Columbia families received $26.6 million settlement--NASA kept it under wraps

CAPE CANAVERAL -- NASA launched shuttle Columbia with more than 1,600 known problems that could have destroyed the spaceship and killed its crew.
Internal documents obtained by Florida Today show NASA has been flying shuttles with twice as many accepted flaws in critical systems -- those whose failure could lead to catastrophe -- than were on the books when Challenger exploded in 1986.

No fewer than five independent oversight groups since then have criticized the agency for failing to reform its system for granting such waivers.

The waivers amount to decisions to accept the risk posed by defects in the orbiters, solid rocket boosters, fuel tanks and other equipment.
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At least 5,800 waivers were on the books when Columbia launched Jan. 16. That number includes the 1,672 waivers of problems that could have destroyed the orbiter, as well as other flaws with less-severe consequences.
At the time, NASA told Challenger investigators it was flying with 829 open waivers on what it calls Criticality 1 systems. Those are the ones, which if they failed, could cause the loss of a shuttle and its crew. The famous example is a waiver of a requirement that hot gases not escape rubber seals in the twin solid rocket boosters.
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Former astronaut Sally Ride had a sense of déjà vu last month. As a member of the panel looking into the cause of the Feb. 1 Columbia shuttle disaster, she noted a disturbing "echo" — the recurrence of problems that first surfaced and were supposedly solved following the 1986 Challenger shuttle tragedy, which she also helped investigate.

Ride's echo now sounds more like a sonic boom. At a Senate hearing on Wednesday, retired admiral Harold Gehman, who heads the Columbia probe, charged that a NASA safety office created in response to the Challenger explosion is a façade "with no people, money, engineering expertise, analysis."

Gehman's rebuke, together with Ride's observation, points to the space agency's failure to learn from its first shuttle disaster 17 years ago. Instead of implementing safety reforms that could lessen the chances of another deadly accident, the agency continues to downplay potential hazards until they prove catastrophic.

The mind-set was at the heart of the Challenger explosion. As long as it remains ingrained in NASA's culture, merely fixing the problem that caused the Columbia to disintegrate won't get the nation's space program into a successful orbit.

The technical cause of the 1986 disaster was a leaky O-ring, a safety seal that joined segments on the shuttle's booster rockets. Separating seconds after liftoff, the O-ring allowed hot gases to leak, setting off a massive explosion that killed all seven astronauts aboard.

Missteps by NASA led to that fatal blast. It ignored flaws in the O-ring design as missions succeeded without mishap. The agency also relied too heavily on a private contractor that made the seals, and NASA overruled warnings that Challenger shouldn't launch on Jan. 28, 1986. Evidence surfaced that top officials were aware of the risks and allowed the mission to go forward.

So far, the investigation of the Columbia breakup does not suggest a repeat of the gross negligence NASA showed in the Challenger case. Still, a stunning series of lapses in judgment, missed signals and complacency are reminiscent of the events that occurred 17 years earlier.
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http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2003-05-15-edit_x.htm