Does possible Telco scapegoat Neustar, Inc. have White House connections?

Registrant Name: NeuStar, Inc.
Registrant Organization: NeuStar, Inc.
Registrant Address1: Loudoun Tech Center
Registrant Address2: 45980 Center Oak Plaza
Registrant City: Sterling
Registrant State/Province: Virginia
Registrant Postal Code: 20166
Registrant Country: United States
Registrant Country Code: US
Registrant Phone Number: +1.5714345757
Registrant Facsimile Number: +1.5714345758

This .US domain name was recently registered with NeuStar, Inc. This site is currently under construction. Please try back at a later date.

Domain Name: WHITEHOUSE.US
Domain ID: D665758-US
Sponsoring Registrar: .US RESERVE
Domain Status: serverTransferProhibited
Domain Status: inactive
Registrant ID: 10092-FEDEOP
Registrant Name: Carlos Solari
Registrant Organization: Whitehouse - Executive Office of the President
Registrant Address1: 1800 G Street
Registrant Address2: 10th Floor
Registrant City: Washington
Registrant State/Province: DC
Registrant Postal Code: 20502
Registrant Country: United States
Registrant Country Code: US
Registrant Phone Number: +1.2023950960
Registrant Facsimile Number: +1.2023956436

Carlos Solari '79 had one of the most sensitive and fascinating positions in the White House—but he can't say much about it. Not because he's modest, although he is; not because he's shy, because he's a friendly sort. Rather, it's because he was the chief information officer in charge of computer security for the past two and a half years, and, well, discretion comes with the job. A biology major, he's a prime example of how a scientific education can prepare a student for just about anything—such as careers in the military, the FBI and a presidential administration.

Carlos Solari, who spent the last 2 1⁄2 years as White House CIO, left last week to return to industry.

The largest offering came just two days ago, when NeuStar Inc. (NYSE: NSR) netted $605 million, with over $500 million of it going to (former) majority shareholder Warburg Pincus.

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NeuStar was founded in 1996 as an operating division of Lockheed Martin Corp., and was acquired in 1999 in a management buyout lead sponsored by Warburg Pincus. Warburg held a 71.59% pre-IPO stake, while other significant shareholders include MidOcean Partners (13.95%) and ABS Capital Partners (5.93%).

Business News
February 10, 2005
ICANN's .Net Evaluator Under Scope

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) said it is confident that Telcordia Technologies, its choice to pick the next .net manager from a list of bidders, can render a fair decision.

The comment comes in the wake of a Web of connections among the company and the bidders whose applications for the domain it will be reviewing.

"Substantial safeguards have been established to ensure that the members of the Telcordia evaluation team who review and analyze the applications do so in an objective manner independent of inappropriate influences," the governing body said in an advisory. "Neither Telcordia Technologies, Inc. nor individual members of the evaluation team has any financial interest in or similar dealings with any of the applicants."

But Telcordia has indirect connections with two of the five bidders: the incumbent .net owner VeriSign (Quote, Chart) and NeuLevel, which is owned by NeuStar.

NeuStar was formed five years ago by Warburg Pincus and Lockheed Martin to serve as the FCC-approved administrator of the North American Numbering Plan (NANP), which is the area code directory for telephones in the United States, Canada, Bermuda and much of the Caribbean.

U.S. GOVERNMENT SELECTS NEUSTAR®TO MANAGE NORTH AMERICAN NUMBERING PLAN ADMINISTRATION NeuStar Selected to Serve Second TermWASHINGTON, DC, July 14, 2003--NeuStar, Inc., the premier neutral third party provider of mission-critical clearinghouse services, announced today that the Company has been selected bythe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to manage the North American Numbering Plan Administration (NANPA). Effective July 9, 2003, NeuStar assumed its second term as the NANPA. NeuStar was awarded a one-year contract with four one-year options to be exercised at the discretion of the FCC. NeuStar has administered this national public resource since 1997. In this vital role, NeuStar manages the critical responsibilities of NANPA, including code administration, area code exhaust forecasting and relief planning, and the collection and reporting of telephone number utilization and forecast data. “In these dynamic times in the telecom industry, we remain committed to superior performance and the delivery of excellent service,” said John Manning, the new Director of NeuStar/NANPA. “NeuStar looks forward to the continued partnership it has built with the FCC, state regulatory authorities, and the telecommunications industry as a whole.”

Company Overview
NeuStar (NYSE: NSR) is a leading provider of essential clearinghouse services to the global communications and Internet industry.

As the trusted, neutral, third-party provider of mission-critical database and clearinghouse services to the communications industry, NeuStar manages many of the resources that will lead to the true convergence of voice and data networks. More specifically, NeuStar manages:
• North American Numbering Plan Administration (NANPA)
• Local number portability (LNP) registry
• CARE Clearinghouse, a mediation system that offers customer record information to local and long-distance telecommunications service providers
• Internet Protocol (IP) registry services, including emerging convergence technologies such as ENUM
• Registry services for the .US top-level domain
• Also, NeuStar's subsidiary NeuLevel manages:
o Registry services for the .BIZ top-level domain (in a joint venture with Melbourne IT)
o The Registry gateway outside China for the .CN top-level domain
Neutrality
As a result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, NeuStar emerged as a neutral, third party that facilitates competition across a tightly regulated industry. NeuStar abides by a strict neutrality policy, meaning that it will never show any preference or provide any special consideration to any company or service provider, either directly or indirectly. The FCC has found NeuStar to be in compliance with neutrality standards. NeuStar is headquartered in Sterling, VA.

fiducianet, inc.(SM) is headed by Michael Warren, a 29 year veteran of the FBI who was in charge of CALEA implementation for the Bureau before retiring in September 2000. The name fiducianet derives from the Latin word fiducia or "trust" in English.

(1) Former FBI wiretap expert H. Michael Warren recently joined the firm to launch a new consulting practice, Telecommunications and Law Enforcement Associates (TeLEA), which will provide clients with a variety of services, including analyzing existing compliance infrastructures under the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) and criminal discovery laws, facilitating key meetings with law enforcement officials and the Federal Communications Commission, developing compliance strategies, guides and reports, and conducting educational seminars.

Redelegation of .us Country-Code Top-Level Domain

After a long governmental procurement process, on Friday, 26 October 2001, the United States Government entered an agreement with NeuStar, Inc. to provide registry services for the .us country-code top-level domain (ccTLD), replacing VeriSign, Inc. Consistent with this change in contracted operators, on Friday, 16 November 2001, the .us ccTLD was redelegated from VeriSign to NeuStar.

This redelegation occurred before the completion of the normal IANA requirements. The United States Government informed ICANN on 16 November 2001 that, because of complexities of U.S. procurement laws, it was not able to extend the existing arrangements with VeriSign nor complete the necessary three-way set of communications among itself, ICANN, and NeuStar. This presented a peculiar set of circumstances: ICANN was faced with the choice of (1) either authorizing a redelegation, or (2) creating a situation where the event would have occurred regardless but there would be inconsistent data in the IANA database. Given ICANN's primary mission focus on stability (and security as part of achieving stability), ICANN authorized an emergency redelegation prior to an appropriate contract.

All parties involved are committed to complete these contractual and other arrangements as soon as practicable following the end of the protest period (regarding the NeuStar contract) that is allowed for by U.S. law, this apparently being the earliest opportunity that U.S. law allows the U.S. Government to participate in contract negotiations. In its contract with NeuStar, the United States requires NeuStar to abide by the GAC principles (which require a binding written communication with ICANN), and has so committed to ICANN directly.

A full IANA report will be posted as soon as it is complete.

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In the mid-1990s, the continued growth of demand for domain names placed strains on the Domain Name System (DNS) management, as what had been primarily technical issues became political, legal, and economic problems that attracted high-level official attention. ... Meanwhile, from a small company in 1993, NSI, the monopoly registrar and registry for gTLDs, had quickly become a multibillion dollar company.

Setting up ICANN: <44> in June 1998 that contained a policy statement of its intent to privatise the management and coordination of the DNS. In addition, it articulated four guiding principles that would be used during this transition process, namely stability, competition, representation and bottom-up policy-making. DoC has stated that the stability and security of this important global resource can best be achieved through privatisation of the technical management of the DNS and continued global co-operation, via appropriate public-private partnerships that reflect the international nature of the Internet.

The responses to this paper from the private sector were several proposals<45> , including one shepherded by Jon Postel from the newly created Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) – a private non-profit corporation, incorporated in California. In November 1998 the US Department of Commerce entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN, to establish a process for transitioning the Domain Name System (DNS) from the US Government to the private sector <46>. In a separate agreement, the DoC contracted ICANN to perform the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions previously performed by other entities under US Government contracts. Under this contract <47> , ICANN allocates blocks of IP addresses to Regional Internet Number Registries (RIRs) that serve geographical regions...

As a part of the IANA functions contract, ICANN receives change requests and makes recommendations regarding them to the DoC, which has the operational oversight responsibility for the authoritative root zone file, All top level domain delegations, redelegations, and name server change requests require the final approval of the U.S. Government. The Department of Commerce directs VeriSign to make changes to the authoritative root zone file pursuant to Amendment 11 of their cooperative agreement upon recommendation of ICANN. ICANN’s legitimacy, processes, structure, and handling of a number of issues have been questioned by various stake-holders...

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There is also new competition in 2005 to provide registry services for .net, after Verisign’s contract terminates 30 June 2005. ... The fifth applicant is Sentan (a joint partnership between NeuLevel and Japan Registry Services).

~snip~

There is substantial evidence, discussed below, that DoC has directly instructed ICANN on policy matters. Furthermore, as ICANN is utterly dependent on DoC for ICANN's continuing authority, funding, and, indeed, its reason for being, it would be reasonable to conclude that the corporation is currently so captive that all of ICANN's decisions can fairly be charged to the government. If so, the DNS has not, in fact, been privatized at all, even temporarily. At least in cases where ICANN does what DoC tells it to do, and arguably in all cases, DoC's use of a private corporation to implement policy decisions represents an end run around the APA and the Constitution. To the extent that DoC launders its policy choices through a cat's paw, the public's right to notice and meaningful comment; to accountable decisionmaking; to due process; and to protection against arbitrary and capricious policy choices, self-dealing, or ex parte proceedings are all attenuated or eliminated; so, too, is the prospect of any meaningful judicial review. The result is precisely the type of illegitimate agency decisionmaking that modern administrative law claims to be most anxious to prevent.{29}

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Democratic theory suggests that the absence of accountability tends to breed arbitrariness and self-dealing.{38} In addition to avoiding governmental accountability mechanisms, ICANN lacks much of the accountability normally found in corporations and in nonprofits. Or- <*pg 30> dinary corporations have shareholders and competitors. ICANN does not because it is nonprofit and has a unique relationship with the Department of Commerce. Many nonprofit organizations have members who can challenge corporate misbehavior. ICANN has taken steps to ensure that its "members" are denied such legal redress under California law.{39} All but the wealthiest nonprofits are constrained by needing to raise funds; ICANN faced such constraints in its early days, but it has now leveraged its control over the legacy root into promises of contributions from the registrars that have agreed to accept ICANN's authority over them in exchange for the ability to sell registrations in .com, .org and .net, and from NSI, the dominant registrar and monopoly .com/.org/.net registry,{40} which agreed to pay $2.25 million to ICANN this year as part of agreements hammered out with DoC and ICANN.{41} The result is a body that, to date, has been subject to minimal accountability. Only DoC (and, in one special set of cases, NSI or registrars{42}) currently has the power to hold ICANN account- <*pg 31> able. NSI currently has no incentive to use its limited power, and DoC has nothing to complain of so long as ICANN is executing the instructions set out in the White Paper. The accountability gap will get worse if DoC gives full control of the DNS to ICANN.{43} But it should be <*pg 32> noted that opinions may differ as to whether DoC could legally give away its interest in DNS to ICANN without an act of Congress. It is likewise unclear what precisely "giving away control" would consist of beyond DoC's interest in its contracts with the maintainer of the root, since the most important part of anyone's "control" over the root is publishing data that other parties, many of whom are independent of the government, choose to rely on.{44}

~snip~

If ICANN is engaged in policymaking, and if DoC is reviewing these decisions and retaining the authority to countermand them, then DoC's adoption of or approval of ICANN's regulatory and policy decisions are subject to the APA. One could argue as to whether DoC's approval is an informal adjudication under the APA,{45} or whether due to its overwhelming influence over ICANN and due to its adopting ICANN's rules, DoC is engaged in rulemaking without proper notice and comment. In either case, however, the APA has been violated.

~snip~

ICANN is a flawed attempt to tackle a genuinely difficult policy problem: what the U.S. government should do with its almost accidental control over the DNS, an essential element of an increasingly global communications network. The DNS problem is complicated because of its significance to e-commerce and expressive rights, its international aspects, its affect on trademark and perhaps other intellectual property rights, and because control over the DNS could be misused if it fell into the wrong hands. Further complicating matters, while the United States currently has de facto control over the DNS, and its direct control of a minority of the root servers makes it difficult to see how anyone else could supplant it, the legal basis and likely permanence of that control are not beyond any imaginable challenge. Last, but not least, Congress has yet to legislate on DNS management other than to pass one bill providing private rights against cybersquatters.{670}

~snip~

This new corporation -- ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers -- has, over the past several months, set up shop and gotten to work. It's been a busy time. It has begun to establish "Supporting Organizations," new coalitions comprising various Internet constituencies (e.,g., domain name registrars, trademark owners) who will be responsible for electing certain members of the ICANN Board of Directors and for formulating aspects of domain name policy. It has accredited five companies (America Online, CORE (Internet Council of Registrars), France Telecom/Oléane, Melbourne IT, and register.com) to begin issuing registrations in the COM, ORG, and NET, domains during a two-month test period (along with twenty-nine other entities who can begin accepting registrations in these domains once the test phase is completed). It commissioned, and recently adopted (in part), a report from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) outlining the procedures to be used in cases involving "cybersquatting" (the intentional "warehousing" of domain names for later sale).

~snip~

And that is why these are governance questions, why any reorganization of this system, far from being an arcane technical detail of Internet engineering, is inherently of constitutional significance. Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely -- on the Internet as elsewhere. Questions about constraining any form of absolute power are constitutional questions of the highest order, and "governance" means nothing more (and nothing less) than the search for mechanisms to insure that absolute power is not exercised in an unjust or oppressive manner. How can we be assured that ICANN will be able to resist pressures to stray beyond this limited "technical" mandate? Where are the checks on the new corporation's exercise of its powers?

You think, perhaps, that I exaggerate the significance of these developments, and perhaps I do. But let me point to a few dark clouds on the horizon that make me very, very nervous about what ICANN is up to. Remember all those things you could do if you were in control of the root? Like " require that domain server operators pay you a certain fee"? Well, ICANN has imposed the requirement that each accredited registrar pay ICANN a fee of $1 for each new domain name they hand out -- can anyone say "taxation without representation"? Or "provide you with particular kinds of information about the people to whom they have handed out specific names and addresses"? ICANN, having now endorsed the WIPO Report referenced earlier, is about to impose a requirement on all domain name registrars that they collect and make available "accurate and reliable contact details of domain name holders," and that they agree to "cancel the domain name registrations" wherever those contact details are shown to be "inaccurate and unreliable."-- a move with grave consequences for the continued viability of anonymous communications on the Internet. Or "abide by a particular set of laws or rules or regulations"? The WIPO Report, again, envisions that all claims by trademark holders that a domain name registrant registered an infringing name "in bad faith" be submitted to a single, uniform, worldwide dispute resolution process for adjudication.