Wanna Change Votes in Ohio? Use a PDA and a Magnet

Wanna Change Votes in Ohio? Use a PDA and a Magnet

Study Finds Ohio's Voting System Is Seriously Flawed

BY HANNA SIEGEL
Dec. 16, 2007

Got a PDA and a magnet? You could switch votes cast in an Ohio election by connecting your PDA to the voting machine.

A study conducted over a two-month period this year found that Ohio's voting systems are seriously flawed. An 86-page report released by Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner says, "The findings in this study indicate that the computer-based voting systems in use in Ohio do not meet computer industry security standards, and are susceptible to breaches of security that may jeopardize the integrity of the voting process."

When Brunner was campaigning for her office seat, she promised a top-to-bottom overview of Ohio's voting system.

Her findings have broad implications. With the election less than a year away, Ohio is an important swing state, decisive in returning President Bush to office in 2004.

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Further Study

Another potentially useful aspect of the election for determining numbers of cross-votes, particularly those not evident using results for one race, might be statistical comparison with down-ticket races using cross-voting probability sorts such as those herein. Precinct level pairing of cross-voting in diverse races could be analyzed. Comparison with 2006 results may reveal patterns of change correlating to vote-switch probability patterns in 2004.

This study has not considered the history of decisions that created the Cuyahoga County election. Given the irregularities noted, the decisions in that process, particularly organization of precincts, ballot orders, and locations, and why these factors combined as they did to Bush's advantage, should receive official review in the light of the post-election results evidencing cross-precinct voting. Because the situation resulted in election results different from the votes cast, an official inquiry into all aspects of the process should take place. In particular, the strong correlation between minority populations and both non-vote percentages and cross-voting also requires a civil rights investigation.

Given the number of switched-votes in Cuyahoga County, results in other Ohio counties and elections should also be analyzed for irregularities wherever more than one ballot order was employed at a punch card voting location. The same needs to be accomplished for past Ohio elections. Also, statistical analysis may reveal the patterns produced by switching ballots to precincts with different ballot orders to effect vote-switching.

I did not anticipate the complexities of Cuyahoga County's election organization, the resultant amount of work required to fully and accurately answer the questions I first posed, and the evidence of irregularities. The number of Ohio Kerry votes switched to Bush votes remains to be fully quantified. While a precise answer is unattainable, statistical analysis can provide a useful answer. Cross-vote outcome probability sorting allows quantification of the impact. The number is far more than I initially thought, and more than would be expected under random circumstances.

January 27, 2007. At this writing, analyses, study, and editing of this article continue. Nonetheless, this material needs to be available for the new semester. I will continue updating. The spreadsheets display various analyses not yet presented herein. Focus, in particular, on the highlighted cells for the most pertinent results. More charts are also found in the spreadsheets.

Conclusions

In 2004, the Ohio Presidential voting results do not accurately reflect voter intentions. In Cuyahoga County, the election was flawed and the design appears to have been manipulated. At locations with several ballot orders in use, many votes were cast by voters crossing precincts, hence counted other than as intended. At precincts with the highest Kerry support, the percentage of uncounted votes is inexplicably high. The obvious inference—intentional manipulation produced concentrated undercounting, cross-voting, and vote-switching in areas of highest Kerry support—cannot be ignored in the face of the evidence and statistics. The possibilty that ballots were switched to different precincts, post-voting to effect vote-switching, must also be considered.

Many individual ballots resulted in a vote-switch, a two-vote margin difference from the intended result. Switched-votes cast for Kerry and counted for Bush had twice the impact as their actual occurence, by each subtracting one from Kerry and adding one to Bush. Bush and Kerry votes also went uncounted as non-votes or were miscounted as minor candidate votes. A high percentage of all Cuyahoga County votes were cast at locations with multiple ballot orders. The manner in which precincts and ballot orders were combined increased the probability of a Kerry cross-vote being recorded as a Bush vote. Quantitative analyses of candidate votes and of non-vote percentages evidence the cross-voting and the patterns of cross-voting and vote-switching.

Sorting locations and precincts to their specific cross-voting probability subsets reveals intended voting patterns and the degree of cross-voting. The combinations of ballot orders and precincts at polling locations enables quantitative analysis of cross-voting and vote-switching. The complexity of the election's organization—the great number of combinations of ballot orders and locations—also makes the task of determining the number of cross-votes laborious and complex. While that process is not concluded herein, the procedures so far taken in this study define the process. This process may be more easily applied to other Ohio counties given less-complex ballot order combinations.

Any official inquiry into the 2004 irregularities needs to be independent of political interests, and monitored by political interests. The fact that the irregularities discussed herein are known and have been reported to multiple jurisdictions and law enforcement entities, and yet no official inquiry into the election has occurred, illustrates the broader failure of the current election process and judicial system to respond to election fraud and irregularties or to hold officials accountable for their actions. Polling places should never have been arranged such as in Ohio, with multiple ballot orders and separate casting and counting devices. Measures are required to prevent the possibility of similar future flawed election designs. To this end, control of elections should be removed from competing political interests and actors to politically-independent processes, with at the least, independent and political oversight of elections.

Many more conclusions remain to be made as study and analysis continues. The 2004 Ohio election ballots must be preserved to allow further investigations. If this study illustrates anything, hopefully it is the degree to which this problem has not yet been fully considered, and the complete failure of officials to respond. During an era of new voting system technologies and reforms, careful consideration of past errors may prove useful in avoiding their repetition and in preventing future abuses of process and power.

The 2004 Ohio Presidential election remains to be fully investigated. The blatant evidence of irregularities and unfairness of organization continues to be ignored by the authorities who have been informed of the evidence.