Report to Congress proves "benchmarks" talk is pure BS!

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq May 2006 Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006 (Section 9010)

Measures of Stability and Security and the
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

The President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq focuses on helping the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitutional and representative government that respects political and human rights and with sufficient security forces to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. To this end, the United States is pursuing an integrated strategy along three broad tracks:

• Political: helping the Iraqi people forge a broadly supported compact for democratic government.
• Economic: assisting the Iraqi government in establishing the foundations for a sound economy with the capacity to deliver essential services.
• Security: developing the capacity of Iraqis to secure their country while carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency.

Each of these tracks is integrated with the others; success in each is necessary for success along the other tracks. Security depends on a democratic political process, which in turn depends in part on economic opportunity. Economic progress depends on securing the Iraqi infrastructure against sabotage and attack and protecting the Iraqi people from terrorist attacks that undermine individual participation in economic development and the political process.

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III. Transitioning Security Responsibility to the Iraqi Government and Criteria for Withdrawing Forces

As described previously in this report, the transfer of security responsibility from Coalition forces to the Iraqi government is an objective of the security track in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. Such transfers reflect the capability of the Iraqi government to fulfill its sovereign responsibility in the most fundamental vital interest of any state— to protect its citizens and safeguard its territory. As Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, Coalition forces will increasingly move to supporting roles in most areas. In some cases, this may allow for personnel reductions or, as the President announced earlier this month, to delay previously scheduled deployments. Our posture on the ground will remain responsive and flexible, as will that of our Coalition partners. As the security situation evolves, we will ensure that we maintain sufficient forces on the ground to help Iraq consolidate and secure its gains on many different fronts.

Transitioning Security Responsibility

Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) lead within designated territories or areas of responsibility, described in the previous section, is only one step in fulfilling the criteria for transferring security responsibilities in any province. In concept, security transition is a four-phased process:

• Implement Partnerships—MNF-I and its Major Subordinate Commands establish and maintain partnerships across the entire spectrum of Iraqi Security Forces units, from battalion through to ministerial level.
• Iraqi Army Lead (IAL)—Process during which Iraqi Army units progress through stages of capability from unit formation to the ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations.
• Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)—Iraqi civil authorities satisfy the conditions required to assume control and exercise responsibility for the security of their respective provinces.
• Iraqi Security Self-Reliance—The Government of Iraq achieves PIC (or a combination of PIC and IAL) throughout Iraq; and the Government, through its security ministries, is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces.

These phases are not strictly sequential. For example, Iraqi forces do not have to assume the lead in each governorate before Coalition forces may begin transfer of provincial control in governorates where all conditions, including Iraqi Security Forces lead for security, have already been established.

Phase one of the security transition concept, implementing partnerships, is already complete. As described in the section on Iraqi Security Forces, the second phase, Iraqi Army lead, is well under way in several provinces. The third phase, establishing provincial Iraqi control over security, will be implemented on an area-by-area basis, building to control of entire governorates. The Iraqi government, jointly with military and political leadership of the United States and Coalition partners in Iraq, assesses when conditions permit handing over security responsibility for specific areas from Coalition forces to the Iraqi civil authorities. The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR) has developed criteria to guide the transfer of security responsibility. The Ministerial Committee for National Security acknowledged these criteria on February 3, 2006. The JCTSR principals include the U.S. Ambassador, the United Kingdom Ambassador, the Iraqi Ministers of Defense and Interior, the Iraqi National Security Advisor, and the Commanding General and Deputy Commanding General of MNF-I. Conditions necessary to transfer security responsibility are evaluated both in provinces and provincial capitals. Recommendations for transfer include an assessment of conditions in four categories:

• threat assessment;
• Iraqi Security Forces;
• governance; and
• MNF-I Forces.

The recommendation to transfer security responsibility is based on the specific situation in any one province or provincial capital in the context of the overall security environment. The appropriate Multi-National Force Division Commander, Provincial Governor, with assistance from representatives from the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense and U.S. and United Kingdom Embassies, are now conducting monthly assessments of provinces—and of provincial capitals if provinces do not meet security transition criteria. A Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR) working group will continue to meet monthly to review the assessments and present recommendations to the JCTSR principals regarding which provinces are ready to be transferred. Once a decision is made, the JCTSR working group will provide oversight of the development of transition directives, public affairs plan, and post-transfer security agreement between MNF-I forces and provincial governors. Each and every transfer will ensure an effective and successful handover of security responsibilities. Moreover, the transition and reduced presence of MNF-I forces will be clearly visible to the Iraqi people. The May joint assessments for the 18 provinces and provincial capitals of Iraq are currently being conducted.

Criteria for Withdrawing Forces

In consultation with the military commanders in Iraq, the Government of Iraq, and allies, the Secretary of Defense continues to advise the President on the appropriate level of U.S. Forces in Iraq and the surrounding theater of operations based on current conditions. These conditions include, but are not limited to, key elements of MNF-I Campaign Plan—such as the increasing leadership of Iraqi Security Forces in counter-insurgency operations and ownership of areas of responsibility—and progress in the political process. Pursuant to these conditions, and acting on the advice of his military commanders and the Secretary of Defense, earlier this month, the President decided to delay the deployment of a brigadesized unit from Germany to Iraq.

Arbitrary deadlines or timetables for withdrawal of Coalition forces—divorced from conditions in Iraq and the region—would be a serious strategic error, as they would suggest to the terrorists, Saddamists, and Rejectionists that they can simply wait to win. No war has ever been won on a timetable, and neither will this one. Lack of a timetable, however, does not mean that the Coalition’s posture in Iraq is static. On the contrary, the Coalition continually adjusts its posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow.

As Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, Coalition forces will increasingly move to supporting roles in many areas. As security conditions improve and as the Iraqi Security Forces become more capable of securing their own country, Coalition forces will move out of the cities, provide transition teams, reduce the number of bases from which they operate, and conduct fewer visible missions, but remain postured to assist. Although the Coalition military presence may become less visible, it will remain lethal and decisive, able to confront the enemy wherever it may gather and organize.

The military posture will continue to adjust to the requirements and conditions in Iraq and the status of Iraqi capabilities. The Coalition retains the ability to quickly reinforce Iraqi personnel as required and to provide critical enablers as Iraqis develop their own capabilities. Coalition troop levels will increase if necessary to defeat the enemy or to provide additional security for key events, like the recent referendum and elections. But the goal, over time, is to reduce Coalition forces as Iraqis continue to take on more of the security and civilian responsibilities themselves. This process is already under way.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/may2006/d20060530SecurityandStabiltyRptFinalv2.pdf

UK troops hand over to Iraqis

The training of Iraqi soldiers will be the key to the foreign pull-out

The transfer of security to the Iraqi government in Muthanna next month will pave the way for handovers in other provinces, the defence minister says.

Des Browne said the announcement by the Iraqi PM on Monday of the handover "will eventually lead to our ability to draw down our forces in Iraq".

Talking to BBC News from Baghdad, Mr Browne said he is also discussing a long-term security plan for Basra.

About 150 British troops are stationed in the southern Muthanna province.

"We will now begin to look at other provinces ... this is the beginning of that process," Mr Browne said.

"It's an important day for Iraq and a very important day for the UK as well as an important day for the people of Muthanna province."


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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5095120.stm#provinces