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I thought not long before the war ended the German military offered to surrender to the French, UK and US, but wouldn't surrender to the Russians. And the Allies turned them down.
Do you know anything about that? Was it the human rights record of the soviets that made the Germans turn the offer down? And why didn't the Allies take it? I thought they invaded Korea to restrict the ambitions of the USSR (so they wouldn't get the whole of Korea, just the south). And I thought a reason they used the atomic bomb on Japan was fear the same would happen in Japan, with the soviets taking a part of it unless they conquered it quickly.
I also heard at least one general was wanting to take down the soviets right after the Germans went down (when they'd be weak). Do you know anything about that?
So it seems the Allies (minus the Russians) would've been happy to have the whole of Germany surrendered to them instead of split with the Russians. So do you know anything about that or about the politics of the Russians within the allies near the end of the war?
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As long as Hitler lived (the end of April 45), there were only informal attempts by germans to get a separate peace (Officers, Party, Statesmen). They were doomed to failure since the allies either didn't believe in the sincerity of the offer or didn't believe that the circles making the proposal had the necessary clout (which was true in most cases) to circumvent or oust Hitler. Another thing was that the US and GB both had reservations about what would happen to Germany if the Officers or some Party minions were to succeed Hitler - especially the British despised this possible outcome ("Rule of the Junkers") more than anything else. Given the impression that Hitler was the all-powerful, almost omniscient leader of Germany, they simply didn't put much attention to minor figures claiming that they could circumvent Hitler for a separate peace and then get rid of him. Even when they trusted their capabilities to do so, they did not trust the intentions of said groups.
Hitler made Admiral Dönitz his successor. Dönitz was sure no angle or a Democrat, but he was a very capable Officer. Many historians believe Hitler chose him over others so that Germany could have a separate peace under the leadership of a relatively "Non-Nazi" (always a question of degrees). But I highly doubt that. By the time Hitler killed himself Goering, Himmler, Bormann and many other figures had already begun to make plans of their own and were mostly betraying Hitler more or less overtly. So there really was no staunch representatives of the Old School Nazis to succeed him - something that led some to the assumption that now there was no obstacle to a separate peace.
Although the Western Allies may have preferred a separate peace with Germany by early 1945 over having the Soviets in Berlin, there was almost no realistic chance of that happening. First of all, the Allies were baffled by Dönitz as the new head of the Reich, and didn't trust the situation - was he a stooge, did he lead a coup or did he simply have luck? They weren't sure how legit the Dönitz succession was, if it was accepted within Germany - but most importantly, by the time Dönitz succeeded Hitler the war was already taking place within Germany and there was no real merit in stopping on the 9.5 yard mark for some kind of dubious peace. (Although many an American and British Officers and Politicians would have preferred to shake hands with the Germans and go on to Moskau.)
The most important reason of all though are the treaties between the Allies. Ever since the Meeting of Tehran in 1943 the Western Allies promised the Russians to open a second front and made a solemn promise NOT TO SIGN A SEPARATE PEACE WITH GERMANY. So in a sense it was a question of honor or better of keeping word in times of need - it would have made beautiful propaganda for the Soviets if the US would have "forgiven" the Germans in order to pick a fight with the Russians. But the promise was mostly the logical outcome of the US and UK's strategy of making the Russians bear most of the work and most of the casualties of the war - it was reasonable to provide the Soviets with material and let their huge manpower take care of the rest.
The general you're thinking of is Patton. He made several statements in the direction of "we're fighting to wrong guys here" and he really cranked that up after the war - he wanted to raise German divisions and march to Moscow with them. (Some people still believe that is the reason for the car "accident" that killed him - indeed that crash came after a series of other suspicious occurrences, but the scarce documentation doesn't really allow one to draw a conclusion). But, popular as Patton and his views may have been with certain circles in America, the people in power in America at that time (the pres, the press, the OSS (pre-CIA), the whole anglo american establishment and most of the traditional left were more or less pro-Soviet at that time. Indeed, there is some evidence that Roosevelt trusted Stalin quite more than he did trust Churchill (there is still some debate on that).
These are some reasons that come to mind why the US didn't implement the strategy of cooperation with Germans against the Soviets earlier than they did. There is some discussion about when the cold war started, extreme early would be the Hiroshima version you mentioned, the extreme late one takes the first blockade of Berlin as the starting date.
Maybe it's better to say the Western Allies SHOULD have been happy to take the offer at that point, not that they WOULD have. But that wasn't a realistic option because of the above mentioned reasons. Needless to say, they more than made up for their anti-Nazi pro -Soviet stance as soon as they realized there was a cold war going on - then they showed that they didn't have scruples to play with the Nazis or to deceive or cheat the Soviets. So in hindsight, one might think it wise to pursue such a strategy from earlier on. although such an interpretations is purely realpolitik and leaves out moral implications (just as the US did after WW2).
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