General Discussion
Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region ForumsGerrymandering. One of the most damaging aspects of American politics.
I know this is an older piece, but it is really relevant today - less than 100 days to election.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/01/13/this-is-actually-what-america-would-look-like-without-gerrymandering/
What the maps currently look like and what it should look like . . .
https://img.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=
frogmarch
(12,159 posts)in the late 1950s. I thought it would soon be stopped.
I was wrong.
tonyt53
(5,737 posts)a Democrat appointed majority in the SCOTUS, AND the results of the 2020 census to get many changes in the congressional districts. I am in agreement with those that feel the house can't be switched until 2022 for those very reasons.
maxsolomon
(33,400 posts)And most will still be in the hands of the Regressives.
I'd like to see Gerrymandering brought before the SCOTUS somehow. It might be a way to bring about "compactness", although I have no idea whether it would favor Dems or Regressives.
Wounded Bear
(58,717 posts)I don't have links, but I remember that several states have had to re-district by court order because of obvious political gerrymandering.
Thankfully, I live in a state (WA) that uses a 3-way panel to re-district, so while it's not perfect, it at least gets some compromising and some sense of sanity in the maps. The panel always has a Dem, a Repub, and a Judge, who is supposed to be non-partisan.
yeoman6987
(14,449 posts)No. President, congress does not!!!!!!!!!!!
2020 needs to be a huge democratic wave in the STATE HOUSES around the country. That is the only way to fix it. Having the presidency or congress won't do a thing.
JustinL
(722 posts)"Party-blind" districting only produces a fair result if the parties have the same geographic pattern of distribution. Party-blind districting inherently disadvantages the more geographically-clustered party, i.e., the Democrats. The issue is discussed at length in this article from the Quarterly Journal of Political Science:
http://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/wp/florida.pdf
While conventional wisdom holds that partisan bias in U.S. legislative elections results from intentional partisan and racial gerrymandering, we demonstrate that substantial bias can also emerge from patterns of human geography. We show that in many states, Democrats are inefficiently concentrated in large cities and smaller industrial agglomerations such that they can expect to win fewer than 50% of the seats when they win 50% of the votes. To measure this unintentional gerrymandering, we use automated districting simulations based on precinct-level 2000 presidential election results in several states. Our results illustrate a strong relationship between the geographic concentration of Democratic voters and electoral bias favoring Republicans.
I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Gaffney v Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973), that "reverse gerrymandering" to achieve proportional representation doesn't violate the Equal Protection Clause. From pp. 753-754:
It may be suggested that those who redistrict and reapportion should work with census, not political, data, and achieve population equality without regard for political impact. But this politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results; and, in any event, it is most unlikely that the political impact of such a plan would remain undiscovered by the time it was proposed or adopted, in which event the results would be both known and, if not changed, intended.
It is much more plausible to assume that those who redistrict and reapportion work with both political and census data. Within the limits of the population equality standards of the Equal Protection Clause, they seek, through compromise or otherwise, to achieve the political or other ends of the State, its constituents, and its officeholders. What is done in so arranging for elections, or to achieve political ends or allocate political power, is not wholly exempt from judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. As we have indicated, for example, multi-member districts may be vulnerable, if racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political process and their voting strength invidiously minimized. See White v. Regester, supra; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra. See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra. Beyond this, we have not ventured far or attempted the impossible task of extirpating politics from what are the essentially political processes of the sovereign States. Even more plainly, judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so. There is no doubt that there may be other reapportionment plans for Connecticut that would have different political consequences, and that would also be constitutional. Perhaps any of appellees' plans would have fallen into this category, as would the court's, had it propounded one. But neither we nor the district courts have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it undertakes not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State.