General Discussion
Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region ForumsMr president do not send in the green berets
Msnbc is reporting Obama is sending in green berets. I like Obama support him and defend him but I will be in DC protesting if any military for any reason other than protecting the embassy.
alsame
(7,784 posts)in for 'advising and training'. GOD DAMN IT!!
ChangeUp106
(549 posts)It's just a few people. What, you think it'll escalate to another full-scale deployment? Don't be silly.
Exposethefrauds
(531 posts)FYI green berets do not protect us embassies that is the job of the usmc
And many here said he would not send ground troops to Iraq .
Now I will sit back and watch people spin like tops here.
gwheezie
(3,580 posts)I'm an Obama supporter and remember the fall of Saigon so I have no issue with beefing up the marines to prepare for an evacuation if it comes to this. This escalation sounds to me like prep for targets for bombing raids. It feels like an escalation. I can't support it.
RKP5637
(67,108 posts)involved again. There is no easy solution to this, but I do not want to see the US get involved again other than protecting the embassy.
alsame
(7,784 posts)protect the embassy, the reports say advising and training.
These forces are going to be in extreme danger
ChangeUp106
(549 posts)(or not...*cough* Gulf of Tonkin *cough*)
and we're right back in there
Erose999
(5,624 posts)jwirr
(39,215 posts)Autumn
(45,082 posts)Damn if that don't seem familiar.
customerserviceguy
(25,183 posts)is on Obama, and can't be blamed on Bush/Cheney anymore.
Meet the new boss, same as the old boss...
morningfog
(18,115 posts)Stupid stupid move.
Tierra_y_Libertad
(50,414 posts)The next few years saw the rise of a Communist insurgency in South Vietnam, and President Diem looked increasingly to US military assistance to strengthen his position, albeit with certain reservations. Attacks on US military advisers in Vietnam became more frequent. On October 22, 1957, MAAG and USIS installations in Saigon were bombed, injuring US military advisers.[4] In the summer of 1959, Communist guerrillas staged an attack on a Vietnamese military base in Bien Hoa, killing and wounding several MAAG personnel.[5] During this time, American advisers were not put in high ranking positions, and President Diem was reluctant to allow American advisers into Vietnamese tactical units. He was afraid that the United States would gain control or influence over his forces if Americans got into the ranks of the army. The first signs that his position was beginning to shift came in 1960, when the number of official US military advisers in the country was increased from 327 to 685 at the request of the South Vietnamese government.[5] By 1961, communist guerrillas were becoming stronger and more active. This increased enemy contacts in size and intensity throughout South Vietnam. At this point, Diem was under pressure from US authorities to liberalize his regime and implement reforms. Although key elements in the US administration were resisting his requests for increased military funding and ARVN troop ceilings, MAAG played a significant role in advocating for a greater US presence in the country.[6] Throughout this period relations between the MAAG and Diem were described as "excellent", even through the advisers were doubtful of his ability to hold off the insurgency.[7]
Newly elected President John F. Kennedy agreed with MAAG's calls for increases in ARVN troop levels and the U.S. military commitment in both equipment and men. In response, Kennedy provided $28.4 million in funding for ARVN, and overall military aid increased from $50 million per year to $144 million in 1961. In the first year of the Kennedy administration, MAAG worked closely with administration officials, USOM, and the US Information Service to develop a counterinsurgency plan (CIP). The CIP's main initiatives included the strengthening of ARVN to combat the Communist insurgency, which had the corollary effect of strengthening Diem's political position.[8] At the same time President Diem agreed to the assignment of advisers to battalion level, significantly increasing the number of advisers; from 746 in 1961 to over 3,400 before MAAG was placed under U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and renamed the Field Advisory Element, Vietnam. At the peak of the war in 1968, 9,430 Army personnel acted as advisors down to the district and battalion level to train, advise and mentor the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps, Republic of Vietnam Navy and the Vietnam Air Force.
MAAG, Indochina had three commanders: Brig.Gen. Francis G. Brink, October 1950-August 1952; Maj.Gen. Thomas J. H. Trapnell, August 1952-April 1954; and Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, April 1954-November 1955. MAAG, Vietnam was commanded by Lt.Gen. Samuel T. Williams, November 1955-September 1960; Lt.Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, September 1960-July 1962; and Maj.Gen. Charles J. Timmes, July 1962-May 1964.