Welcome to DU!
The truly grassroots left-of-center political community where regular people, not algorithms, drive the discussions and set the standards.
Join the community:
Create a free account
Support DU (and get rid of ads!):
Become a Star Member
Latest Breaking News
General Discussion
The DU Lounge
All Forums
Issue Forums
Culture Forums
Alliance Forums
Region Forums
Support Forums
Help & Search
Why Grenfell Tower Burned: Regulators Put Cost Before Safety
Full disclosure: I own shares of Arconic. Every DUer who owns shares of an S&P 500 Index fund owns shares of Arconic. According the the wiki, Arconic has 41,500 employees.
This investigation is going to take a while.
Why Grenfell Tower Burned: Regulators Put Cost Before Safety
By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK, DANNY HAKIM and JAMES GLANZ JUNE 24, 2017
....
Residents of Grenfell Tower had complained for years that the 24-story public housing block invited catastrophe. It lacked fire alarms, sprinklers and a fire escape. It had only a single staircase. And there were concerns about a new aluminum facade that was supposed to improve the building — but was now whisking the flames skyward.
....
The first well-known use of aluminum cladding on a high-rise was on the Alcoa Building, in Pittsburgh, erected as the manufacturer’s headquarters. Makers of cladding promoted it as both aesthetically striking and energy-efficient, because the aluminum surface reflects back heat and light. Demand for cladding surged with rising fuel costs and concerns about global warming, and over time, producers began selling it in a thin “sandwich” design: Two sheets of aluminum around a core made of flammable plastics like polyethylene. ... The cladding is typically paired with a much thicker layer of foam insulation against the building’s exterior wall, as was the case at Grenfell Tower. Then the cladding may be affixed to the wall with metal studs, leaving a narrow gap between the cladding and the insulation.
But by 1998, regulators in the United States — where deaths from fires are historically more common than in Britain or Western Europe — began requiring real-world simulations to test any materials to be used in buildings taller than a firefighter’s two-story ladder. “The U.S. codes say you have to test your assembly exactly the way you install it in a building,” said Robert Solomon, an engineer at the National Fire Protection Association, which is funded in part by insurance companies and drafts model codes followed in the United States and around the world. ... No aluminum cladding made with pure polyethylene — the type used at Grenfell Tower — has ever passed the test, experts in the United States say. The aluminum sandwiching always failed in the heat of a fire, exposing the flammable filling. And the air gap between the cladding and the insulation could act as a chimney, intensifying the fire and sucking flames up the side of a building. Attempts to install nonflammable barriers at vertical and horizontal intervals were ineffective in practice.
As a result, American building codes have effectively banned flammable cladding in high-rises for nearly two decades. The codes also require many additional safeguards, especially in new buildings or major renovations: automatic sprinkler systems, fire alarms, loudspeakers to provide emergency instructions, pressurized stairways designed to keep smoke out and multiple stairways or fire escapes. ... And partly because of the influence of American architects, many territories around the world follow the American example. But not Britain.
-- -- -- --
David D. Kirkpatrick and Danny Hakim reported from London, and James Glanz from New York. Zephira Davis contributed reporting from London, and Nour Youssef from Cairo.
A version of this article appears in print on June 25, 2017, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: ‘An Accident Waiting to Happen’: Blame in a Deadly London Fire.
By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK, DANNY HAKIM and JAMES GLANZ JUNE 24, 2017
....
Residents of Grenfell Tower had complained for years that the 24-story public housing block invited catastrophe. It lacked fire alarms, sprinklers and a fire escape. It had only a single staircase. And there were concerns about a new aluminum facade that was supposed to improve the building — but was now whisking the flames skyward.
....
The first well-known use of aluminum cladding on a high-rise was on the Alcoa Building, in Pittsburgh, erected as the manufacturer’s headquarters. Makers of cladding promoted it as both aesthetically striking and energy-efficient, because the aluminum surface reflects back heat and light. Demand for cladding surged with rising fuel costs and concerns about global warming, and over time, producers began selling it in a thin “sandwich” design: Two sheets of aluminum around a core made of flammable plastics like polyethylene. ... The cladding is typically paired with a much thicker layer of foam insulation against the building’s exterior wall, as was the case at Grenfell Tower. Then the cladding may be affixed to the wall with metal studs, leaving a narrow gap between the cladding and the insulation.
But by 1998, regulators in the United States — where deaths from fires are historically more common than in Britain or Western Europe — began requiring real-world simulations to test any materials to be used in buildings taller than a firefighter’s two-story ladder. “The U.S. codes say you have to test your assembly exactly the way you install it in a building,” said Robert Solomon, an engineer at the National Fire Protection Association, which is funded in part by insurance companies and drafts model codes followed in the United States and around the world. ... No aluminum cladding made with pure polyethylene — the type used at Grenfell Tower — has ever passed the test, experts in the United States say. The aluminum sandwiching always failed in the heat of a fire, exposing the flammable filling. And the air gap between the cladding and the insulation could act as a chimney, intensifying the fire and sucking flames up the side of a building. Attempts to install nonflammable barriers at vertical and horizontal intervals were ineffective in practice.
As a result, American building codes have effectively banned flammable cladding in high-rises for nearly two decades. The codes also require many additional safeguards, especially in new buildings or major renovations: automatic sprinkler systems, fire alarms, loudspeakers to provide emergency instructions, pressurized stairways designed to keep smoke out and multiple stairways or fire escapes. ... And partly because of the influence of American architects, many territories around the world follow the American example. But not Britain.
-- -- -- --
David D. Kirkpatrick and Danny Hakim reported from London, and James Glanz from New York. Zephira Davis contributed reporting from London, and Nour Youssef from Cairo.
A version of this article appears in print on June 25, 2017, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: ‘An Accident Waiting to Happen’: Blame in a Deadly London Fire.
National Fire Protection Association
Connecting the dots on today’s fire problem
Blog Post created by James Pauley Employee on Jun 21, 2017
....
When government and other entities don’t adopt or designers don’t use the latest versions of codes and standards, they lose the benefit of the latest technology, research and collective wisdom related to fire, electrical and life safety.
When policy makers decide to remove life safety and property protection provisions from codes, they have substituted politics for technical requirements that were determined after extensive input from across the spectrum of knowledgeable people.
When users fail to review and follow standards that are referenced in the codes, they aren’t ensuring the right practices and products are used in the right situations, increasing vulnerability to disaster.
When the professionals involved in design, installation, enforcement and maintenance have not kept up to date on the latest requirements they can end up applying products improperly leading to catastrophic results.
When jurisdictions, under fiscal pressures or lack of understanding of the importance, reduce enforcement efforts, they place their communities at risk as buildings deteriorate, change ownership or type of use.
And when the public takes safety for granted and is uneducated about fire risks, their improper or uneducated actions can place them in peril.
The system the public relies on for managing fire safety is broken and a single solution isn’t the answer. It will take a systems approach to fix it. At NFPA, we are focused on looking at the entire system and working with everyone involved to fill the gaps.
We may not be able to prevent every tragedy from occurring, but by recommitting to and promoting a full system of fire prevention, protection and education, we can help save lives and reduce loss. That is the story that should consume the news of the day.
Jim Pauley
President and CEO
NFPA
Blog Post created by James Pauley Employee on Jun 21, 2017
....
When government and other entities don’t adopt or designers don’t use the latest versions of codes and standards, they lose the benefit of the latest technology, research and collective wisdom related to fire, electrical and life safety.
When policy makers decide to remove life safety and property protection provisions from codes, they have substituted politics for technical requirements that were determined after extensive input from across the spectrum of knowledgeable people.
When users fail to review and follow standards that are referenced in the codes, they aren’t ensuring the right practices and products are used in the right situations, increasing vulnerability to disaster.
When the professionals involved in design, installation, enforcement and maintenance have not kept up to date on the latest requirements they can end up applying products improperly leading to catastrophic results.
When jurisdictions, under fiscal pressures or lack of understanding of the importance, reduce enforcement efforts, they place their communities at risk as buildings deteriorate, change ownership or type of use.
And when the public takes safety for granted and is uneducated about fire risks, their improper or uneducated actions can place them in peril.
The system the public relies on for managing fire safety is broken and a single solution isn’t the answer. It will take a systems approach to fix it. At NFPA, we are focused on looking at the entire system and working with everyone involved to fill the gaps.
We may not be able to prevent every tragedy from occurring, but by recommitting to and promoting a full system of fire prevention, protection and education, we can help save lives and reduce loss. That is the story that should consume the news of the day.
Jim Pauley
President and CEO
NFPA
High-rise building safety
I work for an organization that works with the NFPA. I myself do not work with the NFPA. I had a coworker who worked closely with them. He left last year to take a higher up position at another agency. He knows much more about the NFPA consensus standards than I do.
11 replies
= new reply since forum marked as read
= new reply since forum marked as read
Grenfell Tower: fire-resistant cladding is just £5,000 more expensive
Alexi Mostrous, Sean O’Neill, Sam Joiner
June 16 2017, 12:01am, The Times
Grenfell Tower refurbishers would have needed less than £5,000 to upgrade the building’s external panels to a fire-resistant version thought not to have been used, The Times can reveal.
Hundreds of aluminium panels, known as Reynobond, were installed on the 230ft west London property in a £8.6 million refurbishment. Witnesses described the building’s cladding, made up of the panels and an insulating underlayer, as going up like a “matchstick”.
Reynobond offers three types of panel: a standard one with a polyethylene core (PE) and two with fire resistant or “non combustible” cores. Grenfell Tower had reportedly been fitted with the cheaper PE version.
Alexi Mostrous, Sean O’Neill, Sam Joiner
June 16 2017, 12:01am, The Times
Grenfell Tower refurbishers would have needed less than £5,000 to upgrade the building’s external panels to a fire-resistant version thought not to have been used, The Times can reveal.
Hundreds of aluminium panels, known as Reynobond, were installed on the 230ft west London property in a £8.6 million refurbishment. Witnesses described the building’s cladding, made up of the panels and an insulating underlayer, as going up like a “matchstick”.
Reynobond offers three types of panel: a standard one with a polyethylene core (PE) and two with fire resistant or “non combustible” cores. Grenfell Tower had reportedly been fitted with the cheaper PE version.
For the non-engineers here, one inch is 25.4 millimeters. Three millimeters is one-eighth of an inch. 250 millimeters is ten inches. 50 millimeters is two inches.
I wonder if it would have mattered which version of Reynobond was used, with all that Celotex in place. How is that for flammability?
Celotex Products
If the "FR" in FR5000 stands for "fire-retardant" or "fire-resistant," than its use might have been appropriate for this application. Again, I do not keep up with building codes in the UK.
Celotex FR5000
Offering best in class performance, Celotex FR5000 is over 100% more thermally efficient than many mineral fibre products and up to 10% better than typical PIR. Developed specifically for use in pitched roofs, floors and walls, Celotex FR5000 is a high performance insulation board that:
Has a lower thermal conductivity value (0.021W/mK) compared with other typical PIR insulation boards providing enhanced thermal performance and better U-values
Has super low emissivity value
Achieves an 'A+' rating when compared to the BRE Green Guide
Has Class 0 fire performance throughout the entire product in accordance with BS 476
Is suitable for a range of applications including pitched roofs, walls and floors
Future proofs the energy performance of new and existing buildings
Edit: Wikipedia says it's another kind of Celotex, Celotex RS5000:
Grenfell Tower fire, exterior cladding and insulation
Hmmm. The datasheet for Celotex RS50000 has been updated:
Celotex UK
Update - Friday 23rd June
Grenfell Tower: Celotex is to stop the supply of RS5000 for use in rainscreen cladding systems in buildings over 18m tall
