1984 in 2014: A new propaganda war underpins the Kremlin’s clash with the West
FIREWORKS, concerts, uplifting speeches and patriotic euphoria: the Kremlin is celebrating the annexation of Crimea as though Russia had won the second world war (again) rather than grabbing a piece of land from a smaller and weaker neighbour. The public seems intoxicated by victory in a war that was begun, conducted and won largely through propaganda.
Russians have been subjected to an intense, aggressive and blunt disinformation campaign in which they were bombarded by images of violence, chaos and fascism in Ukraine, sinister plotting by the West and evidence of Russias strength and nobility in response. The Russian media have always shaped reality as much as they have reflected it. But in the seizure of Crimea, television played as much of a leading role as the army. Russian television, widely watched in Crimea, bolstered the loyalty of the local population while justifying the Kremlins actions at home.
The propaganda campaign has seen several stages since the protests on Kievs Maidan began, says Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Centre, an independent pollster. It portrayed Maidan as a conspiracy by the West. It showed the protesters as nationalists, fascists and anti-Semites who had staged a putsch, posing great danger to Russian-speakers. It faked stories of Ukrainian refugees fleeing to Russia (using footage of a border crossing between Ukraine and Poland). The case for taking Crimea, to defend the Russian population from an imagined threat, morphed into Russias reclaiming historic lands. Addressing a crowd in Red Square, Vladimir Putin boomed: After a long, hard and exhausting voyage, Crimea and Sevastopol are returning to their harbour, to their native shores, to their home port, to Russia!
Nobody knows how long Mr Putin has been working on the idea of this homecoming (some say since the 2008 war in Georgia), but the appointment of Dmitry Kiselev as the face of Russian propaganda in December last year marks the moment when he began to execute it. Mr Kiselevs anti-Western and homophobic rhetoric made him a marginal figure a few years ago. But as the new head of RIA-Novosti, the state news agency, and an anchor on the state news channel, he has become one of Mr Putins key weapons (and is now subject to European Union sanctions).
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http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21599829-new-propaganda-war-underpins-kremlins-clash-west-1984-2014
pangaia
(24,324 posts)during the olympics...
Igel
(35,317 posts)That's what you plan for.
Unless the FSB sent in diversionary groups to engineer the Euromaidan's late-January evolution and the following events, the excuses offered by Putin wouldn't have been available. The planning wouldn't have been useful in the short-term, and may not have worked out for many years. Kiselev, in fact, might have moved on. Putin plans for the long-term. We see that as a constant criticism of the West--we plan short term for the most part. We hear it from Islamists, we hear it from Russophiles, we hear it from all sorts of folk. Perhaps one day we'll learn. We used to plan long-term rather well. Something broke along the way.
Still, let's not make the foe superhuman. He just hasn't forgotten something we used to know; perhaps we can re-learn that skill. I doubt it, though: It takes a certain amount of elitism to look over the current situation and say that short-term loss is fine if it yields short-term gain. Those who mostly feel the objective effects of the short-term loss are likely to be in the bottom half of the income spectrum, which is decidedly more than 1/2 of the population.