.

By Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

Last week, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto marked the failure of an ill-conceived U.S. attempt to orchestrate the return of a deeply divisive political exile, discredited by allegations of corruption and incompetence, to take power in Pakistan. The Bush administration's aim was to install a leader who would simultaneously "democratize" and secularize her country, fight terrorist groups, and make peace with Israel. Instead, the sad event of Bhutto's murder has exposed the strategic bankruptcy of the administration's Pakistan policy. But Democrats should not feel vindicated by this failure, for they have endorsed virtually all of the Bush team's mistaken views about Pakistan policy.

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In the wake of Bhutto's death, it is clear that the Bush administration has no Plan B for Pakistan. But Democrats -- with the singular exception of presidential hopeful Sen. Chris Dodd -- want to "double down" on the administration's failed approach, effectively pursuing Bush's "Bhutto strategy" without Bhutto. Thus, New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson talks obtusely about organizing all of Pakistan's "democratic" parties into a coalition government, even though, if Pakistani politicians were capable of such a step, it would not need to be suggested by an American politician. Richardson also advocates withholding all military assistance to Pakistan until Musharraf steps down; similarly, Sen. Hillary Clinton talks vacuously about the lack of sufficient conditionality on U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Sen. Joseph Biden, for his part, talks about the need to proceed expeditiously to parliamentary elections. Biden anticipates, with seeming sincerity, that Bhutto's party, the PPP -- now headed by her 19-year-old son, who will not be able to lead the party in the next round of elections, as this would interfere with his academic schedule as an Oxford undergraduate -- would win the right to form the next government.

Sound policy toward Pakistan must start with a sober understanding of reality. That reality was described with admirable succinctness in 2004 by the 9/11 Commission, writing in its final report: "Musharraf's government represents the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan." But insisting that Musharraf -- or any potential successor from the senior ranks of the Pakistani army -- break ranks with his military power base and the only institution that can limit the spread of militant violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan is only going to undermine the prospects for such stability.

Getting Pakistan "right" will require that we, first of all, get Afghanistan"right," and that we embed both of these troubled states in a broader regional strategy that includes the development of regional security institutions. Russia and China are already moving in this direction with their cultivation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, encompassing the former Soviet states of Central Asia -- which have largely abandoned their post-9/11 security ties to the United States -- and including Pakistan, India and Iran as observers. If the United States wants to preserve a serious leadership role in the region, or simply protect its critical security interests where Central and South Asia come together, it will need to abandon comforting illusions about "democratization" and begin working seriously to persuade Pakistan and other regional states that they can serve their interests best by working with us.

The Bush administration's bungling in Pakistan and Afghanistan has led to a resurgent Taliban and al-Qaida and loss of U.S. influence in the region. But Democrats did little to stop it.

Thursday, January 03, 2008

Pakistan

by tristero

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett contribute a blunt overview of Pakistan/Afghanistan in the wake of Bhutto's murder. Short version: it's even worse than the pessimists are saying. How bad is that? Well, they conclude that Musharraf, a deeply unpopular figure within Pakistan, is America's best hope to influence the situation and counteract the Taliban. That is very bad indeed.

There is much about their article that seems disputable. For example, I think the comparison of Bhutto to Chalabi is mostly specious but they are right to recognize the parallels in the disastrous efforts by Bush to "install" both. And I think they are wrong to assert that Bush - of all presidents! - was pushing for "free and fair" elections in Pakistan. Those of us who followed American machinations during the loya jirga that installed Karzai in Afghanistan know that Bush has no interest whatsoever in democracy for the region, only in creating, for certain audiences, the illusion that it exists.

However, even with the problems that I see with parts of their analysis, the Leveretts provide a cogent and worthwhile indictment of Bush's incredibly idiotic actions vis a vis Pakistan and Afghanistan, and a well-deserved slap at Democrats who have failed miserably to articulate both a coherent criticism of Bush's Afghan/Pakistan policies, let alone alternatives. It highlights how important it will be for the next American government to craft a sensible foreign policy, untainted by neocon fantasies and other manifestations of American narcissism.

We are concerned that President Musharraf appears to have no intention of leaving power voluntarily or holding free and fair elections. However, given an increasingly assertive opposition, it will be impossible for the president and his military backers to maintain the status quo. Western friends of Pakistan, most influentially the United States, should not be or be seen as propping up President Musharraf against a overwhelming popular demand that Pakistan return to democratic government by holding a free, fair and democratic election in 2007.

The worst scenario in Pakistan is the imposition of rule by emergency decree and the use of force to suppress the expected massive opposition. This would immediately produce chaos and violence and ultimately increase the role of Islamist groups and, if Washington supports the move or even tacitly accepts it, further increase anti-U.S. sentiment. The best scenario is Pakistan’s transition to democratic rule through free and fair elections that would marginalize extremist forces and reduce growing tensions in society. This could occur if the military feels it is in its interests to pull back from direct rule, as it has in the past.

The United States should urge a peaceful transition by strongly and publicly urging Musharraf and his military against subverting the electoral process or any measures to stifle constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech, association, assembly and movement. It should urge President Musharraf and his military to allow a return to democracy through free and fair elections, including the return of exiled political leaders.