So what are our troops fighting and dying for?

The Danger of Seeking Permanent U.S. Military Bases.

The United States is currently building a number of military facilities in Iraq, including 14 major installations sometimes referred to as “enduring bases” to be used by the Iraqi Army.164 Such construction is both necessary for the future effectiveness of the Iraqi military and not particularly surprising for a strategy that seeks to empower indigenous security forces since many of Iraq’s prewar bases and military infrastructure were in serious decline on the eve of U.S. intervention. Additionally, and more importantly, the widespread and often systematic looting that followed the ouster of Saddam Hussein caused massive and sometimes total destruction of those military facilities. In some cases, looters with cranes and trucks stole everything valuable at military sites.165 Rebuilding a totally shattered military infrastructure thus has become a necessity.

Some suggest that the U.S. Government may be tempted to seek its own large and significant military bases to remain in that country after the departure of the majority of U.S. forces.166 The disadvantages associated with such a policy clearly have been recognized by the U.S. administration, and Secretary Rumsfeld has characterized the suggestion that the United States is interested in such facilities as “inaccurate and unfortunate.”167 President Bush has also made the statement that “We will stay in Iraq as long as we are needed, and not a day longer,” which some observers have interpreted as an indication that the administration is not seeking permanent bases.168

The question naturally arises as to how long the United States will stay to help fight the Iraqi insurgents without enjoying “permanent” basing rights. If the insurgency lasts for 12 years, as Secretary Rumsfeld suggests it might, does the United States keep some forces in Iraq throughout that time while maintaining that such deployments are not permanent? Perhaps because of these ambiguities, a great deal of suspicion exists in the Middle East and elsewhere that the United States will reverse itself at some key point and seek military facilities in Iraq beyond those needed to assist the Iraqi government with its struggle against the insurgents.169

Part of the suspicion of U.S. intentions is probably simply a general distrust of U.S. policy, but it may also reflect awareness by Middle Eastern publics of the calls by some neo-conservative commentators for U.S. basing rights in Iraq.170 Furthermore, the decision to relinquish U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia is sometimes seen as a factor driving the United States to seek Iraqi bases.171 There is some logic behind these worries. While the primary purpose of the Saudi bases was usually presented as deterring and containing Saddam Hussein, these facilities also entered into the strategic equation regarding Iran and other problematic Middle Eastern scenarios. Thus, the decision to leave the Saudi bases is sometimes viewed as a setback for U.S. strategic flexibility.

Within the Iraqi context, the primary justification for retaining U.S. bases would be to support the Iraqi governmental security forces after the majority of U.S. troops have withdrawn from that country. Moreover, it would signal a strong and continuing U.S. interest in the future of this country. Nevertheless, these reasons for staying in Iraq in most circumstances will be strongly outweighed by the disadvantages associated with such a policy if they involve U.S. military assets that remain after U.S. forces are no longer necessary to cope with the insurgency.

A basing agreement may also seriously hurt the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, which the United States must seek to support. Resistance to basing rights by Western powers traditionally has been a central characteristic of Arab nationalism, which cannot be casually disregarded by key Iraqi leaders.172 Even moderate Iraqi politicians fear that the United States may seek to dominate the post-Saddam Iraqi government.173 Bases could be seen as a central part of such a strategy. Additionally, anti-American radicals in both the Shi’ite and Sunni communities would be given the gift of a major issue with which to rally their followers. Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who has a strong following among Iraq’s most impoverished Shi’ites, has made opposition to U.S. influence in Iraq a central demand for his movement.

Perhaps most significantly, large and important Arab countries are seldom the most optimal locations for Western military bases. The presence of such facilities is widely taken to imply a certain higher level of Western influence over the government in question. Such a relationship is not only embarrassing with the public, but it is also a serious obstacle to seeking regional and Arab leadership and regionwide respect, especially at a time when anti-Americanism is high. Smaller Arab states, by contrast, have no serious chance of claiming Arab leadership, and this factor is not a consideration for them. Additionally, small wealthy states, such as Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, clearly see U.S. bases as an important source of protection from bullying and perhaps even military invasion by larger regional neighbors.174 These states are much easier to work with in time of crisis, and their facilities can meet the same operational requirement as bases in Iraq.175

Conclusion.

This monograph has sought to illustrate how challenging, multifaceted, and difficult it will be to devise an effective exit strategy for Iraq that can also serve as a victory strategy, leaving both the United States and Iraq better off than when the intervention was undertaken in 2003. While this goal is still attainable, remarkably little room exists for error, ideological dogmatism, or ignorance about the nature of the multiple problems associated with such an undertaking. Although the authors of this work understand that no one can generate a perfect plan for addressing the issue of an exit strategy, the following recommendations are offered in the hope that they will be of value to planners and policymakers grappling with this fundamental issue of U.S. strategic policy.

1. U.S. Government leaders must never forget that the United States will achieve its key objectives once the Iraqi government is viewed by the majority of its people, regardless of sect or ethnicity, as a legitimate government that is worth fighting and dying for; and the Iraqi security forces have the training, know-how, and equipment to put these convictions into practice. Empowering the government and security forces is the key to an endstate in Iraq acceptable to the United States. The U.S. decision to avoid lingering in that country to eradicate the insurgency is therefore compatible with these priorities. All U.S. actions must be considered in light of the burden that they might place on Iraqi governmental legitimacy since this is the key to a government victory.

2. The United States must develop detailed plans for implementing a withdrawal of significant numbers of troops under a variety of much less than optimal conditions. This requirement means that the Iraqi government may not yet have a strong human rights record, and the security forces may not be able to destroy the insurgency when the United States begins withdrawing troops. If the government is legitimate enough to survive, it may be useful to consider withdrawing the bulk of coalition forces as a way of empowering the new government by giving it the status of a fully independent entity. The United States may also have to scale back its expectations for Iraq’s political future. If the United States withdraws and a civil war does not take place, Iraq is better than we found it. Any regime that respects the need to share power among all major Iraqi groups (and one hopes minor groups) is a great deal better than the Saddam Hussein regime. Moreover, some Iraqi governmental violations of human rights may be inevitable, so long as the government is locked in a death struggle with insurgents who are perfectly willing to bomb mosques and murder large numbers of children such as occurred in July 2005. The United States should be prepared to criticize Iraqi human rights violations, but it also must be aware of the context, and the possibility that the criticism will be more effective and meaningful at a point when the Iraqi government is no longer fighting for its existence.

3. U.S. military and intelligence leaders must be painfully honest in addressing the question of when Iraqi security forces will be able to function without a coalition troop presence to prop them up. To answer this question incorrectly could cause the United States fail to meet its minimal objective of helping empower a functioning government in Iraq. One of the most serious threats to U.S. goals in Iraq is the danger of unrealistic optimism about the capabilities and élan of the Iraq security forces, and especially those units that have not actually been tested in combat. Such wishful thinking, if acted upon, could cause the Iraqi military to be given too much responsibility and then collapse in the face of enemy opposition which they are not yet prepared to address. The United States does not have the time or resources to build and then rebuild the Iraqi security force after a series of collapses. False or foolish optimism on the ability of forces may lead to a repeat of the November 2004 Mosul disaster on a nationwide scale.

4. Senior U.S. military leaders must resist the view that they are “grading themselves” when they are asked to train the security forces and to evaluate Iraqi readiness to assume more expanded duties for military and security operations. The viability of Iraqi units must be measured by a series of tough indicators, including real efforts to measure intangibles like morale and unit cohesion, as well as quantifying training and the distribution of weapons and equipment. Iraqi units that have not proven themselves in battle should remain suspect, units that have histories of heavy infiltration by insurgents and high rates of desertion should be even more suspect, units that have an internal culture where troops speak openly in favor of the insurgents or maintain publicly that they will desert to join an ethnic militia if their sectarian leaders ask them to should be especially suspect. While these military problems may not be easily corrected by U.S. trainers and advisors, neither should they be ignored when attempting to make an honest evaluation of Iraqi prospects for self-defense.

5. The United States MUST NOT establish a timetable to withdraw from Iraq so long as U.S. leaders consider the situation in Iraq to be redeemable. If a timetable is established and rigidly adhered to regardless of the situation on the ground, then the United States has, in effect, given up on Iraq, and is engaged in what amounts to choosing a withdrawal date by lottery. It has also replaced the judgement of the U.S. military and intelligence leadership with an arbitrary decision on when Iraqi forces will be ready to assume the security duties necessary for that nation to survive intact. A timetable is not a strategy for even the most limited of form of success in Iraq; it is an excuse for allowing the system to collapse.

6. As a last resort for preventing near-term civil war, the United States may have to swallow the bitter pill of allowing local militias to retain a significant and ongoing role in Iraqi politics if the Iraqi government is interested in pursuing this option and if the Iraqi security forces cannot take full responsibility for the nation’s safety. It is no longer clear that the United States will be able to create military and police forces that can secure the entire country no matter how long U.S. forces remain. It is also doubtful that Sunni Muslims will trust the Shi’ite-dominated central government and security forces to the point that that they will give up their militias without a fight. Militias are better than anarchy, although the danger they may serve as the building blocks for civil war should cause them to be used only as a last resort. It is worth reiterating that this is only one step better than anarchy and should only be considered as a final choice. Once power is decentralized, it will be deeply difficult to recentralize.

7. The United States needs to renounce interest in permanent bases in Iraq on a strong and continuing basis. Once a long-term basing agreement is formalized, it will become a festering grievance for Iraqi nationalists and will be criticized constantly by Iraqi and Arab World radicals. Since a primary U.S. goal is to empower the Iraqi government with legitimacy, such bases must be renounced as a way of reinforcing that legitimacy, which this monograph claims is a military necessity to achieve victory.

8. The United States needs to deemphasize rhetoric that may cause Iraqi citizens to believe their government has been put in place to wage war on U.S. enemies in the Muslim World and otherwise serve U.S. interests. If Iraq is the “central front” in the war on terrorism, then it is part of a campaign that mainstream Muslims view as including Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s actions against the Palestinians and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s campaign against Chechnya. The United States does not need to burden the Iraqi government with the specter of collusion in what may be seen as anti-Muslim policies.

9. U.S. leadership must recognize that it may still continue to support democracy after U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq, providing that the nation is stable when it leaves. The United States is expected to continue providing the Iraqi government with strong diplomatic and material support for its efforts. Following a U.S. departure, it is conceivable that the Iraqi military will be defeated if they show a lack of fighting spirit, but it is inconceivable that the United States should be willing to allow them to be defeated by a lack of military equipment and weaponry. As noted, materiel support will not save a failed military, but it might save a faltering military of a struggling government.

10. U.S. leaders should continually note the courage, commitment, and sacrifice of our troops in the field, while realizing that these same qualities are reasons to safeguard their lives even more carefully. All future wars should have carefully planned exit strategies based on something other than best case planning for the future of the countries involved. In undertaking such plans, the United States must take care to maintain realistic expectations of what it can actually achieve with military intervention, especially with regard to the imposition of market economies and democracy on states that we do not fully understand. Goals for intervention might at times be maintained at a limited level and adjusted upwards if conditions permit rather than held to lofty high standards (such as total “de-Ba’athification”) which conditions may later force the United States to compromise to extricate itself from a position of indefinite occupation.

http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Articles/PUB627.pdf#search=%22Kurdistan%20U.S.%20permanent%20bases%22

The former top operating officer at the Pentagon, a Marine Lieutenant General, said "the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions--or bury the results." It is hard for a career military officer to speak those words. But at a time when the administration cannot let go of the myths and outright lies it broadcast in the rush to war in Iraq, those who know better must speak out.

At a time when mistake after mistake is being compounded by the very civilian leadership in the Pentagon that ignored expert military advice in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, those who understand the price being paid for each mistake by our troops, our country, and Iraq itself must be heard.

Once again we are imprisoned in a failed policy. And once again we are being told that admitting mistakes, not the mistakes themselves, will provide our enemies with an intolerable propaganda victory. Once again we are being told that we have no choice but to stay the course of a failed policy. At a time like this, those who seek to reclaim America's true character and strength must be respected.

John Kerry, April 22, 2006