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Nuclear power plant collusion (on station blackout regulations in Japan)
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/ed20120623a1.html#.T_CEz830fSu
Saturday, June 23, 2012
EDITORIAL
Nuclear power plant collusion
As the March 2011 reactor meltdowns at Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s Fukushima No. 1 power plant demonstrated, loss of power sources for an extended period of time at a nuclear power plant — known as a "station blackout" (SBO) — can lead to catastrophic results. It was recently reported that the Nuclear Safety Commission colluded with Tepco over the nation's SBO-related safety standard about two decades ago.
<snip>
In 1990, the government issued a safety standard stating that there is no need to take into account SBOs lasting 30 minutes or longer in designing a nuclear power plant. Because preparations for long SBOs had become obligatory overseas, in 1991 the NSC established a working group to consider a revision of the safety standard. The group consisted of five experts and officials from Tepco, Kepco and the then Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, which had a cooperative relationship with the power companies.
Because Tepco and Kepco opposed incorporating preparations for long SBOs into the design standard, the then Science and Technology Agency, which was serving as NSC's secretariat, asked the two power companies to "compose sentences" stating why there is no need to consider preparations for SBOs lasting more than 30 minutes and to submit them.
The working group subsequently adopted Tepco's explanation that nuclear power plant design in Japan has an adequate margin of safety, and that if a nuclear power plant is operated properly, the level of safety will be sufficient.
In June 1993, the working group issued a report saying that even if an SBO occurs, it would not lead to a severe accident. As a result, the government safety standard was not revised.
<snip>
Saturday, June 23, 2012
EDITORIAL
Nuclear power plant collusion
As the March 2011 reactor meltdowns at Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s Fukushima No. 1 power plant demonstrated, loss of power sources for an extended period of time at a nuclear power plant — known as a "station blackout" (SBO) — can lead to catastrophic results. It was recently reported that the Nuclear Safety Commission colluded with Tepco over the nation's SBO-related safety standard about two decades ago.
<snip>
In 1990, the government issued a safety standard stating that there is no need to take into account SBOs lasting 30 minutes or longer in designing a nuclear power plant. Because preparations for long SBOs had become obligatory overseas, in 1991 the NSC established a working group to consider a revision of the safety standard. The group consisted of five experts and officials from Tepco, Kepco and the then Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, which had a cooperative relationship with the power companies.
Because Tepco and Kepco opposed incorporating preparations for long SBOs into the design standard, the then Science and Technology Agency, which was serving as NSC's secretariat, asked the two power companies to "compose sentences" stating why there is no need to consider preparations for SBOs lasting more than 30 minutes and to submit them.
The working group subsequently adopted Tepco's explanation that nuclear power plant design in Japan has an adequate margin of safety, and that if a nuclear power plant is operated properly, the level of safety will be sufficient.
In June 1993, the working group issued a report saying that even if an SBO occurs, it would not lead to a severe accident. As a result, the government safety standard was not revised.
<snip>
