faith and that we should not question the mysteries of the church. I could never accept that even as a kid. It always seemed to me that religion was more a controlling influence in people's lives. I rejected religion a long time ago for that reason.
To me, religion is a substitute for developing ones own personal philosophy. As support of this I find that religious people are constantly trying to increase their numbers which to me is a sign of insecurity in thier faith. Because if you were secure in your beliefs you would not care whether others agreed with you or not. The desire to protilatize is a desire to seek safety in numbers. Safety in the sence that if so many others agree with you you must be right. But right there you are relying on the teachings of a religion for your belief system rather than on yourself.
I find Immanual Kant's answer to the question "What is enlightenment" very telling.
IMMANUEL KANT
An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"
Konigsberg in Prussia, 30th September, 1784.
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity
is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another.
This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but
lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The
motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own
understanding!
Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large proportion of men, even
when nature has long emancipated them from alien guidance (naturaliter
maiorennes), nevertheless gladly remain immature for life. For the same
reasons, it is all too easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians.
It is so convenient to be immature! If I have a book to have understanding in
place of me, a spiritual adviser to have a conscience for me, a doctor to judge
my diet for me, and so on, I need not make any efforts at all. I need not think,
so long as I can pay; others will soon enough take the tiresome job over for me.
The guardians who have kindly taken upon themselves the work of supervision will
soon see to it that by far the largest part of mankind (including the entire
fair sex) should consider the step forward to maturity not only as difficult but
also as highly dangerous. Having first infatuated their domesticated animals,
and carefully prevented the docile creatures from daring to take a single step
without the leading-strings to which they are tied, they next show them the
danger which threatens them if they try to walk unaided. Now this danger is not
in fact so very great, for they would certainly learn to walk eventually after a
few falls. But an example of this kind is intimidating, and usually frightens
them off from further attempts.
Thus it is difficult for each separate individual to work his way out of the
immaturity which has become almost second nature to him. He has even grown fond
of it and is really incapable for the time being of using his own understanding,
because he was never allowed to make the attempt. Dogmas and formulas, those
mechanical instruments for rational use (or rather misuse) of his natural
endowments, are the ball and chain of his permanent immaturity. And if anyone
did throw them off, he would still be uncertain about jumping over even the
narrowest of trenches, for he would be unaccustomed to free movement of this
kind. Thus only a few, by cultivating the;r own minds, have succeeded in freeing
themselves from immaturity and in continuing boldly on their way.
There is more chance of an entire public enlightening itself. This is indeed
almost inevitable, if only the public concerned is left in freedom. For there
will always be a few who think for themselves, even among those appointed as
guardians of the common mass. Such guardians, once they have themselves thrown
off the yoke of immaturity, will disseminate the spirit of rational respect for
personal value and for the duty of all men to think for themselves. The
remarkable thing about this is that if the public, which was previously put
under this yoke by the guardians, is suitably stirred up by some of the latter
who are incapable of enlightenment, it may subsequently compel the guardians
themselves to remain under the yoke. For it is very harmful to propagate
prejudices, because they finally avenge themselves on the very people who first
encouraged them (or whose predecessors did so). Thus a public can only achieve
enlightenment slowly. A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism
and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true
reform in ways of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones they
replaced, will serve as a leash to control the great unthinking mass.
For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom
in question is the most innocuous form of allÑfreedom to make public use of
one's reason in all matters. But I hear on all sides the cry: Don't argue! The
officer says: Don't argue, get on parade! The tax-official: Don't argue, pay!
The clergyman: Don't argue, believe! (Only one ruler in the world says: Argue as
much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey!). . All this means
restrictions on freedom everywhere. But which sort of restriction prevents
enlightenment, and which, instead of hindering it, can actually promote it ? I
reply: The public use of man's reason must always be free, and it alone can
bring about enlightenment among men; the private use of reason may quite often
be very narrowly restricted, however, without undue hindrance to the progress of
enlightenment. But by the public use of one's own reason I mean that use which
anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public.
What I term the private use of reason is that which a person may make of it in a
particular civil post or office with which he is entrusted.
Now in some affairs which affect the interests of the commonwealth, we require a
certain mechanism whereby some members of the commonwealth must behave purely
passively, so that they may, by an artificial common agreement, be employed by
the government for public ends (or at least deterred from vitiating them). It
is, of course,impermissible to argue in such cases; obedience is imperative. But
in so far as this or that individual who acts as part of the machine also
considers himself as a member of a complete commonwealth or even of cosmopolitan
society, and thence as a man of learning who may through his writings address a
public in the truest sense of the word, he may 'indeed argue without harming the
affairs in which he is employed for some of the time in a passive capacity. Thus
it would be very harmful if an officer receiving an order from his superiors
were to quibble openly, while on duty, about the appropriateness or usefulness
of the order in question. He must simply obey. But he cannot reasonably be
banned from making observations as a man of learning on the errors in the
military service, and from submitting these to his public for judgement. The
citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed upon him; presumptuous criticisms
of such taxes, where someone is called upon to pay them, may be punished as an
outrage which could lead to general insubordination. Nonetheless, the same
citizen does not contravene his civil obligations if, as a learned individual,
he publicly voices his thoughts on the impropriety or even injustice of such
fiscal measures. In the same way, a clergyman is bound to instruct his pupils
and his congregation in accordance with the doctrines of the church he serves,
for he was employed by it on that condition. But as a scholar, he is completely
free as well as obliged to impart to the public all his carefully considered,
well-intentioned thoughts on the mistaken aspects of those doctrines, and to
offer suggestions for a better arrangement of religious and ecclesiastical
affairs. And there is nothing in this which need trouble the conscience. I;or
what he teaches in pursuit of his duties as an active servant of the church is
presented by him as something which he is not empowered to teach at his own
discretion, but which he is employed to expound in a prescribed manner and in
someone else's name. He will say: Our church teaches this or that, and these are
the arguments it uses. He then extracts as much practical value as possible for
his congregation from precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with full
conviction, but which he can nevertheless undertake to expound, since it is not
in fact wholly impossible that they may contain truth. At all events, nothing
opposed to the essence of religion is present in such doctrines. For if the
clergyman thought he could find anything of this sort in them, he would not be
able to carry out his official duties in good conscience, and would have to
resign. Thus the use which someone employed as a teacher makes of his reason in
the presence of his congregation is purely private, since a congregation,
however large it is, is never any more than a domestic gathering. In view of
this, he is not and cannot be free as a priest, sinÏ he is acting on a
commission imposed from outside. Conversely, as a scholar addressing the real
public (i.e. the world at large) through his writings, the clergyman making
public use of his reason enjoys unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to
speak in his own person. For to maintain that the guardians of the people in
spiritual matters should themselves be immature, is an absurdity which amounts
to making absurdities permanent.
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