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I guess part depends on the relative sway the maliks and mullahs have over their clans and how balanced among clans the training/support would be.
Today it was reported that two jirgas asked the foreign militants to leave or face measures, with no sign of compliance by the militants. But a couple of days back, in the Swat valley one village jirga asked the Taliban/insurgents to leave; they did, presumably because of what wasn't reported--a willingness or capacity to effectively fight.
One should note there are a few different things going on. First, often the Frontier Guard can't match what the militants pay, and there are unemployed young men that the FG can't hire--there are too many of them. The foreign militants use zakat to hire them, and a number of the fighters are, apparently Uzbek, Chechen, Arab, or even Uighur, according to reports from various sides. And their numbers have increased in the last year, with Mullah Radio and others helping.
The militants' takfiri faith fits nicely with the local Deobandi version, so there's common cause there. Since the dominant form of education is in madaris, not necessarily ones that focus on modern subjects, there's a ready pool of young men since 2001 to go and fight for their faith--whether or not that's the faith of American Muslims is up for the two groups to decide. Some madaris train explicitly for jihad; some use foreign, experienced fighters, a lot get foreign funds and weapons. Sometimes very nice new weapons.
Then there's the drug money and drug lords, who work hand in glove with some mullahs, if not all. They provide additional monies for protection, and the possibility of a farmer growing profitable opium poppies instead of wheat probably plays a role--after all, land and water are limited, but birth rates have been on the order of 5-7 kids/family for the last 30 years and a population in which well over half the population is under 25.
There are also apparently logging interests at work in and around Swat, helping to make sure that the Swat Valley in particular is out from under the NEPA authorities (not that they, it would seem, were much of a threat).
How the program would work on the ground depends on how loyal clans are to the various mullahs/militants/criminals, how profitable their relationships are, how radicalized the fighters and local population are, how the different clans' relationships not only are but how they evolve, how the locals relate to central government, whether the maliks or mullahs have sway and if the mullahs are radicalized, and how American help is perceived. Having some jirgas call for nifaz-i shariah, the actual implementation of shari'ah as the local law, isn't a good sign; but then again, they may be calling for it as a middle path, one that would make the Taliban realize there's no point in removing the local powers that be since they're "good rulers", so it's a negotiated settlement--these clans are often at war with the aim of settlement, with lots of air-borne lead but a death toll of 0, so that's not an unreasonable suspicion.
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