What to Worry About in an Iran Nuclear Deal
What to Worry About in an Iran Nuclear Deal
A good deal makes the Middle East a safer place. A bad one makes matters worse. Here are some issues to keep in mind if nuclear talks lead to a provisional agreement.
JEFFREY GOLDBERG MAR 29 2015, 4:29 PM ET
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The more extreme positions on both sides are distasteful. The Pollyannas who not only seem to believe that Iran should be allowed to maintain an advanced nuclear infrastructure if it promises to behave nicely, but who also believe that this nuclear accord will somehow serve to convince the Iranians to moderate their approach to their neighbors and, for instance, stop sponsoring terrorism and murdering large numbers of people in Syria (among other places), are dangerous and naïve. On the other side, those who argue that no negotiated settlement will ever be good enough to keep Iran from the nuclear thresholdthat only military action would guarantee an end to the Iranian nuclear programbelieve that it is wise to start an actual war now in order to prevent a theoretical one later. If you believe that we are living in 1938, and that Israel, and the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia are playing the role of Czechoslovakia, then I suppose this position makes sense. I dont think we are there, however.
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1) What will Saudi Arabia do in response to a deal? If the Saudiswho are already battling the Iranians on several frontsactually head down the path toward nuclearization, then these negotiations will not have served the underlying purpose President Obama ascribed to them. The president has warned, in interviews with me and others, that a nuclear Iran would trigger a nuclear arms race across the Middle East, the worlds most volatile region. One goal of these talks is to assure the rest of the Middle East that Iran cannot achieve nuclear status. If Saudi Arabia (and Egypt and Turkey and the U.A.E.) does not believe that a deal will achieve this, then it will move on its own to counter the Persian nuclear threat.
2) If the underground enrichment facility at Fordowwhich had been hidden from Western view for several years, and which the U.S. and Europe have repeatedly said needs to be closedis allowed to run centrifuges, even to spin germanium and other elements that cannot be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, then doubt could legitimately be sown about the strength of this deal. Already-spinning centrifuges in a maintained, guarded, and fortified bunker can be retrofitted to handle uranium, should the Iranians choose to break their agreement. It would be better to see Fordow filled with cement, or otherwise crippled.
3) The Iranians have never answered most of the questions put to them by the International Atomic Energy Agency about the possible military dimensionsthe so-called PMDsof their nuclear program. These questions must be answered before sanctions are even partially lifted. Otherwise, the West will never get answers.
4) The proposed speed of sanctions relief is, of course, something to watch carefully. The Iranians want immediate sanctions relief, but the West should only agree to a stately pace of sanctions-removal, predicated on 100-percent Iranian compliance on intrusive inspections, among other issues.
5) The largest question in my mind concerns the matter of break-out timehow long it would take for Iran, once it made a decision to violate the terms of a deal and go for full nuclearization, to actually make a deliverable weapon. The goal of the Obama administration is to make sure that it would take Iran at least a year to cross the threshold. The assumption is that a year would give the West time to devise a responseincluding, if necessary, a military response. This will be among the issues of greatest controversy because this is an easily misunderstood and distorted matter, one that is both devilishly complicated and, in many ways, theoretical. On this issue, as on others, I will be listening to experts I respect. There are several, but three of the people I will be listening to carefully on this issue in particular are Gary Samore, formerly President Obamas point man on the Iran nuclear file; David Albright, of the Institute for Science and International Security, and Olli Heinonen, a former deputy director general of the IAEA. If these three, and a handful of others, seem nervous about the details of a framework deal, should one be reached, then I'm going to be nervous as well.
840high
(17,196 posts)still_one
(92,366 posts)overthrew the democratic elected government of Iran in 1953, and installed the Shah, we set the course for where we are now
Frankly, I am a little tired of our elective wars
Hoyt
(54,770 posts)Truth is, if Iraq had nukes - or maybe just a viable army, navy, air force - bush would not have invaded.
It's a tough situation, one we've had a big part creating.
BillZBubb
(10,650 posts)Iran is not going to agree to that. Nor should they without some significant benefit in return from the West. A reasonable number of centrifuges can safely be allowed as long as routine, unobstructed inspections of the facilities are granted. If Iran is refining Uranium to a level even close to being usable in an effective bomb, modern test equipment will show that easily. It can't be hidden.
Goldberg is playing the same scare tactic game as occurred in the lead up to the Iraq invasion. He's building a straw man, while seeming to take the middle, peaceful ground. He's not. What he is claiming as the middle ground is actually a recipe for war.
quadrature
(2,049 posts)BillZBubb
(10,650 posts)You do understand what level of refinement is needed to make a reasonable bomb, don't you?
If inspections are allowed there is no way for Iran to get to that level without it being easily detected.
quadrature
(2,049 posts)Bill.
you might be interested in this web page.
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Conversion-Enrichment-and-Fabrication/Uranium-Enrichment/
I direct your attention to the lower of two graphs
that are about one-third down the page
to produce 5.6 kg of 90% enriched(weapon grade)
requires 1300 total separation-work-units.
to produce 26 kg of 20% enriched
(on your way toward 5.6kg of 90%)
1100 separation-work-units have already be expended
BillZBubb
(10,650 posts)The fact is significant refinement is still required and it takes TIME. Of course it is less "work" because most of the mass has been lost as the material is purified.
If there are frequent, regular inspections, there is no way enrichment beyond 20% can be concealed. There is plenty of time to detect a breach in the agreement before a critical mass is acquired.
BillZBubb
(10,650 posts)You seem to be taking the position of those who want war, not peace.
cprise
(8,445 posts)You can't get any more pro-nuclear-power than the very same set of people who think its too dangerous for those 'dangerous countries'.
And then there is the press, who have for more than a decade now insisted on differentiating nuclear power from weapons while simultaneously describing Iran's efforts with vague expressions like "nuclear program" (essentially giving cover to the neocon rhetoric).