The Three Stooges of Iraq Warfare show that you can't teach pompous chickenhawks who never experienced combat COIN tricks:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/12_iraq_biddle/12_iraq_biddle.pdf However, it seems, Iraq combat experienced officers have come to realize that the essence of COIN strategy is POLICE, not military , action.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/151-modarelli.pdf Insurgents should be prosecuted, not persecuted, nor killed, as Bing West wants Marines to do exclusively. Before we invest incrementally in Afghanistan, let us recall the key lesson of Vietnam: that when the Phoenix Program got going, it wiped out the Viet Cong Infrastructure-- not our military forces, nor our air-power; these assets were reserved for North Vietnamese regular divisions on South Vietnam's unpopulated borders.
In Iraq there are no enemy regulars for us to bomb or shoot to pieces from our up-armed HUMVEEs. If we had selected 15,000 Iraqis for police training, brought them and their familes to specially made towns with training centers in america, over three to five years these could have been the police force that keep Iraq together while apprehending the criminal elements that are the basic forces behind the insurgency. Serving as an American trained National Police Force, well paid and their nulcear familes kept safe in the US, they would have developed law and order in Iraq instead of the current "surge." In fact, Gen. Jack Keane, the so called mouthpiece of the Surge, is quoted by Woodward in his book THE WAR WITHIN advocating exactly that as a way of minimizing the civilian casualties, both in honor and life. I would greatly appreciate the views of others on these articles.
Happy Holidays and the best of the New Year to all
Daniel E. Teodoru