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Ukraine shows uselessness of NATO nukes in Europe
http://thebulletin.org/ukraine-shows-uselessness-nato-nukes-europe7257
Ukraine shows uselessness of NATO nukes in Europe
Tom Sauer
06/23/2014
Many people in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands wonder why there are still US tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. These B-61 nuclear gravity bombs were stationed in Europe during the Cold War to deter the Soviet threat, but while this may (or may not) have once made sense, most pundits nowadays agree that at least from a military point of view, the weapons are irrelevant.
Or should I say "agreed?" Russian President Vladimir Putin's expansionist policy over recent months is not of much help to those who would like to see the B-61 bombs withdrawn. “Prospects for nuclear reductions in Europe are bleak," as Polish expert Lukasz Kulesa recently wrote. Even before the crisis in Ukraine, Eastern European NATO members, and especially the Baltic states, resisted withdrawal. The issue was at the heart of the internal deliberations of the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review in 2011-2012. At that time, Germany asked for the warheads to be withdrawn, while the Baltic states (supported by France) preferred the status quo. Others held in-between positions.
With the crisis in Ukraine, opponents of withdrawal appear at first glance to have been right. Russia's invasion of Crimea and its provocations in the eastern part of Ukraine prove that the threat has not gone, and that Russia should be contained and deterred, just like during the Cold War—or so the argument goes. The deterrent should include a nuclear component, some argue, preferably as close as possible to the Russian border. For those in Western Europe who had already been skeptical of the idea of withdrawal out of solidarity with their eastern neighbors, the issue is dead.
They may be wrong. The cost-benefit calculus over whether to keep these Cold War weapons in Europe has not fundamentally changed, even after the crisis in Ukraine. In fact, the only political argument of the last couple of years in favor of keeping the nuclear warheads deployed—that doing so was necessary to reassure the Baltic States—has failed dramatically with the recent crisis. Despite the remaining US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the Baltic states do not feel reassured at all. Though they are NATO members, protected by the organization’s security guarantee, they constantly seek clues that the guarantee will actually be honored if their territory is attacked. Apparently, these three states are unconvinced that NATO's nuclear umbrella "works."
The reaction by the West to the crisis and to the demands of the Baltic States shows that these nuclear weapons are indeed irrelevant.
<snip>
Ukraine shows uselessness of NATO nukes in Europe
Tom Sauer
06/23/2014
Many people in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands wonder why there are still US tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. These B-61 nuclear gravity bombs were stationed in Europe during the Cold War to deter the Soviet threat, but while this may (or may not) have once made sense, most pundits nowadays agree that at least from a military point of view, the weapons are irrelevant.
Or should I say "agreed?" Russian President Vladimir Putin's expansionist policy over recent months is not of much help to those who would like to see the B-61 bombs withdrawn. “Prospects for nuclear reductions in Europe are bleak," as Polish expert Lukasz Kulesa recently wrote. Even before the crisis in Ukraine, Eastern European NATO members, and especially the Baltic states, resisted withdrawal. The issue was at the heart of the internal deliberations of the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review in 2011-2012. At that time, Germany asked for the warheads to be withdrawn, while the Baltic states (supported by France) preferred the status quo. Others held in-between positions.
With the crisis in Ukraine, opponents of withdrawal appear at first glance to have been right. Russia's invasion of Crimea and its provocations in the eastern part of Ukraine prove that the threat has not gone, and that Russia should be contained and deterred, just like during the Cold War—or so the argument goes. The deterrent should include a nuclear component, some argue, preferably as close as possible to the Russian border. For those in Western Europe who had already been skeptical of the idea of withdrawal out of solidarity with their eastern neighbors, the issue is dead.
They may be wrong. The cost-benefit calculus over whether to keep these Cold War weapons in Europe has not fundamentally changed, even after the crisis in Ukraine. In fact, the only political argument of the last couple of years in favor of keeping the nuclear warheads deployed—that doing so was necessary to reassure the Baltic States—has failed dramatically with the recent crisis. Despite the remaining US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the Baltic states do not feel reassured at all. Though they are NATO members, protected by the organization’s security guarantee, they constantly seek clues that the guarantee will actually be honored if their territory is attacked. Apparently, these three states are unconvinced that NATO's nuclear umbrella "works."
The reaction by the West to the crisis and to the demands of the Baltic States shows that these nuclear weapons are indeed irrelevant.
<snip>
