You're in Iowa, what do you think? (Snippet from much longer analysis piece. I think it's a pretty good look at what actually happened in Iowa, as opposed to the idiotic lefty freeper memes: )
Kerry Ads
There were three big stories of the Kerry ad campaign. First, Kerry switched from testifying about himself to having others testify about him. second, Kerry decided his route to the presidency was through Iowa. Finally, Kerry "spent later, not earlier" (Shrum, 2004).
Kerry's media team produced and played 42 ads-almost twice as many as his nearest competitor, Edwards at 23 ads. Kerry's early ads from September through December (18 ads) focused on him-(2 ads) a 60- and a 30-second bio-documentary, Kerry in platform presentations (5) from his announcement speech, talking head ads (2) with Kerry facing the camera and talking, voiceover ads (2) with scenes visualized as Kerry did the voiceover, announcer driven ads (2) focusing on Kerry's accomplishments and negative comparative ads (5) between Bush and Kerry because "The whole notion of the advertising was that Kerry was the person who could take on Bush" (Shrum, 2004).
Kerry's ads focused on him using a variety of formats. Some were played more than others but no ad was played as much as his only 60-second bio/documentary ad. In its opening, a young, dark haired Kerry was depicted in 1971 footage from the Senate Foreign relations committee testifying: "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die in Vietnam? How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?" This footage was distinctive and riveting. I was familiar with the testimony because I use the Kerry speech to counterbalance the Nixon pro Vietnam speeches in my "Great American Speeches" class.
His chief ad creator, Jim Margolis, disclosed:
I always believed that biography, not for biography sake but also as a point to show what motivates, what drives John Kerry, was going to be very important to this campaign. It was differentiating from many of the others who were out there. And there was such a riveting story. Rarely in my business do you get the combination of a biography that is as intense and as strong as John Kerry's but also material to go with it. You have the great story and the film to go with it. (Margolis, 2004)
My political communication classes acted as focus groups to react to candidate's ads. They liked this ad and reacted that it was good to hear that Kerry was both a war hero and a war opposer. Margolis' ad captured its intended information and feeling.
That biography, that story really conveyed why this person was presidential timbre ... after coming home a hero, having served, volunteered, having done his duty, having taken shrapnel and saying "this is wrong" was compelling. It shows the depth of this person at a couple of levels-one, in terms of conscience, two in terms of maturity. (Margolis, 2004)
I had a few Dean supporters in class who reacted in an interesting way. They felt the ad showed him as a Vietnam vet but also as a Vietnam War opposer. "Ah," they said, "but he was an Iraq War supporter while only Dean opposed the Iraq War." So the ad reminded them that Kerry once right about war was now wrong.
The "m" word is the lightning rod word in the ad. By using "mistake" to refer to Vietnam, Kerry gets the response of those who may view Iraq as a mistake. This is good in a Democratic primary but Dean seemed to have the clear advantage here.
If I could use an analogy. By emphasizing both his service in and opposition to Vietnam it was similar to Kerry's being awarded medals but throwing them away. His acts cut both ways. It attracted Kerry supporters but gave Kerry detractors a reason to reject him. Margolis was aware of the downside to Kerry's compelling biography but thought the use of his anti-war testimony was worth it. "Among voters, they saw it as strength, as principal, they saw it as having done your duty ... and then came back and followed his heart. At the end of the day we thought that outweighed any potential downside" (Margolis, 2004). Maybe so, but Kerry's testimony and the word "mistake" never appeared again in any other Kerry ad.
My class thought the variety and the quality of Kerry's other ads-his talking heads, voiceover, and comparison ads-were the class of the field of candidates. Most chose to do their papers on Kerry's ads but it was the biography that initially motivated them.
I used their positive reaction to Kerry's ads to ask an exam question in early December 2003.1 asked, "If Kerry's ads are viewed by most in this class as 'the class of the field' why is he sinking like a rock?" In early December a Zogby poll had Dean at 42% in New Hampshire and Kerry at 12%. In their essays, few faulted Kerry ads and most simply focused on Dean becoming an unstoppable phenomenon in 2004.
But within weeks Kerry had turned his campaign around in Iowa and New Hampshire. How did it happen and how did ads play a role?
It was a combination of things-campaign events played a role, he invested his own money, became better as a campaigner with a crisper message, his crowds got bigger and he had the good fortune to have a surprise visit from a former Green Beret lieutenant, who Kerry had plucked from a river in Vietnam. Jim Rassman told a DesMoines, Iowa audience: "I'm not a politician .... I'm a registered Republican .... I owe this man my life .... He's going to get my vote ... ."
When this event happened, it was one of those rare consequential campaign moments. Kerry was so genuinely touched that he and Jim wiped away tears and Kerry hugged Rassman three times. The moment received much Iowa media and national coverage. One rival ad maker observed, "It gave Kerry the heart he needed. It gave people a connection to this Boston aristocrat. It was seductive" (Axelrod, 2004).
The crucial media decision in the Kerry campaign was the shift from Kerry testifying about himself to having others testify for him. Kerry started to air testimonial ads with people talking about Kerry, about their problems with healthcare or family budgets. But most importantly, from one of his crewmates who testified, "this is a good man, folks." Bob Shrum whose partner, Mike Donilon, advocated for testifier ads stated:
Kerry had to talk about problems in human terms. The decision was made to talk about healthcare in terms of the Knowles family and to talk about tax policy in terms of Kathleen Henricks. They were powerful ads because they connected him with people. (Shrum, 2004)
His boat buddies, Del (a white crewmate ad that was heavily played in Iowa and New Hampshire), and Alston (a black crewmate ad that was heavily played in South Carolina) humanized him. Margolis emphasized:
There was something quite compelling in the stories of others speaking about him. They convey something that we can never convey about ourselves-who this person was .... It is why I think the Del spot is one of the most important of the campaign. Del opens and says, "The decision he made saved our lives." Well, when you are electing a president what is a bigger decision than life or death . . . especially if you're going against someone who wants to be considered a war president. (Margolis, 2004)
Instead of Vietnam as a mistake, the Del spot emphasizes the positive and noncontroversial statement uttered by Kerry, "After Vietnam, every day is extra." Shrum observed, "We needed to have other people talking about his Vietnam experience to validate it and turn it into a validation of character and resolve" (Shrum, 2004).
Character, resolve, humanity, support from common people gave this Boston aristocrat the emotional feeling to appeal to voters. Finally, as Shrum disclosed, "the transition to 'every other day is extra,' was a transition to the future" (Shrum, 2004).
The future for Kerry happened fast. The Del ad was released in early January and Margolis reported they had "a turnaround within three weeks" (Margolis, 2004). The Del ad won an Honorable Mention Award as one of the best 2005 Poly Award presidential primary ads.
The second big story of the Kerry winning campaign was the importance of a win in Iowa. "We had to do well in Iowa to do well in New Hampshire" (Shrum, 2004). Margolis emphasized:
The strategic bet that was correct was the path through Iowa . . . . New Hampshire was going to be difficult for us to win outright given the momentum that Dean had . . . . In Iowa there was more openness to us, less solidarity to the support of others . . . . We needed to exceed, in a fairly dramatic way, expectations in Iowa. That was the path . . . . Essentially, we went 100% in Iowa and decided no matter what, that's what we're doing. (Margolis, 2004)
I was in New Hampshire over Christmas break leading up to Iowa and New Hampshire. I knew from nine previous election cycles that winning candidates usually spend a lot of time in New Hampshire. I got to see Kerry only twice in three weeks because he was in Iowa. His ads were on heavily in New Hampshire but not his physical presence.
In 2000, New Hampshire was the dominant state with ad spending approximating $12 million in competitive races in two parties-Gore vs. Bradley and Bush vs. McCain (Devlin, 2005). In 2004, Iowa was the champion spending state. $12.4 million was spent on behalf of all candidates while $10.4 million was spent in New Hampshire.
Edward's ad coordinator reflected on Kerry's Iowa strategy.
They were brilliant in their strategy. They knew they were dead unless they pulled off a surprise in Iowa. They mortgaged the house to win Iowa. They outspent us in the last six weeks by almost $2 million and that was all the difference. It was a tactically brilliant maneuver. It was a great strategy and was well executed. (Axelrod, 2004)
The third and the crucial media decision made by the Kerry campaign was to air ads later and heavily buy later in Iowa and New Hampshire. Dean and Edwards went up in August and stayed on the air while Kerry did not air ads heavily until November. Margolis confided:
It was very hard with his campaign and with his family to not be on the air when Howard Dean was up every single day in the summer and fall. There was a tremendous amount of pressure to be up and to stay up . . . . Over 80% of voters in Iowa and New Hampshire would decide after January 1. That is the history since the mid 1980s. Well over 50% of caucus goers and primary voters would decide within the last two weeks . . . . So we needed to make difficult decisions about expenditures . . . . My consistent belief was we must be there when voters are deciding. (Margolis, 2004).
During the late stages of the New Hampshire campaign I taped ads from all candidates during news broadcasts. It seemed that Kerry was on much more during the hour and a half of local news on WMUR in Manchester, New Hampshire. After the campaign I examined candidate Manchester, New Hampshire ad spending. Kerry spent $1,043,320 during the five months of his TV ad campaign. But he spent only $184,425 during the first two months while spending $858,845 in the last three months. This confirmed the late spending dominance that the campaign disclosed. Other campaigns spent proportionately more in the last months but none with the heavy late spending of Kerry.
Both Clark and Lieberman put ads on in November and focused only on New Hampshire. They ended up spending $684,000 and $680,000-both were outspent by Kerry's late spending. In the last three months Dean spent $582,000, Edwards spent $559,000, Kucinich spent $102,000 and Gephardt spent only $38,000 during November through late January on WMUR in Manchester.
FROM:
Communication Quarterly, Vol. 53, Issue. 4, p 451 10-01-2005
By L Patrick Devlin
And that's a fact, jack.
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