The continued Russian occupation of Georgia is totally unacceptable, but that shouldn't detract from the fact that it was Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili who began the war by ordering an attack on Ossetia.
The plan was to capture the Ossetian capital and to block the strategically important Roki tunnel, according to Stratfor:
"Fundamentally there are only two locations in this conflict that matter: the capital and the southern end of the Roki Tunnel, which connects South Ossetia to Russia. The capital is the only city of note in South Ossetia, and the Roki is the only means for Russia to shuttle forces to and from the territory. The tunnel is only two lanes wide and is an excellent choke point. If Georgia can capture and hold those two targets, South Ossetia’s 15-year rebellion will in essence be over."
Stratfor, Decision time in Moscow,
August 7Today Georgian national security adviser Alexander Lomaia admitted that this was indeed the plan:
"Alexander Lomaia is Mikheil Saakashvili's right-hand man and was partly responsible for giving the go-ahead for the Georgian military action in South Ossetia. But the operation had a completely different outcome from what he was expecting.
"Our aim was to block the Roki Tunnel (between Russian and South Ossetia). For some time it had been the route of illegal support for the separatists. We thought that after we had done that we would be able to negotiate with the Russians."
What followed was a large-scale Russian assault.
"It was an enormous surprise," he says. He was also surprised when the West gave Georgia only verbal support.
http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/region/europe/080819-russia-georgia-goriIn the morning of August 7, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza was informed that the Georgians had made the decision to attack Ossetia:
2 a.m. in Washington is 10 a.m. local time in Tbilisi.
At the same time, or perhaps a little earlier, U.S. military trainers in Georgia learned that the unit they were training was preparing for battle:
The Americans arrived for work Aug. 7 to unexpectedly find training was over for the unit they had been assigned to for three weeks, the 4th Brigade: The Georgian soldiers were sitting on their rucksacks and singing folk songs as an Orthodox priest walked among them chanting and waving incense.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5j6kA_-cfbTg2ZfWRQ4AI5wmlMxMgD92KSSI80This is important because the Georgian Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili now claims that the decision to move the troops to the front was only made at 6 p.m.:
But by evening, Kezerashvili said, the Georgian side had had enough.
"At 6, I gave the order to prepare everything, to go out from the bases,".
Washington PostAnd the Georgian president claims that the decision to lift the ceasefire was made at 11:50 p.m.:
At 11 p.m., Saakashvili said, he received the first reports that Russian units were passing through the tunnel.
"We started to check, and around 11:50, I got confirmation that Russian armor was coming in," Saakashvili said. "So what we do now? I said, 'Now we respond with fire.'
Washington PostGeorgia initially justified the attack by claiming that it was in response to heavy shelling from the Ossetian side.
However, the OSCE monitors on the ground were unable to confirm this:
OSCE monitors in Tskhinvali also did not record any outgoing heavy artillery fire from the South Ossetian side at that time, according to a Western diplomat with access to the organization's on-the-ground reporting.
Washington PostAfter the defeat, Saakashvili began to claim that he had ordered the attack because "Russian units" were already "passing through the tunnel" on the night of August 7.
However, this seems to clash with Alexander Lomaia's remarks today that the Russian response "was an enormous surprise".
Interestingly, the official "Letter dated 8 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council" also makes no mention of any Russian troop movement prior to the Georgian attack:
According to the Georgian defense minister, the shelling of South Ossetia’s capital city Tskhinvali had begun "at 12 at night".
Key Battle at Gufta/Kurta BridgeOne commentator, analyzing the Georgian defeat ("Could the Georgians Have Done Better?"), unknowingly discovers the daring plan on which the Georgian attack was based:
"The route by which Russian troops, weapons and humanitarian supplies came south while thousands of refugees went north is a single narrow road from the Roki Tunnel built in 1985. Readers are invited to
“drive” this road on Google (Maps). If one does so, one comes to a large bridge where the road turns south in a defile at 42°21'29.61"N 43°54'2.58"E. This location is about 25 kilometres from the South Ossetian border.
Had Georgian forces got to that location, blown the bridge and set up an ambush position, what would we be looking at today?"
Russia BlogWhat the analyst apparently doesn't know is that this is precisely what the Georgian special forces tried to do (but failed to achieve):
With the bridge still intact, a column of one hundred fifty tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles of Russia's 58th army was able cross the border into South Ossetia at 3:47 p.m. on August 8 and when they reached Tskhinvali a few hours later the battle was effectively over.