I do not believe the count was "hacked," although I could be convinced. Were we beaten by lies, inaccuracies, lots of stupid voters, voting laws, etc., YES. But that is not a "Hack."

election. Worth looking into at any rate.

Bryant

There certainly is a lot of conjecture and suspicions.

that is really all that matters. but don't worry, if nothing was done after 2000, it won't be done now. personally, i am seriously going to look into getting a ballot initiative in my state to require hand counting of all ballots.

Statistical anomalies don't count as "evidence".

There are always reports every election that the screen showed a different choice than the one they selected but they can actually be rigged to show a correct choice. I

One way we would know is if they were obviously stuffing the ballot box to the point where they exceeded registered voters in a precinct or county. In any case someone could easily do it with no one the wiser.

The fact she did a lot worse in counties with machine voting than paper ballot could be a sign they were. These machines are notoriously easy to hack or rig especially when there is no audit or paper trail. The flaws and easy to get into software is by design.

Take Georgia for example which is entirely electronic, polling suggested a closer race than what it turned out to be.

Also check this out from October

Pennsylvania's aging voting machines could be 'nightmare scenario' in the event of a disputed election

On election day, voters in Pennsylvania will be touching the lighted buttons on electronic vote counters that were once seen as the solution to messy paper ballots.

But in the event of a disputed election, this battleground state — one of the few that relies almost entirely on computerized voting, with no paper backup — could end up creating a far bigger mess.

(Snip)
The GOP nominee has specifically targeted Pennsylvania as a state where the election may be “stolen,” despite no evidence to back up such a claim and several polls showing Democratic rival Hillary Clinton well ahead of him here.

“The only way we can lose,” he told a recent rally in Altoona, “is if cheating goes on.”

(Snip)

Pennsylvania is among those states that rely almost entirely on computerized voting, according to Verified Voting.

“Pennsylvania is using technology from the ’80s made by the companies that don’t exist anymore. In computer years, that’s a very long time ago,” Smith said

(Snip)
But Andrew Appel, a Princeton professor of computer science, said that given a screwdriver and seven minutes with an electronic machine, he could “install a vote-stealing program” that would be hard to detect and shift a percentage of the votes.

https://www.google.com/amp/www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-pennsylvania-voting-paperless-20161020-snap-story,amp.html

They have paper ballots. Also is it's so easy to hack the systems why did so many down ticket Democrats win statewide elections in Pennsylvania? The hackers forgot about those races?

Long Lines, Machine Malfunctions
Not only are voters standing in long lines, they're also encountering equipment failures and, in Berkley, an election clerk who said voters had to show a voter identification, according to ProPublica's Electionland project. That's not the case in Michigan.

The project also reported the only voting machine in Precinct 16 is repeatedly breaking, and that some voters have been waiting outside in the rain before getting into the building, where they are facing a 45-minute wait.

The Detroit Free Press reported that nearly two hours after the polls opened, no one at the Marcus Garvey Academy Precinct 134 in Detroit’s West Village had been able to cast a ballot due to a problem with voting machines. A technician was on the way, the Free Press said, but some voters had to get to work and put their ballots in a box.

Across the city, a voting machine malfunctioned at Detroit's Precinct 32, located at East English Village Prep. Some voters who registered on the last day it was allowed didn't show up on voting lists.


http://patch.com/michigan/detroit/live-2016-election-results-trump-clinton-swing-state-michigan

Voting machine problems reported across metro Detroit


(WJBK) - The polls have been open in Michigan for a couple hours now, and FOX 2 has received dozens of calls and emails from voters saying the machine at their polling place isn't working correctly.

An overwhelming number of voters from several cities report the machine isn't able to accept the ballot, so they've had to leave their ballot in the hands of the volunteers. Many say the machines are malfunctioning or jamming. FOX 2 has taken calls and emails from voters in Detroit, Sterling Heights, Novi, Holly and Roseville - just to name a few.

Many voters are concerned, though, that their vote may not be counted since they won't be there to physically see it go through the machine.

http://www.fox2detroit.com/news/elections-2016/216159836-story

I can't count how many times I've seen this story especially in bigger cities, it all seems a little convenient.

If someone were to go inside they could focus on what races to edit, I could see officials doing this for certain local races.

I think North Carolina is simular with electronic voting issues but a Dem won or it was close with a recount but I'm not sure I remember correctly.


NAACP gets reports of problems with electronic voting machines in New Hanover County


TOP STORIES 1 of 1


NAACP gets reports of problems with electronic voting machines in New Hanover County
Jon Evans
Oct 25, 2016 06:11 AM
WILMINGTON, NC (WECT) - The North Carolina Chapter of the NAACP says it has received reports that electronic voting machines “may have malfunctioned” in New Hanover and at least four other counties, and is calling on state and county elections officials “to make efficient and effective remedies to maintain confidence and trust in the elections."

Rev. Kojo Nantambu, the Director of Religious Emphasis Advocacy for the state NAACP, said three individuals have expressed concerns about the voting machines in New Hanover County. All three used one-stop voting at the Government Center on Saturday, October 22.

According to Nantambu, one individual pushed the screen to vote for Hillary Clinton, the Democratic nominee for President of the United States. When the voter reviewed her ballot, she saw the machine had checked the Republican nominee, Donald Trump.

The second voter informed Nantambu she had pressed the screen to vote for a Democratic candidate, and the check on the screen went to the Republican candidate. The third individual had not yet provided Nantambu the information on his concern.

NC NAACP officials said that in the instances of which they are aware, voters have been able to fix the problem before submitting their vote.

"The machine is not working and people are voting on it,” said Nantambu. “That's just as bad as suppressing the vote, because the vote is not counting properly."

http://m.wect.com/wect/db_330750/contentdetail.htm?contentguid=itAr5VNJ

I'm not sure if there would be something in all 3 states, but if they were looking at Pennsylvania as a state that could win or lose it for them could pull it off, the machines could be tampered at any time. Trump indicated there was "cheating" going on there before the election took place. Outside of that it could be anyone anywhere and it would depend what race motivates them.

Even if no one fucks with it they shut down, glitch, freeze, improperly counted, old outdated hardware a machine can't handle 1 day every 2 years is certainly effective at suppressing the vote and if everything is simply a coincidence how can we expect a shoddy piece of equipment to even correctly get the vote right.

California and other places were wise to get rid of them.

The fact she did a lot worse in counties with machine voting than paper ballot could be a sign they were. These machines are notoriously easy to hack or rig especially when there is no audit or paper trail. The flaws and easy to get into software is by design.

The counties with the paper ballots were urban counties, so of course she would do better there than in the rural counties where the electronic machines were.

Even the computer science professor that was quoted in all of the news stories says that he doubts the election was hacked.

I'm not sure which article it says that specifically.

They suggest the data merits in Independent review and I'm not sure exactly where machines are or not but Clinton lost several counties outside the big cities each in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania that Obama won last time around like the differences weren't even close.

BTW computer scientists have been warning us about these machines for years. We used to be very informed of them back in 2004 but I guess we lost interest after 8 years of Obama but there are countless number of events that were questionable to say the least. I'm confident machines somewhere have been tampered with every election since Bush signed the "Help America Vote Act" not to mention the glitching, malfunctioning, and errors and a lot of this is well documented.

I found this looking for voting machine companies in Wisconsin (can't for Pennsylvania since they no longer exist)

Wisconsin


Election night’s unofficial returns found Trump ahead of Clinton by 27,000 votes. But Clinton won only counties using all-paper ballots, the computer voting experts said. In the counties using a mix of electronic and paper-based voting systems that President Obama won in 2012, Clinton lost by 1-2 percent. In the Obama counties using all paperless machines, she lost by 10 to 15 percent.


http://www.alternet.org/election-2016/fair-election-serious-hard-explain-questions-arise-about-trump-vote-totals-3-key

I don't know why people find it hard to believe someone would rig a machine especially since they are all outdated with little security and there is a lot riding on the election. There is so much proof of suspicious results coming out these things.

Trump was probably telling us the election is being rigged by his guys but used Clinton to hide the fact he was taunting. He focused a lot of attention where cheating may happen so he had staff go down there to ensure things are "fair"

https://medium.com/@jhalderm/want-to-know-if-the-election-was-hacked-look-at-the-ballots-c61a6113b0ba#.s5d7u2bjy

He says in the blog post that he doubts the election was hacked.

And perhaps you can provide something that no one else has been able to provide, namely, where is the proof of suspicious results?

Hint: Losing a state that you're expected to win is not a suspicious result.

I have trouble on my phone opening other tabs copy and pasting returning to the post tab.

The main thing is unless someone announces "I did it" there won't be direct evidence but discrepancies should be a red flag worth checking out.

What is suspicious is how she got creamed in all electronic counties that Obama won compared to the 1% deficit in mixed counties and won the paper vote.

If the election officials are Republican then they have access to the machine which are outdated, unsecure and have already numerous "glitches", shut down a lot. Plus the media spent a lot of airtime hyping the possibility of Russia hacking the election by showing how they could by slipping a memory card.

That Alternet link has basic info on a few states. Pennsylvania is by far the most problematic with numerous stores how vulnerable they are compounded by the fact there is no audit or paper trail in the scenario of a contested election.

I could go into state by state including ones not as decisive but searching and loading causes problems but I'll start with this piece of info.

How to Hack an Election in 7 Minutes

(Snip)

In some ways, the country’s response was suggestive of the real crime committed in Florida: Not inaccuracy, but anxiety. Congress's solution was to pass the Help America Vote Act in 2002, a nearly $4 billion federal fund meant to incentivize states to upgrade their voting machines. It worked. All 50 states took the money. Requirements included upgrading voter registration methods and making polls disability-friendly, but Section 102 provided funds specifically allocated for replacing outdated voting machines; almost universally, "upgrade" meant a new, computerized touch-screen voting machine. By 2006, states had spent nearly $250 million on new machines with Section 102 funds. In Pennsylvania, the funds purchased 20,597 new machines—around 19,900 of which were digital touchscreens. Some, like the Diebold TSX, Advanced WINvote, the ES&S iVotronic, and a variant of Appel’s AVC Advantage—the Sequoia Edge—would be the same models to come under scrutiny by cybersecurity experts and academics. Thousands of touchscreen DREs were similarly sold in state contracts. Between Election Day 2000 and the HAVA cutoff in 2006, the stock prices of the major companies soared.

The appeal of such machines seemed plain: Voting was crisp, instantaneous, logged digitally. To state officials—and, at first, voters—the free federal money seemed like a bargain. To computer scientists, it seemed like a disaster waiting to happen. Wallach remembers when he testified before the Houston City Council, urging members not to adopt the machines. “My testimony was: 'Wow, these are a bad idea. They’re just computers, and we know how to tamper with computers. That’s what we do,'” Wallach recalls. “The county clerk, who has since retired, essentially said, ‘You don’t know anything about what you’re talking about. These machines are great!’ And then they bought them.”

Almost from the day they were taken out of the box, the touch-screen machines demonstrated problems (the same companies had a much better track record with Optical Scan machines). During the primaries in Florida in 2002, some machines in Miami-Dade malfunctioned and failed to turn on, resulting in hourslong lines that locked out untold numbers of voters—including then-gubernatorial candidate Janet Reno. That year, faulty software (and an administrator oversight) on Sequoia models led to a fourth of votes initially omitted during early voting in Albuquerque’s Bernalillo County. In Fairfax County, Virginia, an investigation into a 2003 school board race found that a vote was subtracted for every 100 votes cast for one of the candidates on 10 machines. With margin sizes small enough to be noticed, local elections were vaulted into the forefront of these debates; Appel later found himself issuing expert testimony for a tiny election for the Democratic Executive Committee in Cumberland County, New Jersey, where a candidate lost by 24 votes. The margin was small enough that the losers sued, and called 28 voters as witnesses—who each swore they voted for them. The machine in use was a Sequoia AVC Advantage.

Cybersecurity researchers flocked to study the machines, but they say they were faced with an uncompromising adversary: the voting machine companies, which viewed the code of the machines as intellectual property. Until 2009, two companies, Diebold and ES&S, controlled the lion’s share of the voting machine market. The accreditation process is equally narrow: Since 1990, a voluntary federal accreditation process has certified voting technology, a system that has come under fire for its lack of transparency. The laboratories (“Independent Testing Authorities”) which conduct the certification reviews are typically paid by the manufacturers, and are usually required to sign nondisclosure agreements. In 2008, five labs were accredited; one was suspended that year for poor lab procedures, and another temporarily suspended for insufficient quality control

(Snip)

Election officials have sometimes complained that the lab reports they do receive lack vital detail, and information from the labs, bound by the NDAs, can be unforthcoming. In 2004, when the California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley—in charge of overseeing the state’s elections—asked one of the five laboratories for more information on the testing of machines, he was stonewalled, and told by a researcher, “We don’t discuss our voting machine work.” Because of a flood of machines introduced to the market after HAVA, the 2002 accreditation standards are the ones that matter—the same process that approved touch-screen Diebold machines that had supervisor passcodes of “1111” in order to access the voting system. Shelley later banned Diebold TSX machines, calling Diebold’s conduct “deceitful.”

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-to-hack-an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144

I'm sure we know anout Diebold whose CEO donared $100,000 to Bush and was "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year.".

The company RABA did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote in January 2004 confirming many of the problems found by Avi Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[14]

In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Department of State said that, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[15]

In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[16] on page 2 the California report states that:

"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti's attack does work: Mr. Hursti's attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."

A new vulnerability, this time with the TSx DRE machines, was reported in May 2006. According to Professor Rubin, the machines are "much, much easier to attack than anything we've previously said... On a scale of one to 10, if the problems we found before were a six, this is a 10. It's a totally different ballgame." According to Rubin, the system is intentionally designed so that anyone with access can update the machine software, without a pass code or other security protocol. Diebold officials said that although any problem can be avoided by keeping a close watch on the machines, they are developing a fix.[17]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions

I'd recommend reading up on Sequoia Voting Systems who like Diebold (or whatever name they are going by) has a checkered past.

There is also the documentary Hacking Democracy which detailed issues in the 2006 Florida election.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hacking_Democracy

More on Sequoia who is still around.


Verified Voting
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Home › Resources › Voting Equipment › Sequoia Voting Systems (now owned by Dominion) › Sequoia (Dominion) AVC Edge
Sequoia (Dominion) AVC Edge
The Sequoia AVC Edge is a touch screen direct-recording electronic voting machine. It is a multilingual voting system activated by a smart card and records votes on internal flash memory. Voters insert a “smart-card” into the machine and then make their choices by touching an area on a computer screen, much in the same way that modern ATMs work.The votes are then recorded to internal electronic flash memory. When polls close, the votes for a particular machine are written to a PCMCIA card which is removed from the system and either physically transported to election headquarters or their contents transmitted via computer network.

The AVC Edge has a 15-inch LCD touchscreen that displays the ballot; allows voters to make selections and navigate the ballot; and provides an interface for testing, maintenance, and opening and closing the polls. On the front of each Edge unit is a slot for a smart card (also known as a “vote activation card”). A voter must have an activated smart card in order to begin voting. After the voter casts his or her ballot on the Edge, the smart card is deactivated and returned to a pollworker. This prevents one voter from voting multiple times.

The back of the Edge contains the power switch and a switch that opens and closes the polls on that particular voting machine. The cover for the poll function switch accommodates a tamper-evident seal. Also on the back of each Edge unit is a yellow “Activate” button, which can be used to switch the Edge into different operating modes. Finally, the backside of the Edge has a small LCD screen (two rows of 20 characters) that displays diagnostic and error messages. Sequoia uses a proprietary operating system for the Edge. Similarly, the firmware that the Edge uses to control the hardware and to allow voting are proprietary applications. The Edge also contains three serial EEPROMs (electronically programmable read-only memory), which store permanent configuration information about the Edge unit as well as ballot counters. One of these EEPROMs is the “configuration ROM,” which holds information to identify the machine and the customer and also contains a “cryptographic seed value.” The other EEPROMs hold a public counter (a counter that is reset at the beginning of each election) and a protective counter (a counter that is incremented each time a vote is cast and is never reset).

The ballot definition and audio files to assist visually impaired voters are programmed on a WinEDS election management system server and stored on the Results Cartridge. Prior to an election, the Results Cartridge is inserted into the Edge’s Results Port and covered by a plastic door, which is sealed with a tamper-evident seal. The Results Cartridge also stores the Audit Trail, which consists of ballot images, ballot summaries, and the event log. The Edge also stores a copy of the Audit Trail in the internal Audit Trail memory. If the Results Cartridge is lost, damaged or destroyed, it can be recovered from this internal memory. Event logging for the Edge is always turned on; it cannot be disabled.

At the close of an election, a pollworker may print the audit log on a VVPAT. Alternatively, or in addition, election officials may access the event log stored as part of the Audit Trail on the Results Cartridge. Several other devices support the Edge. First, the Card Activator processes the smart cards (also known as “vote activation cards”) that voters use to access the Edge. After each use of a smart card, the Card Activator prepares the card for use by another voter. Before an election, each Card Activator must be prepared with the ballot definitions and other information appropriate for the precinct in which it will be used. An alternative to the Card Activator is the HAAT (Hybrid Activator, Accumulator, and Transmitter). There are two models of the HAAT, Model 50 and Model 100.

A Voter Demo Edge without VVPAT from York County PA:

A Pollworker Training Video from San Francisco CA:

Voting Process: When the voter enters the precinct, he or she is given a “smart-card” by a poll worker after confirming the voter is registered. A “smart-card” is a card the size and shape of a credit-card which contains a computer chip, some memory and possibly basic data such as the voter’s political party. The voter then takes the smartcard to a voting machine and inserts the smart-card into the yellow slot visible in the middle picture above. The first screen presented to the voter is one that allows him or her to choose the ballot language. After using the touchscreen to vote, 1) the record of the vote is directly recorded electronically to two flash memory cards and 2) the voter’s smart card is reset to ensure that the voter can only vote once. The AVC Edge may also be equipped in some precincts to print a voter-verifiable paper audit trail using the VeriVote printer. In this case, the voter will inspect the printout which is displayed underneath glass. If the paper accurately reflects the vote, the voter indicates so using the touchscreen and casts the vote; the printed paper is withdrawn into the machine to protect privacy. If the paper is incorrect, the voter may mark it as spoiled and change his or her vote using the touchscreen interface. After the vote is cast, the smart-card pops out of the machine and the voter returns it to a poll worker.

Checking the Voter-Verifiable Paper Trail: The Edge’s optional voter-verifiable paper-trail printer is called the VeriVote. The VeriVote printer is a cash-register type printer and is located to the left of the touch screen. Jurisdictions which use the Edge but do not equip their machines with the VeriVote include the state of Louisiana.

Spurred by the testimony of computer scientists at a hearing inSanta Clara County CA in January 2003, Sequoia Voting Systems was the first major vendor to produce a VVPAT retrot for their touch-screen voting machine, the Sequoia AVC Edge. A team led by John Homewood led for a provisional application in the Spring of 2003 and a full patent application in early 2004. The Sequoia system uses a thermal printer and a roll of cash-register receipt tape. After each voter completes a ballot on the display screen, the printed choices are displayed behind a glass window for voter approval, and then rolled onto a take-up reel before the next voter enters the voting booth. Unlike the Avante Vote Trakker, the tape is not cut after each ballot is printed. The Premier/Diebold AccuView VVPAT mechanism and the Hart Intercivic VBO also use thermal paper.1

When the polls close, a poll worker or election official inserts a different-type of smart card, an administrator card, into each voting machine and puts the machine into a postelection mode where it will no longer record votes. At this point, the machine writes the votes from its internal memory to flash memory on a PCMCIA card, a removable form of flash memory. A printed tape of all votes cast or vote totals for the voting machine can also be printed out at this time depending on local procedure and regulations. The PCMCIA cards are removed from each machine and either taken to a central tabulation facility or to remote tabulation facilities. At the tabulation facility the votes are copied from the PCMCIA cards and into a central computer database where precincts are combined to result in an aggregate vote. The votes may also be transmitted to the central tabulation facility via a closed “Intranet”, the Internet or modem. The PCMCIA cards and possible any printouts from the voting machines can then become part of the official record of the election.

Security Concerns2

Researchers contracted by the California Secretary of State for the State’s Top to Bottom Review in 20073 found significant security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia system. The nature of these weaknesses raises serious questions as to whether the Sequoia software can be relied upon to protect the integrity of elections. Every software mechanism for transmitting election results and every software mechanism for updating software lacks reliable measures to detect or prevent tampering. These weaknesses, and their implications, in Chapters 3 and 4 of the Source Code Report.

In certain cases, audit mechanisms may be able to detect and recover from some attacks, depending on county-specific procedures; other attacks may be more difficult to detect after-thefact even with very rigorous audits. There were numerous programming, logic, and architectural errors present in the software we reviewed. Some of these errors may be relatively harmless and reflect the large size and heterogeneous nature of the codebase. But other errors we found clearly have serious security implications. Many of the most significant vulnerabilities we found — those likely to be especially useful to an attacker seeking to alter election results — arise from four pervasive structural weaknesses:

Data Integrity The Sequoia system lacks effective safeguards against corrupted or malicious data injected onto removable media, especially for devices entrusted to poll workers and other temporary staff with limited authority. This lack of input validation has potentially serious consequences, including:

– Precinct election results stored on DRE Results Cartridges and optical scan memory packs are not effectively protected against tampering. A poll worker with physical access to a Results Cartridge or MemoryPack before results are counted (e. g. when returning results to the county elections board) can change recorded votes, and, in some cases, can introduce spurious results for other precincts. Under some conditions, a corrupted Results Cartridge may be able to cause damage to the WinEDS system itself when it is loaded for vote counting.

– The safeguards against introduction of corrupt firmware into the precinct voting hardware are largely ineffective. An individual with even brief access to polling station hardware can tamper with installed firmware in a way that causes votes and paper trails to be recorded incorrectly, security logs to be corrupted, or ballots to be presented to voters incorrectly. Under some configurations and conditions, corrupt firmware may be able to be spread virally from compromised hardware and may persist across more than one election.
https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/sequoia/avc-edge/

This was mostly historical information. Outside of these are very vulnerable systems which someone could edit where no one would notice unless there was a recount if there was an audit or paper trial which Pennsylvania and a few other states or areas. Pennsylvania is the most problematic and lile Wisconsin a lot of counties which Obama won comfortably Hillary Clinton was blown out in such as Scranton and Green Bay.

Bottom line someone could do it we wouldn't know unless they were sloppy but even if they didn't these machines have mysteriously miscount and strangely glitch, freeze, shutdown especially in large cities. The only way to recognize a hack is by the numbers.

I'll focus on states with machine issues in 2016 for my next post. I just had to highlight how notoriously unreliable they have been since 2004.

It's been said here repeatedly that there is proof - so where is it?

Something, anything, other than saying "We have proof".

No one has provided ANY kind of proof, other than "Hillary shouldn't have lost".

before the recount? personally, i don't trust computer vote counting, period. the machines are hackable, the presidency of the united states is at stake; you do the math.

That's why people should stop saying they already have it.

And there is not guarantee there is going to be a hand recount - there can't be a hand recount in PA, and WI and MI don't have to do hand recounts unless they choose to do so. Hell, in MI and PA, there is no guarantee there will even be a recount.

untrustworthy. if nothing was done after 2000, nothing will probably be done now. need to take action on local level to require hand-counting.

wrong, i am absolutely for the recount; i donated and pray to god that some evidence of the truth comes to light, but the very fact that we are still using hackable machines, 16 years after 2000, shows that absolutely nothing has changed, and there was a bigger fuss then than there is now.

We have gone off the deep end with conspiracies.

sorry, but i'm not a faith-based voter; show me the paper ballots, or it was hacked.

In that we will never have accurate elections again. They have completed their coup and perfected vote manipulation.

hell yes

It's our only hope. I don't think we are voting our way out of this. A foreign power is changing the world and until we fix that little nest of evil we aren't going anywhere.

They've had years to work on/perfect it. Remember Andy was pursuing it way back when. It could explain a few things such as the GOP refusal to consider a SCOTUS nomination. Why would they if they knew in advance that they were going to win the election and could install their own hack? It could explain Trump's bromance with Pooty, who apparently has ties to gangsters in St. Petersburg according to a new Deutsche Welle documentary investigating the polonium poisoning of Litvinenko. Maybe the GOP has an accomplice or two inside the voting machine companies that have told them how to get into a few critical locations and change the numbers. It could explain why so many Congressional seats have turned red when the radical GOP has virtually no recent record of doing anything but summarily obstructing anyone trying to serve "The People."