It was a typical tactic: refute the wildest accusations, while not addressing wider, more plausible charges.
Most people know there was some squaking about the Contras and drugs, but the accusations never went anyplace. Those people never listened to nor read the testimony of Special Councel Jack A. Blum to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Drug Trafficking and the Contra War:
(Emphasis below mine -- JHB)
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We found no evidence to suggest that people at the highest level of the United States government adopted a policy of supporting the Contras by
encouraging drug sales. For the most part the Contras on the ground were forgotten men, short on both supplies and money. The drug trafficking some Contras engaged in went to line their pockets not to help their political cause. In one case Jorge Morales, a drug trafficker, gave money to the Southern front Contras. They knew that the money was drug money and had no qualms about taking it. On another occasion an emissary for the drug cartel offered the United States government $10,000,000 for the Contras in exchange for amnesty for the Colombian traffickers. The approach, which we investigated to the best of our ability, was turned down.
There was, however, plenty of evidence that policy makers closed their eyes to the criminal behavior of some of America's allies and supporters in the Contra war. The
policy makers ignored their drug dealing, their stealing, their human rights violations. The policy makers allowed them to compensate themselves for helping us by remaining silent in the face of their impropriety and
by quietly undercutting the law enforcement and human right agencies that might have caused them difficulty.
In short, what you say about drugs and the Contras depends totally on the question. If the question is
did the CIA sell crack in the inner city to support the contra war, the answer is a categorical
no. If you ask
whether the United States government ignored the drug problem and subverted law enforcement to prevent embarrassment and to reward our allies in the Contra war, the answer is
yes.
We were aware of the Contra connection to the West Coast cocaine trade. When we tried to pursue the investigation, the Justice Department Criminal Division, then headed by Bill Weld,
fought giving us access to essential records and to witnesses in government custody. I remember a telephone conversation in which the United States Attorney for Northern California shouted at us and
accused us of being subversive for wanting the information. The Blandon-Meneses ring was just part of a larger picture. It was not the sole or even the most import source of cocaine in Los Angeles. I might add that the Justice Department did everything possible to block our investigation.
It moved prisoners to make them inaccessable, instructed Justice employees not to talk to us, punished an assistant U.S. Attorney for passing information to the Subcommittee. Since Gary Webb's stories in the San Jose Mercury many people have asked why they never heard about our investigation. The reason is that
we were the target of a systematic campaign to discredit our witnesses and the quality of our work. Justice Department officials
called the press that covered our hearings and told them our witnesses were lying. The White House staff described our work as a "politically motivated attack." Once we were attacked the press treated the conclusions with caution and downplayed the testimony of our witnesses. Our findings raised issues that needed extensive public discussion.
The involvement of the covert operations side of the intelligence community with drug traffickers and criminals is a longstanding problem. The willingness of the foreign policy establishment to subordinate every other priority in international relations to the crusade against Communism was also a longstanding problem. We have lived through a period during which priorities were set on an ideological basis that verged on religious belief rather than on a genuine assessment of threat. During the same period covert actions were taken with an eye to short terms results without regard to long term consequences. We must never let that kind of ideological blindness and short term vision infect intelligence assessments again. During the 1980's, I could count in the hundreds the number of dead from drug overdoses and drug wars on the streets of American cities. I could not find a report of a single death in the United States linked to hostile action by a Sandinista. During that period I often joked that if the packages of cocaine had been marked with a hammer and sickle the drug problem would have been the top priority and might have been solved.
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Full text can be found in various places, but I used the copy here:
http://www.totse.com/en/politics/central_intelligence_agency/ciacont2.html