From:
http://www.americablog.com/2009/06/obama-justice-depart... Commentary by John Aravosis at American Blog, text after colon, from the Court document.
Holy cow. Obama invoked incest and people marrying children:
The courts have followed this principle, moreover, in relation to the validity of marriages performed in other States. Both the First and Second Restatements of Conflict of Laws recognize that State courts may refuse to give effect to a marriage, or to certain incidents of a marriage, that contravene the forum State's policy. See Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 134; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 284.5 And the courts have widely held that certain marriages performed elsewhere need not be given effect, because they conflicted with the public policy of the forum. See, e.g., Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Conn. 1961) (marriage of uncle to niece, "though valid in Italy under its laws, was not valid in Connecticut because it contravened the public policy of th state"); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 67-68 (N.J. 1958) (marriage of 16-year-old female held invalid in New Jersey, regardless of validity in Indiana where performed, in light of N.J. policy reflected in statute permitting adult female to secure annulment of her underage marriage); In re Mortenson's Estate, 316 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1957) (marriage of first cousins held invalid in Arizona, though lawfully performed in New Mexico, given Arizona policy reflected in statute declaring such marriages "prohibited and void").
Then in the next paragraph, they argue that the incest and child rape cases therefore make DOMA constitutional:
The fact that States have long had the authority to decline to give effect to marriages performed in other States based on the forum State's public policy strongly supports the constitutionality of Congress's exercise of its authority in DOMA.
DOMA is good because it saves the feds money:
"The constitutional propriety of Congress's decision to decline to extend federal benefits immediately to newly recognized types of marriages is bolstered by Congress's articulated interest in preserving the scarce resources of both the federal and State governments. DOMA ensures that evolving understandings of the institution of marriage at the State level do not place greater financial and administrative obligations on federal and state benefits programs. Preserving scarce government resources — and deciding to extend benefits incrementally — are well-recognized legitimate interests under rational-basis review. See Butler, 144 F.3d at 625 ("There is nothing irrational about Congress's stated goal of conserving social security resources, and Congress can incrementally pursue that goal."); Hassan v. Wright, 45 F.3d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Protecting the fisc provides a rational basis for Congress' line drawing in this instance."). Congress expressly relied on these interests in enacting DOMA: Government currently provides an array of material and other benefits to married couples in an effort to promote, protect, and prefer the institution of marriage. . . . If were to permit homosexuals to marry, these marital benefits would, absent some legislative response, presumably have to be made available to homosexual couples and surviving spouses of homosexual marriages on the same terms as they are now available to opposite-sex married couples and spouses. To deny federal recognition to same-sex marriages will thus preserve scarce government resources, surely a legitimate government purpose."
DOMA is constitutional (thus screwing us on any future lawsuits):
The constitutionality of Section 2 of DOMA is further confirmed by the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which expressly empowers Congress to prescribe "the Effect" to be accorded to the laws of a sister State. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. Although the broad contours of this provision have not been conclusively established, the power exercised by Congress in enacting DOMA clearly conforms to any conceivable construction of the effects provision....
Under this view, Congress obviously acted within its plenary effects power in enacting Section 2 of DOMA. If the Constitution itself does not declare "the effect" of the law of "one state in another state," McElmoyle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 325, but instead leaves that "power in congress," Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 485, then Congress clearly had the authority in DOMA to declare that no State is "required to give effect" to the same-sex marriage laws of other States. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
"DOMA Is Consistent with Equal Protection and Due Process Principles." This is important because it means that Obama wasn't content to simply argue, based on technicalities, that this case should be thrown out. He went out of his way to argue that DOMA is actually constitutional, and then went into detail destroying every single constitutional argument we have for opposing DOMA in court. This will screw us on every lawsuit we file on every gay issue, in every public policy debate we have in the states on any gay issue.
DOMA Is Consistent with Equal Protection and Due Process Principles Plaintiffs further allege that DOMA violates their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, including its equal protection component. DOMA, however, merely preserves for each State the authority to follow its own law and policy with respect to same-sex marriage for purposes of State law. And it maintains the status quo of federal policy, preserving a longstanding federal policy of promoting traditional marriages, by clarifying that the terms "marriage" and "spouse," for purposes of federal law, refer to marriage between a man and a woman, and do not encompass relationships of any other kind within their ambit. Thus, because DOMA does not make a suspect classification or implicate a right that has been recognized as fundamental, it is necessarily subject to rational-basis scrutiny, see National Ass'n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000), which it satisfies.
Gays have no constitutional right to marriage, or recognition of their marriages by other states:
Plaintiffs are married, and their challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") poses a different set of questions: whether by virtue of their marital status they are constitutionally entitled to acknowledgment of their union by States that do not recognize same-sex marriage, and whether they are similarly entitled to certain federal benefits. Under the law binding on this Court, the answer to these questions must be no.
Praises DOMA as "cautiously limited":
DOMA reflects a cautiously limited response to society's still-evolving understanding of the institution of marriage.
Sounds to me like Obama just came out against the Loving v. VA case that ensured that people like his parents could marry:
On the merits, plaintiffs' claims that DOMA violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause and their "right to travel" both fail as a matter of law. In allowing each State to withhold its recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions, Congress was merely confirming longstanding conflict-of-laws principles in a valid exercise of its express power to settle such questions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. That Clause ensures that each State retains the authority to decline to apply another State's law when it conflicts with its own public policies. DOMA is fully consistent with that constitutional principle, as it permits States to experiment with and maintain the exclusivity of their own legitimate public policies — such as whether that State chooses to recognize or reject same-sex marriages.
Gays don't deserve same scrutiny in court that other minorities get:
Because DOMA does not restrict any rights that have been recognized as fundamental or rely on any suspect classifications, it need not be reviewed with heightened scrutiny. Properly understood, the right at issue in this case is not a right to marry. After all, the federal government does not, either through DOMA or any other federal statute, issue marriage licenses or determine the standards for who may or may not get married. Indeed, as noted above — and as evidenced by the fact that plaintiffs have married in California — DOMA in no way prohibits same-sex couples from marrying. Instead, the only right at issue in this case is a right to receive certain benefits on the basis of a same-sex marriage. No court has ever found such a right to federal benefits on that basis to be fundamental — in fact, all of the courts that have considered the question have rejected such a claim. (And even if the right at issue in this case were the right to same-sex marriage, current Supreme Court precedent that binds this Court does not recognize such a right under the Constitution.) Likewise, DOMA does not discriminate, or permit the States to discriminate, on the basis of a suspect classification; indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification.
Argues Republican position on how judges should review cases:
DOMA therefore must be analyzed under rational-basis review. Under the highly deferential rational basis standard, moreover, a court may not act as superlegislature, sitting in judgment on the wisdom or morality of a legislative policy. Instead, a legislative policy must be upheld so long as there is any reasonably conceivable set of facts that could provide a rational basis for it, including ones that the Congress itself did not advance or consider. DOMA satisfies this standard.
The twisted logic of this paragraph is sickening. Pat Robertson could have written this:
Likewise, Section 3 of DOMA merely clarifies that federal policy is to make certain benefits available only to those persons united in heterosexual marriage, as opposed to any other possible relationship defined by law, family, or affection. As a result, gay and lesbian individuals who unite in matrimony are denied no federal benefits to which they were entitled prior to their marriage; they remain eligible for every benefit they enjoyed beforehand. DOMA simply provides, in effect, that as a result of their same-sex marriage they will not become eligible for the set of benefits that Congress has reserved exclusively to those who are related by the bonds of heterosexual marriage. In short, then, the failure in this manner to recognize a certain subset of marriages that are recognized by a certain subset of States cannot be taken as an infringement on plaintiffs' rights, even if same-sex marriage were accepted as a fundamental right under the Constitution.
DOMA is a good thing:
It adopts on the national level, and permits on the state level, a wait-and-see approach to new forms of marriage. DOMA thus maximizes democratic flexibility under our federalist scheme, by simply preventing some States from requiring other States and the federal government to grant benefits to forms of marriages that, under their own constitutions, state or federal governments are not obligated to recognize. Because it is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests, plaintiffs cannot overcome the "presumption of constitutionality" that DOMA, like all federal statutes, enjoys.
DOMA is rational and constitutional:
Its cautious decision simply to maintain the federal status quo while preserving the ability of States to experiment with new definitions of marriage is entirely rational. Congress may subsequently decide to extend federal benefits to same-sex marriages, but its decision to reserve judgment on the question does not render any differences in the availability of federal benefits irrational or unconstitutional.
Provides legal argument against gays' right to privacy:
Second, the right to privacy encompasses only rights that are constitutionally fundamental, and, as noted earlier, the right to receive benefits on the basis of same-sex marriage (as well as same-sex marriage itself) has not been recognized by the courts as a fundamental right.
DOMA was actual a very "neutral" law, rather than anti-gay:
Section 3 of DOMA reflects just such an approach: it maximizes democratic flexibility and self-governance under our federalist system, by adopting a policy of federal neutrality with respect to a matter that is primarily the concern of state government. Because all 50 States recognize heterosexual marriage, it was reasonable and rational for Congress to maintain its longstanding policy of fostering this traditional and universally-recognized form of marriage. At the same time, because Congress recognized both the freedom of States to expand the traditional definition, and the freedom of other States to decline to recognize this newer form of marriage, a policy of neutrality dictated that Congress not extend federal benefits to new forms of marriage recognized by some States.
read the rest at...
http://www.americablog.com/2009/06/obama-justice-depart...