so easily be tampered with (here's a page with links:
http://www.voteraction.org/news.html )? Sending voting machines home with poll workers violates the established procedure (by the state of CA) for ensuring chain of custody on these machines as well as election law.
San Diego is the only CA county I've heard is doing this.
The poll workers given the machines in many cases are temporary workers, to help with the election, with a few hours training. They are not full-time workers of the Registrar's office and in fact, if you read the procedures required for using the machines, they do not permit this.
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The ultimate problem, however, is the machines are *NOT* tamper proof. Thus, they shouldn't be being used in any election.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/29/AR2006052900816.html?referrer=emailarticle<snip>
In California, David Jefferson, a computer scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory who consults with the state on its elections, said he was "stunned when he found out" about the vulnerability
identified in the Utah test and agreed with the "frequently expressed opinion that this is the worst vulnerability that we have ever seen."
But Diebold spokesman David Bear said it was a "functionality" that company engineers had built into the voting machines so their software could be easily updated, and it only becomes an vulnerability if an unauthorized person gains unfettered access to the machine, and there are safeguards against that happening.
State officials tried to strike a middle ground. "There certainly are potential security vulnerabilities that have arisen," said Jennifer Kerns, a spokeswoman for California's secretary of state. "But you have to be realistic about it: When you're administrating elections, there's a very low risk of any" tampering.
<snip>
==============what about when machines sit in pollworkers homes and garages for days and weeks?
see also
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/us/12vote.html?ei=5090&en=5b3554a76aad524a&ex=1305086400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=printThe new concerns about Diebold's equipment were discovered by Harri Hursti, a Finnish computer expert who was working at the request of Black Box Voting Inc., a nonprofit group that has been critical of electronic voting in the past. The group issued a report on the findings on Thursday.
Computer scientists who have studied the vulnerability say the flaw might allow someone with brief access to a voting machine and with knowledge of computer code to tamper with the machine's software, and even, potentially, to spread malicious code to other parts of the voting system.
As word of Mr. Hursti's findings spread, Diebold issued a warning to recipients of thousands of its machines, saying that it had found a "theoretical security vulnerability" that "could potentially allow unauthorized software to be loaded onto the system."
The company's letter went on: "The probability for exploiting this vulnerability to install unauthorized software that could affect an election is considered low."
<snip> Aviel Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University, did the first in-depth analysis of the security flaws in the source code for Diebold touch-screen machines in 2003. After studying the latest problem, he said: "I almost had a heart attack. The implications of this are pretty astounding."
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This is just one of the many people with concerns about tampering with most of the election machines available in the US
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=2950&print=1After reading your articles on the Busby/Bilbray Election, I am in shock! The security vulnerabilities I know to be associated with the Diebold touch screen voting machine would makes this unimaginable. Utah (and Diebold themselves) accused me that by my allowing Black Box Voting security expert Harri Hursti having access to two machines in Emery County that I had jeopardized the elections for the entire state of Utah. The analysis was all, of course, supervised and video taped to document anything done by Mr. Hursti.
You just don't let these machines go outside established security procedures. Inappropriate access
for example; loading on a macro program can happen within minutes and will go undetected on the machine. You can access the machines as I recall even if the front doors are sealed. These security seals, that they talk about as the answer, will probably be taken off by these same poll workers and so who will even notice?
I would worry at every stage of the deployment of the machines even by those who might transport or set them up at polling locations.
I believe that people need to keep the security issues of these machines on the front burner and talk it up with everyone. My worry is that when we as people give up and get tired of the fight, then they have won. Corporate America needs to come clean about the vulnerabilities, clean them up, and let an independent group verify it. If these machines are so great why didn't they use them in the Iraq Elections?