"Perhaps trying to be cute, " Iran claims bombs made in USA

FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS
Volume I:
Investigations and Prosecutions
Lawrence E. Walsh
Independent Counsel
August 4, 1993
Washington, D.C.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Division for the Purpose of
Appointing Independent Counsel
Division No. 86-6

Part I
Iran/contra: The Underlying Facts

The Iran Arms Sales

What we now know as the Iran arms sales, or the Iran initiative, was actually a series of related but distinct events that began in the summer of 1985 and continued through 1986. Israel sent U.S.-supplied weapons to Iran on three occasions in 1985. These shipments took place with U.S. approval, and, in one instance, with U.S. participation. They led to the release in September 1985 of one American held hostage in Lebanon. The United States delivered missiles and missile parts to Iran on five occasions in 1986, after President Reagan signed an intelligence ``Finding'' authorizing such shipments. These 1986 shipments led to the release of two more U.S. hostages, though terrorists seized two additional Americans in September 1986.

The first shipment of U.S.-made weapons from Israel to Iran took place August 20, 1985. But discussion and debate within the U.S. Government as to the desirability of arms sales to Iran had been going on for months at the time of the first Israeli shipment.
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The Policy Debate

In early May of 1985, Michael Ledeen, a part-time consultant to the NSC, obtained National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane's approval to meet in Israel with Prime Minister Shimon Peres to explore whether Israel would share information on Iran with the United States.

According to Ledeen, Peres expressed displeasure with Israel's intelligence on Iran and suggested that the United States and Israel should work together to improve their information about and policies toward Iran. He also mentioned a recent Iranian request to buy artillery shells from Israel. Israel would grant the request, Peres said, only if the United States had no objection. Ledeen agreed to relay the question of the proposed weapons sale to McFarlane.35

35 For a more detailed discussion of these events, see McFarlane chapter.
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Approving Israeli Sales

In mid-July 1985, McFarlane informed Shultz, Weinberger and Casey of the Israeli proposal, including the new demand for TOW missiles. Shultz cabled to say that the United States should make a tentative showing of interest in a dialogue with Iran. Weinberger was opposed. Casey's July 18, 1985, letter supporting the draft NSDD favored the Israeli proposal.
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The November 1985 HAWK Shipment

Despite the disappointing results in September, discussions among the United States, Israel and Ghorbanifar continued. Ledeen continued to be the U.S. representative. In a late-September meeting in Paris, Ghorbanifar suggested Iran's interest in various anti-aircraft missiles, including HAWK missiles.


Only 18 HAWKs were delivered to Iran, instead of the planned 80. These 18 HAWKs were not what the Iranians wanted. The Iranians had been given the impression that the ``I-HAWKs'' (improved HAWKs) were capable of shooting down planes at high altitudes. They were not. To make matters worse, the missiles carried Israeli ``Star of David'' markings, which angered the Iranians. No hostages gained their freedom.

The HAWKs shipment caused problems at the CIA as well. The CIA's extensive involvement in the logistics of the delivery, its efforts to gain foreign clearances, and the use of the proprietary aircraft for an Israeli weapons delivery were ``covert actions'' that required a Presidential Finding. Further operations were put on hold while a proper Finding was drafted.
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/