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Ohio law defunding Planned Parenthood blocked by federal judge
Source: Columbus Dispatch
A federal judge today rejected the attempt of state officials to defund Planned Parenthood.
The agency has “established that if the enforcement of (the new law) is not permanently enjoined, plaintiffs will suffer a continuing irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law,” said Judge Michael R. Barrett of U.S. District Court in Cincinnati.
The law stripping about $1.5 million from Planned Parenthood was to have taken effect in May. But the judge, who already slapped a preliminary injunction preventing the law from taking effect, declared the measure violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Kellie Copeland, executive director of NARAL Pro-Choice Ohio, said, “This is the latest in a series of stinging court defeats for John Kasich and his anti-abortion agenda. State legislators need to stop attacking Planned Parenthood and abortion access because they are going to lose."
Read more: http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/08/12/Ohio-law-defunding-Planned-Parenthood-struck-down.html
I have to admit I don't understand the legal basis for this ruling; PP doesn't have a RIGHT to be publicly funded. If the Legislature passed a law blocking a previous appropriation, that seems legal to me.
17 replies
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= new reply since forum marked as read
because Mike DeWine LOVES wasting taxpayer money defending indefensible laws passed by the derp corps Rethuglican legislature in Ohio. 
The District Court's ruling can be found here, although it's difficult to copy and paste from.
As explained by the Supreme Court in Perry v Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972):
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that, even though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit, and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interest, especially his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to "produce a result which [it] could not command directly." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 526. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.
A classic example of the doctrine is Speiser v Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). In that case, California had denied a veterans' property tax exemption to Speiser because he refused to take a McCarthy-era loyalty oath. From pp. 517-518 of the Court's opinion:
It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech. The Supreme Court of California recognized that these provisions were limitations on speech but concluded that "by no standard can the infringement upon freedom of speech imposed by section 19 of article XX be deemed a substantial one." 48 Cal.2d 419, 440, 311 P.2d 508, 521. It is settled that speech can be effectively limited by the exercise of the taxing power. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233. To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is, in effect, to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech. The appellees are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a tax exemption is a "privilege" or "bounty," its denial may not infringe speech. This contention did not prevail before the California courts, which recognized that conditions imposed upon the granting of privileges or gratuities must be "reasonable." It has been said that Congress may not, by withdrawal of mailing privileges, place limitations upon the freedom of speech which, if directly attempted, would be unconstitutional. See Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146; cf. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 255 U. S. 430-431 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This Court has similarly rejected the contention that speech was not abridged when the sole restraint on its exercise was withdrawal of the opportunity to invoke the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board, American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 339 U. S. 402, or the opportunity for public employment, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. So here, the denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech. The denial is "frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas." American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra, at page 339 U. S. 402.
More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in AID v. Alliance for Open Society Intern., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). That case involved the following law (pp. 2324-2325):
The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), 117 Stat. 711, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 7601 et seq., outlined a comprehensive strategy to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS around the world. As part of that strategy, Congress authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars to fund efforts by nongovernmental organizations to assist in the fight. The Act imposes two related conditions on that funding: First, no funds made available by the Act "may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking." § 7631(e). And second, no funds may be used by an organization "that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking." § 7631(f). This case concerns the second of these conditions, referred to as the Policy Requirement. The question is whether that funding condition violates a recipient's First Amendment rights.
The Court explained the doctrine as follows on p. 2328:
As a general matter, if a party objects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the funds. This remains true when the objection is that a condition may affect the recipient's exercise of its First Amendment rights. See, e.g., United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 212, 123 S.Ct. 2297, 156 L.Ed.2d 221 (2003) (plurality opinion) (rejecting a claim by public libraries that conditioning funds for Internet access on the libraries' installing filtering software violated their First Amendment rights, explaining that "[t]o the extent that libraries wish to offer unfiltered access, they are free to do so without federal assistance"
; Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (dismissing "the notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
At the same time, however, we have held that the Government "`may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.'" Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supra, at 59, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (quoting American Library Assn., supra, at 210, 123 S.Ct. 2297). In some cases, a funding condition can result in an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment rights. See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supra, at 59, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (the First Amendment supplies "a limit on Congress' ability to place conditions on the receipt of funds" .
The dissent thinks that can only be true when the condition is not relevant to the objectives of the program (although it has its doubts about that), or when the condition is actually coercive, in the sense of an offer that cannot be refused. See post, at 2325-2326 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Our precedents, however, are not so limited. In the present context, the relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases is between conditions that define the limits of the government spending program — those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize — and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself. The line is hardly clear, in part because the definition of a particular program can always be manipulated to subsume the challenged condition. We have held, however, that "Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise." Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547, 121 S.Ct. 1043, 149 L.Ed.2d 63 (2001).
; Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (dismissing "the notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
At the same time, however, we have held that the Government "`may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.'" Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supra, at 59, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (quoting American Library Assn., supra, at 210, 123 S.Ct. 2297). In some cases, a funding condition can result in an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment rights. See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supra, at 59, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (the First Amendment supplies "a limit on Congress' ability to place conditions on the receipt of funds"
.
The dissent thinks that can only be true when the condition is not relevant to the objectives of the program (although it has its doubts about that), or when the condition is actually coercive, in the sense of an offer that cannot be refused. See post, at 2325-2326 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Our precedents, however, are not so limited. In the present context, the relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases is between conditions that define the limits of the government spending program — those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize — and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself. The line is hardly clear, in part because the definition of a particular program can always be manipulated to subsume the challenged condition. We have held, however, that "Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise." Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547, 121 S.Ct. 1043, 149 L.Ed.2d 63 (2001).
In the Planned Parenthood case, the District Court ruled that the Ohio law in question falls on the unconstitutional side of the line drawn in the final quoted paragraph of the Open Society case.
