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Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region ForumsAvoiding the Sucker Payoff
From Prisoner's Dilema William Poundstone's incredibly entertaining book about games theory:
In US politics, a liberal is a "cooperator", someone willing to share, and even be taken advantage of if there is a chance the common goodwill benefit. For example, liberals are willing to pay more in taxes to help the homeless
.
Conservatives, on the other hand, can be viewed as "defectors", in that they believe one should enjoy the fruits of ones labor alone, and not share them with anyone else. They worry that taxes may be squandered, so they favor lowered taxes, so that income can be kept under one's individual control. They worry that another nation will exploit a unilateral arms reduction. They fear being laughed at, for making the "sucker payoff" to welfare cheats, and arms treaty violators.
Conservatives, on the other hand, can be viewed as "defectors", in that they believe one should enjoy the fruits of ones labor alone, and not share them with anyone else. They worry that taxes may be squandered, so they favor lowered taxes, so that income can be kept under one's individual control. They worry that another nation will exploit a unilateral arms reduction. They fear being laughed at, for making the "sucker payoff" to welfare cheats, and arms treaty violators.
The obesession with avoiding the "sucker payoff" is, to my mind, typical of the paranoid personality. (Like Captain Queeg.)
For background, a standard form of the Prisoner's Dilema, with cooperators and defectors:
(Two people) have been arrested for robbing the Hibernia Savings Bank and placed in separate isolation cells. Both care much more about their personal freedom than about the welfare of their accomplice. A clever prosecutor makes the following offer to each. You may choose to confess or remain silent. If you confess and your accomplice remains silent I will drop all charges against you and use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice does serious time. Likewise, if your accomplice confesses while you remain silent, they will go free while you do the time. If you both confess I get two convictions, but I'll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain silent, I'll have to settle for token sentences on firearms possession charges. If you wish to confess, you must leave a note with the jailer before my return tomorrow morning.
The dilemma faced by the prisoners here is that, whatever the other does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the outcome obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they would have obtained had both remained silent. A common view is that the puzzle illustrates a conflict between individual and group rationality. A group whose members pursue rational self-interest may all end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to rational self-interest. More generally, if the payoffs are not assumed to represent self-interest, a group whose members rationally pursue any goals may all meet less success than if they had not rationally pursued their goals individually. A closely related view is that the prisoner's dilemma game and its multi-player generalizations model familiar situations in which it is difficult to get rational, selfish agents to cooperate for their common good. Much of the contemporary literature has focused on identifying conditions under which players would or should make the cooperative move corresponding to remaining silent. A slightly different interpretation takes the game to represent a choice between selfish behavior and socially desirable altruism. The move corresponding to confession benefits the actor, no matter what the other does, while the move corresponding to silence benefits the other player no matter what that player does. Benefiting oneself is not always wrong, of course, and benefiting others at the expense of oneself is not always morally required, but in the prisoner's dilemma game both players prefer the outcome with the altruistic moves to that with the selfish moves. This observation has led David Gauthier and others to take the Prisoner's Dilemma to say something important about the nature of morality.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/
The dilemma faced by the prisoners here is that, whatever the other does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the outcome obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they would have obtained had both remained silent. A common view is that the puzzle illustrates a conflict between individual and group rationality. A group whose members pursue rational self-interest may all end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to rational self-interest. More generally, if the payoffs are not assumed to represent self-interest, a group whose members rationally pursue any goals may all meet less success than if they had not rationally pursued their goals individually. A closely related view is that the prisoner's dilemma game and its multi-player generalizations model familiar situations in which it is difficult to get rational, selfish agents to cooperate for their common good. Much of the contemporary literature has focused on identifying conditions under which players would or should make the cooperative move corresponding to remaining silent. A slightly different interpretation takes the game to represent a choice between selfish behavior and socially desirable altruism. The move corresponding to confession benefits the actor, no matter what the other does, while the move corresponding to silence benefits the other player no matter what that player does. Benefiting oneself is not always wrong, of course, and benefiting others at the expense of oneself is not always morally required, but in the prisoner's dilemma game both players prefer the outcome with the altruistic moves to that with the selfish moves. This observation has led David Gauthier and others to take the Prisoner's Dilemma to say something important about the nature of morality.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/
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Avoiding the Sucker Payoff (Original Post)
cthulu2016
Jul 2012
OP
And why organized crime does so well as long as the trust is kept by the organization. n/t
Egalitarian Thug
Jul 2012
#1
Egalitarian Thug
(12,448 posts)1. And why organized crime does so well as long as the trust is kept by the organization. n/t