The question remains: WHY??

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/Volume11/centralasia.html
Central Asia Snapshots

Laxman Bahroo and J. L. Khayyam Coelho

Central Asia, the perennial penumbra of empires, has once again gained importance and captured world headlines. The land of war-like Turcomans, ancient cultural centers, the lucrative Silk Road, and the Great Game briefly fell into obscurity as world wars and ideological struggle preoccupied global consciousness. In the post Cold War era, and especially the post 9-11 era, Central Asia has reacquired its lost pre-eminence. Strategically bordering the major regions of Asia, the Russian Federation, China, Indian Subcontinent and the Middle East, it has become the destination of choice for regional and global powers seeking to expand their influence.


The pendulum of strategic thought has oscillated between the contrasting theories of Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman. Mackinder believed that the area constituting Central Asia formed the pivotal "heartland" and its importance summarized in the famous aphorism: He who controls the Heartland controls the World Island; He who controls the World Island, controls the world. Spykman disagreed because Mackinder's formulation discounted the influence of sea power. Instead, Spykman proposed the "Rimland" concept, regions that have access to the sea as well as the interior land mass. It comprised of Western Europe, the Middle East, Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. This concept too has a matching aphorism he who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.


After nearly a century, the heartland has regained its prominence, as the newly independent republics find their footing on the way to nationhood. Countries from the surrounding regions have established military, diplomatic and an economic presence in the region motivated in part by exploration, academic study, competition, religion, and greed. Dubbed the New Great Game, the world has become interested in the region’s natural resources, its people and its conflicts. Energy conduits crisscrossing the region are the new and more enduring Silk Road, the great ancient commercial artery binding the Ganges and the Yellow River to the Near East and the Mediterranean. Central Asia has the potential to become the most significant trade artery of tomorrow, linking together China, India, Middle East, Russia and the fringe of Europe. Therefore the New Great Game is merely a reshuffling of priorities, protagonists, and level of intensity cloaked in a new garb; the underlying motivations have been the same since time immemorial.

http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/American_Empire/American_Empire_page.html
American Empire page
"Europeans rationalized their empires as civilizing missions. Today the utopian rhetoric of American exceptionalism masks the primary intent of the United States to create, not actual colonies, but a global market subservient to transnational capital."
David Moberg
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/American_Empire/American_Empire_page.html

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2003/03/thirty-year-itch

The Thirty-Year Itch

Three decades ago, in the throes of the energy crisis, Washington's hawks conceived of a strategy for US control of the Persian Gulf's oil. Now, with the same strategists firmly in control of the White House, the Bush administration is playing out their script for global dominance.

—By Robert Dreyfuss
March/April 2003 Issue

If you were to spin the globe and look for real estate critical to building an American empire, your first stop would have to be the Persian Gulf. The desert sands of this region hold two of every three barrels of oil in the world -- Iraq's reserves alone are equal, by some estimates, to those of Russia, the United States, China, and Mexico combined. For the past 30 years, the Gulf has been in the crosshairs of an influential group of Washington foreign-policy strategists, who believe that in order to ensure its global dominance, the United States must seize control of the region and its oil. Born during the energy crisis of the 1970s and refined since then by a generation of policymakers, this approach is finding its boldest expression yet in the Bush administration -- which, with its plan to invade Iraq and install a regime beholden to Washington, has moved closer than any of its predecessors to transforming the Gulf into an American protectorate.

In the geopolitical vision driving current U.S. policy toward Iraq, the key to national security is global hegemony -- dominance over any and all potential rivals. To that end, the United States must not only be able to project its military forces anywhere, at any time. It must also control key resources, chief among them oil -- and especially Gulf oil. To the hawks who now set the tone at the White House and the Pentagon, the region is crucial not simply for its share of the U.S. oil supply (other sources have become more important over the years), but because it would allow the United States to maintain a lock on the world's energy lifeline and potentially deny access to its global competitors. The administration "believes you have to control resources in order to have access to them," says Chas Freeman, who served as U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia under the first President Bush. "They are taken with the idea that the end of the Cold War left the United States able to impose its will globally -- and that those who have the ability to shape events with power have the duty to do so. It's ideology."

Iraq, in this view, is a strategic prize of unparalleled importance. Unlike the oil beneath Alaska's frozen tundra, locked away in the steppes of central Asia, or buried under stormy seas, Iraq's crude is readily accessible and, at less than $1.50 a barrel, some of the cheapest in the world to produce. Already, over the past several months, Western companies have been meeting with Iraqi exiles to try to stake a claim to that bonanza.

But while the companies hope to cash in on an American-controlled Iraq, the push to remove Saddam Hussein hasn't been driven by oil executives, many of whom are worried about the consequences of war. Nor are Vice President Cheney and President Bush, both former oilmen, looking at the Gulf simply for the profits that can be earned there. The administration is thinking bigger, much bigger, than that.

"Controlling Iraq is about oil as power, rather than oil as fuel," says Michael Klare, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and author of Resource Wars. "Control over the Persian Gulf translates into control over Europe, Japan, and China. It's having our hand on the spigot."

Ever since the oil shocks of the 1970s, the United States has steadily been accumulating military muscle in the Gulf by building bases, selling weaponry, and forging military partnerships. Now, it is poised to consolidate its might in a place that will be a fulcrum of the world's balance of power for decades to come. At a stroke, by taking control of Iraq, the Bush administration can solidify a long-running strategic design. "It's the Kissinger plan," says James Akins, a former U.S. diplomat. "I thought it had been killed, but it's back."

Akins learned a hard lesson about the politics of oil when he served as a U.S. envoy in Kuwait and Iraq, and ultimately as ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the oil crisis of 1973 and '74. At his home in Washington, D.C., shelves filled with Middle Eastern pottery and other memorabilia cover the walls, souvenirs of his years in the Foreign Service. Nearly three decades later, he still gets worked up while recalling his first encounter with the idea that the United States should be prepared to occupy Arab oil-producing countries.

In 1975, while Akins was ambassador in Saudi Arabia, an article headlined "Seizing Arab Oil" appeared in Harper's. The author, who used the pseudonym Miles Ignotus, was identified as "a Washington-based professor and defense consultant with intimate links to high-level U.S. policymakers." The article outlined, as Akins puts it, "how we could solve all our economic and political problems by taking over the Arab oil fields (and) bringing in Texans and Oklahomans to operate them." Simultaneously, a rash of similar stories appeared in other magazines and newspapers. "I knew that it had to have been the result of a deep background briefing," Akins says. "You don't have eight people coming up with the same screwy idea at the same time, independently.

"Then I made a fatal mistake," Akins continues. "I said on television that anyone who would propose that is either a madman, a criminal, or an agent of the Soviet Union." Soon afterward, he says, he learned that the background briefing had been conducted by his boss, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Akins was fired later that year.

Kissinger has never acknowledged having planted the seeds for the article. But in an interview with Business Week that same year, he delivered a thinly veiled threat to the Saudis, musing about bringing oil prices down through "massive political warfare against countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran to make them risk their political stability and maybe their security if they did not cooperate."

In the 1970s, America's military presence in the Gulf was virtually nil, so the idea of seizing control of its oil was a pipe dream. Still, starting with the Miles Ignotus article, and a parallel one by conservative strategist and Johns Hopkins University professor Robert W. Tucker in Commentary, the idea began to gain favor among a feisty group of hardline, pro-Israeli thinkers, especially the hawkish circle aligned with Democratic senators Henry Jackson of Washington and Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York.

Eventually, this amalgam of strategists came to be known as "neoconservatives," and they played important roles in President Reagan's Defense Department and at think tanks and academic policy centers in the 1980s. Led by Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's influential Defense Policy Board, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, they now occupy several dozen key posts in the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department. At the top, they are closest to Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who have been closely aligned since both men served in the White House under President Ford in the mid-1970s. They also clustered around Cheney when he served as secretary of defense during the Gulf War in 1991.

Throughout those years, and especially after the Gulf War, U.S. forces have steadily encroached on the Gulf and the surrounding region, from the Horn of Africa to Central Asia. In preparing for an invasion and occupation of Iraq, the administration has been building on the steps taken by military and policy planners over the past quarter century.

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