140,000 troops are not enough

140,000 troops are not enough
Arif Ayub
Published: October 28, 2009

Reports on General McChrystal’s request for a further 40,000 US troops to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan are an indicator of how precarious circumstances have become. The Taliban now have a presence in nearly 70 percent of Afghanistan, almost completely dominating the Pashtun areas. The increase in US troop deployment, if approved, would bring the strength of foreign troops in Afghanistan to nearby 140,000 - matching the Soviet presence in the eighties. However, the results of such an increase are likely to be just as dismal, particularly since the US is also committing the same mistakes as the Soviets. This is quite unfortunate because the US started its mission with the support of the international community and the majority of Afghans. However, the mission soon morphed from a nation building and counter-terrorism exercise to a counter-insurgency.

While General McChrystal’s “Initial Assessment Report” is exceptional in its analysis and recommendations, the timing is unfortunately eight years too late. What the general has recommended is what should have been done immediately after the US removal of the Taliban. However, the shift of US focus to Iraq and the almost complete absence of the massive infrastructural development expected by the Afghans have completely changed the dynamics of the ground realities. This was exhibited during the recent elections where only the massive stuffing of ballot boxes, particularly in the Pashtun areas, could ensure a ‘victory’ for President Karzai.

General McChrystal has correctly analysed that the US objective must be the population. The request for extra troops is, however, an admission that the US has so far failed to provide the necessary security umbrella under which economic development and political reconciliation could take place. Guerrilla war is predominantly a political war and the crux of its success or failure resides in the support of the population. Mao’s primer for guerrilla movements put forward the idea that guerrilla war is basically a political war with the military aspect being utilised only to reinforce a decision, which has already been won on the ground in political terms. In broad terms, military doctrine has six components. On the tangible level there are the weapons systems, the supply systems and manpower. The intangibles are space, time and will. Mao’s military problem was how to organise space so that it could be made to yield time. His political problem was how to organise time so that it could be made to yield will. Mao’s real military problem was not that of getting the war over with but that of keeping it going.

This is the contradiction the US is also faced with in Afghanistan. Conventional military forces have struggled with this dilemma and tried to overcome the problem by concretising the intangibles of space and will. Force to space ratio (combatants per square mile) was introduced as a tangible, which would deny the guerrillas their space and sanctuaries, while excessive attrition of their cadres would seek to break their will. Time continued to be a parameter out of control of conventional military forces.

In the unsuccessful insurgencies the balance of forces ultimately tipped the scales. In Malaya, the British built up a regular force to space ratio (combatants per square mile) of seven and a ratio of 30 regulars per guerrilla. Experience has shown that a regular force to space ratio (combatants per square mile) of five and ten regulars per guerrilla ratio is normally sufficient to overcome the inherent intangible advantages of the guerrilla forces. The exception was in Algeria where despite 20 regulars per guerrilla, the French had to grant independence. This shows the primacy of the political framework in guerrilla warfare and, in particular, domestic public opinion in their home countries, which military planners are unable to control. The US is particularly vulnerable in this area every four years, which makes it difficult to fight wars which would take generations to settle, like in Afghanistan.

Rest of article at: http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Opinions/Columns/28-Oct-2009/140000-troops-are-not-enough

Karzai's brother should be in the news today. Either that or they will show another episode of the bubble boy.

Nevada and large swaths of Utah, Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho, while controlling a population the size of California. That is a tough assignment.