Pass the Bill - Kill the Mandate!

Mandates don't kick in until 2014. This means we have some time.

I'm surprised we don't see this for what it is - a shitty provision of a mediocre (but necesarry) bill that can be killed later.

They'll withhold all future campaign contributions to anyone who even looks like they will kill it.

Do you *really* think any of them (with the exception of Sanders and Kucinich) are going to bite the hand that feeds them? The mandate is *nothing* to our reps. Once this POS is passed it will be shelved right next to NAFTA.

Its not patently constitutional

There are many ways to skin that weasel

When you have an administration making deals behind CLOSED DOORS to directly kill the PO and ensure a fat mandate for the insurance companies -- do you really think we're going to find anyone to take the fight to the courts?

Heads the campaign coffers fill, tails the public loses.

Chains we can believe in.

All the swag spread around to push this POS -- no one on Capital Hill will do it. Who then?

Someone needs to not pay their premiums, and go against the court, and hopefully we can fight and win

More five-dimensional chess?

and removes any possibility of a fix leading to a strong public option or single payer.

Why, pray tell, would the insurance companies object to being given 30 million new paying customers?

Think about it.

This is yet ANOTHER talking point thrown out to get people in line --

Try THIS link:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/miles-mogulescu/ny-times-reporter-confirm_b_500999.html

Then tell me again how hard they are fighting against it.

Kill the mandates. Pass Grayson's public option law.

Why do you think everyone is *suddenly* -come to Jesus- on this bill? It's certainly not for the public good. Not with that mandate.

Bullies pick off the herd one by one. You can see that tactic here - the vilification of Dennis Kucinich.

But odds are good that the swag table behind those closed doors is still open for business -- and will be until the bill is passed.

no "subsidies" for the unaffordable deductibles for the poor, fees for those who can't afford the "insurance".

So, to recap: you will be FORCED to buy a product, the rates of which can rise dramatically at any time, the huge deductibles will still block access to health care, and there's no guarantee that the insurance companies will pay your claims.

How is this NOT a scam?

lol

Without mandate, there is no covering pre-existing conditions, one of the most legitimate reasons for reform. Even if we have a PO, that does NOT mean that most, will benefit from govs nonprofit alternative. We need mandate, to average, to cover those that would not otherwise be able, in arazona, many of those now will be children. If we consider HC as a thing, one thing, we can begin to appreciate economy of scale. On drug pricing, and test pricing. The tacked on fees that are unconstitutionally paid by the poor, but not poor enough, and those suffering recission should end immediately. Fair pricing of fees, and expected results, is something we can get the right to back. We can do much still.

ability to discriminate on the basis of a preexisting condition necessitates mandates.


This basic economic reality is known as 'adverse selection' or 'regulatory adverse selection' and is accepted by every single economist as being a fact of life.

If everyone can get insurance any time then people would simply wait to get insurance when they need it and discontinue it when they don't leaving insurance companies only with high risk payers.

All single payer systems are a form of mandated system.

More detailed explanation (which has been explained on DU hundreds of times and never refuted) here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_selection

The term adverse selection was originally used in insurance. It describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance (either the propensity to buy insurance, or the quantity purchased, or both) is positively correlated with the individual's risk of loss (e.g. higher risks buy more insurance), and the insurer is unable to allow for this correlation in the price of insurance <1>. This may be because of private information known only to the individual (information asymmetry), or because of regulations or social norms which prevent the insurer from using certain categories of known information to set prices (e.g. the insurer may be prohibited from using information such as gender or ethnic origin or genetic test results). The latter scenario is sometimes referred to as 'regulatory adverse selection'.<2>

The potentially 'adverse' nature of this phenomenon can be illustrated by the link between smoking status and mortality. Non-smokers, on average, are more likely to live longer, while smokers, on average, are more likely to die younger. If insurers do not vary prices for life insurance according to smoking status, life insurance will be a better buy for smokers than for non-smokers. So smokers may be more likely to buy insurance, or may tend to buy larger amounts, than non-smokers. The average mortality of the combined policyholder group will be higher than the average mortality of the general population. From the insurer's viewpoint, the higher mortality of the group which 'selects' to buy insurance is 'adverse'. The insurer raises the price of insurance accordingly. As a consequence, non-smokers may be less likely to buy insurance (or may buy smaller amounts) than if they could buy at a lower price to reflect their lower risk. The reduction in insurance purchase by non-smokers is also 'adverse' from the insurer's viewpoint, and perhaps also from a public policy viewpoint.

Furthermore, if there is a range of increasing risk categories in the population, the increase in the insurance price due to adverse selection may lead the lowest remaining risks to cancel or not renew their insurance. This leads to a further increase in price, and hence the lowest remaining risks cancel their insurance, leading to a further increase in price, and so on. Eventually this 'adverse selection spiral' might in theory lead to the collapse of the insurance market.

either but I look at it from another perspective. What if the Social Security Act had just the people who wanted to be in it back then. Or the Medicare plan just did that. The idea is the more in the program the cheaper coverage is. It is not just in this HCR. What is wrong with this is that it has no cost saving benefits. They will find that out very soon.

and a requirement to purchase something from a private industry.

I really don't understand why more people aren't alarmed by that. It's a terrible, terrible precedent.

and we'll all be required to buy the crap policies at whatever price the insurance companies collude together to charge.

They'll simply pass 'exemptions' based on personal habits - smoking, obesity, alcohol consumption, gun ownership - anything that might increase a person's risk.

Drive a car? You have an 85% greater chance of being in a car accident than a non-driver - cap exemption.

Work in a gas station? You have a 65% greater chance of ill effects from petrochemical fumes - cap exemption.

If I just thought of this, do you doubt that their multi-million dollar lawyers have not thought of it?

Nothing will change or get fixed with this shitty bill.

now the dems will get lobbyist cash from the insurance industry..

earthquake victims in Hawaii.