Are absentee ballots the key to stealing the '06 elections?

Earlier this week during his press conference, The Chimp-In-Charge was quoted as claiming he had no doubt that both Houses would remain Repuke after the election. And in some sort of Bushism disconnect, he then mentioned something about absentee ballots that appeared to have no relevance. It kinda gave me the creeps. I was thinking at the time that he may have drivelled some strategy about squeezing the vote in Nov. Also this week, I see a story about it possibly taking up to 5 days after the election to count all the absentee ballots despite all the preparation that has gone into the election. Why now, especially with the reliance of manual counting minimized by all the computers, etc.?

Then I get this in my email today...
Permission to excerpt or reprint granted, with link to http://www.blackboxvoting.org

Let's start with this: ABSENTEE BALLOTS MAY REQUIRE MORE POSTAGE THAN YOU THINK

In an election last year in King County Washington, voters were surprised to learn that they needed to affix two stamps, not one, to their absentee ballot envelope. This year Black Box Voting has seen anecdotal evidence that ballots in Florida and California require two stamps, not one, and this is not always clear to the voter.


Next problem: VERY SERIOUS INCIDENTS CAN OCCUR WITH INCORRECT BALLOT INSERTS

In a California location where two different ballots are supposed to be inserted in each envelope mailed to the voters, some voters got only one, others got two of the same thing, and still others report ballots with some of the candidate names incorrect or left off.

Next problem: WAS YOUR SIGNATURE ACCEPTED?

When voting by mail, the signature on your voter registration card is compared with the signature on your mail-in envelope. This is often done with software like VoteRemote, which pulls the signature from your voter registration up on a computer screen and pulls the signature on your mail-in envelope onto the same screen, showing them side by side.

The jurisdiction has the option of having human eyes compare the signature or having the software do the comparison. If the software compares, it can be set strategically to various tolerances of acceptance. Whether humans or machines compare the signature, how do you know whether YOUR signature was accepted?



Next problem: DID YOUR MAIL-IN BALLOT ARRIVE AT THE ELECTIONS DIVISION?

Some jurisdictions allow voters to confirm whether or not their ballot arrived (but this doesn't confirm whether their signature was accepted). In other jurisdictions, there is no easy way to find out whether the ballot you mailed in ever got to the elections division.

WHAT TO DO: Call your local jurisdiction to find out the procedures for you to verify that your ballot was received. If your county cannot provide you with this information, contact Black Box Voting and also take action to change this policy (but that won't help you in the Nov. 2006 election).

Next problem: CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF MAIL-IN BALLOTS

Election officials have told us that this is one of their primary concerns. For example, after the ballots are separated from the envelopes that identify the voter, can new ballots be added or substituted? And what about the storage of absentee ballots as they are coming in, before they are counted? And transportation: In King County, Washington, as many as 60,000 ballots per day are received -- perhaps even more. Who's driving the truck, and what is protecting these ballots enroute?

Next problem: BALLOT PRINTER ACCOUNTABILITY

It used to be that all ballots were serial numbered. There was a careful accounting of how many ballots were printed, in serial-numbered order, and what happened to each ballot. The serial number could, of course, be used to tie a voter to a ballot, so it was affixed to the ballot with a perforation. The serial number was accounted for, then removed and saved in a separate secure ballot box. Not so any more!

Records obtained by Black Box Voting indicate that the Diebold ballot printing company located in Everett, Washington was budgeting to overprint by as many as 25 percent of what they delivered to the county. Employees of the ballot printing company asked US -- what happens to these extra ballots that are being printed up?

Well that's a good question. While counties and townships are expected to account for their ballots (though the accounting may or may not match -- that's another issue!) -- the ballot printer is usually under no obligation to account for what they do with extra ballots.

Having extra ballots floating around anywhere significantly jeopardizes the security of the election. It allows for back-room deals with insiders to replace ballots if a recount occurs, to make sure they "match" the results that were given out.

Next problem: VOTING MACHINE ISSUES

Absentee ballots are usually run through an optical scan voting machine. These machines have, in the past, produced tapes that give the results. These voting machine results tapes can then be compared with the central tabulator.

Diebold, at least, has disabled this results tape in its absentee counting machines, so that the ONLY results are the data held in the GEMS central tabulator machine -- a system so hackable that we once taught a chimpanzee to alter its audit log; this is the system I taught presidential candidate Howard Dean to manipulate.

The absentee votes are at particular risk in the GEMS central tabulator, for the following reason: Many absentee votes are counted after Election Day. By this time, you know exactly how many votes are needed to win. The simplest way to manipulate the tabulator to tweak absentee votes for a particular candidate is this:

- Each candidate is assigned a number in the GEMS system

- By flipping the number, you effectively flip the vote.

- You can flip votes back and forth as often as needed simply by reversing the candidate numbers in the GEMS database.

Yes, that requires inside access. But we should NOT be required to "trust" our government. Instead, we need to trust but verify, and the only way we can begin to verify the absentee central tabulator is to get the actual computer data files for each time the results were run.

Next problem: RECOUNTS ARE DIFFICULT WITH MAIL-IN VOTES

Mail-in votes are often counted in non-homogenous batches, and when candidates seek a recount, they are quoted exceedingly large sums because, they are told, it is impossible or very costly to sort out the ballots to obtain just their district.

Why else would Republicans (and a depressingly large number of Democrats) be so desperate to eliminate the last vestige of elections oversight?

trail? I'd rather trust my vote to paper than to a machine that could be manipulated and leave no trace.

It is a very, VERY dangerous idea to have to wait for a ballot that might not arrive in time, then turn it in with no way to verify that it was even received, much less counted.

From the time I give up my scantron ballot at a polling place to the time my vote is counted, it passes through exactly zero hands. For the rest of the day, my ballot sits in a doublely locked box observed by poll workers representing ALL of Washington State's major parties. After the polls close, the tabulation box is taken to the King County Elections office in the presence of a representative from each of the state's major parties. From the time I submit my ballot to the time the election is validated, there is a definite chain of accountability and I can, for any reason, get the names of every single person who had access to my ballot.

Assuming I get my ballot on time -- King County, Washington has done extremely poorly in this regard over the last few years -- I drop it off into a mail box where any passer by can pick it up. Even if I put it in a secured mailbox at the post office, I have no idea how many postal workers have access to what is very obviously a ballot being mailed from an extremely liberal part of the state. There is no way to verify that it has been delivered to any accountable person. If I have any questions about who has has had access to my ballot, I am up a shit creek without a canoe, much less a paddle.

Personally, I find going to a polling place a few blocks from where I live to be a trivial bother compared to the alternatives. And in 2007, there will be no alternatives in Washington State. :cry:

having scantron ballots this time -- we'll be using Diebold machines. Do you know anything about that?

And what do you think about using an absentee ballot -- if the only other choice is a Diebold machine -- and putting it into a box at the polling place.

This year's election, at least in King County, will use the scantron ballots that have been used now for several years.

Starting in 2007 -- specifically, the first scheduled special election in February of that year -- the entire state of Washington will be going to an all mail-in ballot. All ballots will be mailed out to all registered voters, to the address at which they are registered regardless of whether or not you can actually receive mail at that address. There will be NO exceptions. Assuming the ballots are mailed out in time, assuming it is actually delivered and assuming that no one steals the ballot from your mailbox, you can either mail it in as a regular absentee ballot, or you can hand deliver it to a "regional polling place." My understanding is that there will be only one regional polling place per county, so if you live in one of the big rural ones you are looking at up to a 200 mile drive to your polling place. If you do not receive a ballot and you still want to vote, you will be required to go to the regional polling place and request a provisional ballot, then fill it out and turn it in at the polling place.

The upshot is to eliminate pretty much every security and anti-fraud measure that has been worked out over the last hundred years. I will probably continue to vote, but only out of habit and a residual sense of civic duty. I will have absolutely no faith in the elections anymore, no faith that my vote is worth the poll tax -- excuse me, postage stamp -- that will be required to mail it in.

Added: To clarify why this is such a big deal to me.... Part of my job involves hitting the network security panic button when idiots at my workplace (usually the pointy-haired kind) do something incredibly stupid that puts our enterprise database at risk of being compromised by hackers and other thieves. In that role, I have had to learn quite a bit about systems analysis and how to find gaps in security which could cost my company millions of dollars if they were exploited. Assuming that our votes are at least as important as a database of client financial information, I apply that same type of analysis as best I can to changes in how elections are run. Looking at mail-in voting in that light is... well, let's just say that my dismal view is reasonably optimistic.

do you know if the new Diebold machines in use in the county have a paper trail?

they have electronic voting machines for people with disabilities, but the standard ballot is paper.

http://www.metrokc.gov/elections/access/faq.asp#replacepaper

FAQ # 4

ETA that the EVM's have a paper trail. FAQ # 8

ballot and registered with the county division of elections yesterday. No doubt in my mind that they have it.

to lose those by writing off all absentee votes or making them too difficult to cast.

The problem could come in the tabulation. If you have reason to know that absentee voting is up among Democrats in your precinct or state and yet the tallies are exactlty as biased towards the GOP as they have been in previous elections, ask for a recount and demand to see any "spoiled" or disqualified ballots.