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Deterrence, without nuclear winter
http://thebulletin.org/deterrence-without-nuclear-winter8083
Deterrence, without nuclear winter
Seth Baum
03/09/2015
The biggest danger posed by todays large nuclear arsenals is nuclear winter. One or two nuclear strikes could wreak devastating destruction on a few regions, but would not destroy human civilization as a whole. The roughly 16,300 nuclear weapons that currently exist, though, are more than enough to cause nuclear winter, which, through extreme cold conditions, ultraviolet radiation, and crop failures, could threaten the whole of humanity. If we fail to avoid nuclear winter, we could all die, or we could see civilization collapse, never to return.
That makes avoiding nuclear winter paramount. But the worlds major powers, in particular the United States and Russia, have long argued that their large nuclear arsenals are required for deterrence. Deterrence means threatening another party with some sort of harm in order to persuade it not to do something. In this case, it means threatening massive nuclear retaliation to dissuade another country from launching an attack itself. If two countries were to follow through on their threats of nuclear retaliation, mutual destruction would be assured. That deters both sides from starting a war. But nuclear deterrence can fail, as demonstrated during events like the Cuban missile crisis, when there have been escalations towards nuclear war. (Martin Hellman, Ward Wilson, and others have documented such events.)
<snip>
How significantly do arsenals need to be cut to avoid nuclear winter? They dont need to be reduced to zero, but the short answer is that nobody knows. Humanitys ability to survive massive nuclear attacks is not well-studied. One recent study found that two billion peoplenearly a third of humanitycould be at risk of starvation from a nuclear war involving just 100 weapons. The actual death toll could be even larger, because this study only looked at starvation. Secondary effects such as pandemics and violence could kill even more.
<snip>
Deterrence doesnt have to rely on large arsenals of nuclear weapons, or even on nuclear weapons at all. A range of candidate weapons could conceivably achieve the same goal without risking global catastrophe.
<snip>
Deterrence, without nuclear winter
Seth Baum
03/09/2015
The biggest danger posed by todays large nuclear arsenals is nuclear winter. One or two nuclear strikes could wreak devastating destruction on a few regions, but would not destroy human civilization as a whole. The roughly 16,300 nuclear weapons that currently exist, though, are more than enough to cause nuclear winter, which, through extreme cold conditions, ultraviolet radiation, and crop failures, could threaten the whole of humanity. If we fail to avoid nuclear winter, we could all die, or we could see civilization collapse, never to return.
That makes avoiding nuclear winter paramount. But the worlds major powers, in particular the United States and Russia, have long argued that their large nuclear arsenals are required for deterrence. Deterrence means threatening another party with some sort of harm in order to persuade it not to do something. In this case, it means threatening massive nuclear retaliation to dissuade another country from launching an attack itself. If two countries were to follow through on their threats of nuclear retaliation, mutual destruction would be assured. That deters both sides from starting a war. But nuclear deterrence can fail, as demonstrated during events like the Cuban missile crisis, when there have been escalations towards nuclear war. (Martin Hellman, Ward Wilson, and others have documented such events.)
<snip>
How significantly do arsenals need to be cut to avoid nuclear winter? They dont need to be reduced to zero, but the short answer is that nobody knows. Humanitys ability to survive massive nuclear attacks is not well-studied. One recent study found that two billion peoplenearly a third of humanitycould be at risk of starvation from a nuclear war involving just 100 weapons. The actual death toll could be even larger, because this study only looked at starvation. Secondary effects such as pandemics and violence could kill even more.
<snip>
Deterrence doesnt have to rely on large arsenals of nuclear weapons, or even on nuclear weapons at all. A range of candidate weapons could conceivably achieve the same goal without risking global catastrophe.
<snip>
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Deterrence, without nuclear winter (Original Post)
bananas
Mar 2015
OP
bananas
(27,509 posts)1. Roundtable: The winter-safe deterrence debate
http://thebulletin.org/winter-safe-deterrence-debate8094#wt
The winter-safe deterrence debate
In a recent opinion column for the Bulletin, "Deterrence, without nuclear winter," Seth Baum argued that the biggest danger posed by world nuclear arsenals is a nuclear winter that could be sparked by even a limited exchange of nuclear weapons. Baum's piece went on to suggest that "the worlds biggest nuclear powers [might] meet their deterrence needs without keeping the large nuclear arsenals they maintain today. They could practice a winter-safe deterrence, which would rely on weapons that pose no significant risk of nuclear winter."
In his column, Baum, executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, proposed that alternatives to nuclear weapons be explored, in terms of their ability to provide the deterrence now assigned to large nuclear arsenals. "Exploring 'good' options for threatening large destruction is a peculiar and regrettable task in which no civilized person should take any joy," Baum wrote. "But if doing so can save many lives, and indeed save civilization itself, then it should be done. The two weapons that stand out are non-contagious biological weapons and nuclear electromagnetic pulse. The former could work well if deterrence requires threatening large human populations. The latter could work well when deterrence requires threatening large amounts of infrastructure. In both cases these are tentative conclusions, backed only by my limited, preliminary study. Governments should not move forward with either weapon without more careful examination."
Baum's column and the study from which it draws, "Winter-safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence," published in the journal Contemporary Security Policy, have been vigorously disputed in social media. In this roundtable, security experts Gregory Koblentz, Martin Furmanski, Brett Edwards, Gigi Kwik Gronvall, and Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Baum debate his column and winter-safe deterrence ideas in more depth.
<snip>
The winter-safe deterrence debate
In a recent opinion column for the Bulletin, "Deterrence, without nuclear winter," Seth Baum argued that the biggest danger posed by world nuclear arsenals is a nuclear winter that could be sparked by even a limited exchange of nuclear weapons. Baum's piece went on to suggest that "the worlds biggest nuclear powers [might] meet their deterrence needs without keeping the large nuclear arsenals they maintain today. They could practice a winter-safe deterrence, which would rely on weapons that pose no significant risk of nuclear winter."
In his column, Baum, executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, proposed that alternatives to nuclear weapons be explored, in terms of their ability to provide the deterrence now assigned to large nuclear arsenals. "Exploring 'good' options for threatening large destruction is a peculiar and regrettable task in which no civilized person should take any joy," Baum wrote. "But if doing so can save many lives, and indeed save civilization itself, then it should be done. The two weapons that stand out are non-contagious biological weapons and nuclear electromagnetic pulse. The former could work well if deterrence requires threatening large human populations. The latter could work well when deterrence requires threatening large amounts of infrastructure. In both cases these are tentative conclusions, backed only by my limited, preliminary study. Governments should not move forward with either weapon without more careful examination."
Baum's column and the study from which it draws, "Winter-safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence," published in the journal Contemporary Security Policy, have been vigorously disputed in social media. In this roundtable, security experts Gregory Koblentz, Martin Furmanski, Brett Edwards, Gigi Kwik Gronvall, and Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Baum debate his column and winter-safe deterrence ideas in more depth.
<snip>
Demeter
(85,373 posts)2. There is no good reason for nuclear war or nuclear "deterrance" plans
Nor is there a good reason for nuclear power plants, depleted uranium munitions and armor, or most "peaceful" applications.
Nuclear power is the power to mutate the genome. Genetic mutation (massive and widespread) is the road to extinction of our species and all others (except the tardigrades, if reports are true).
For this reason, nuclear science should be confined to powering long-range space vehicles, providing some medical treatments and diagnostics (but only those proven safe and efficacious) and careful basic research into the properties of matter, energy, physics and chemistry.