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kristopher

(29,798 posts)
Tue Jan 3, 2012, 02:09 PM Jan 2012

Solyndra And The Real Risk To American Taxpayers

Solyndra And The Real Risk To American Taxpayers

The bankruptcy of Solyndra, a solar company that received a federal loan guarantee, has made the front page because of charges of cronyism. But among the biggest risks to taxpayers, who underwrite federal loan guarantees, isn’t renewable energy. It is nuclear power.

The Department of Energy declared its intent to conditionally issue a loan guarantee of $8.33 billion to Georgia Power and its utility partners in February 2010. Why should taxpayers be concerned? Congress and the DOE are ignoring the sordid history of nuclear power plant construction and bailouts, recent developments in nuclear plant construction, and the low-balled cost of Georgia Power’s proposed additions.

The initial wave of nuclear plant construction cost ratepayers $200 billion in cost overruns. Abandoned plants cost the public $50 billion. Because the finished plants were not the least cost resource, it is estimated that by the mid-2000s, ratepayers had paid $225 billion in excess charges. The deregulation scam in the late 1990s saw the public picking up $40 billion in stranded costs for the nuclear industry. The bailout came in the wake of industry whining about not being able to compete in deregulated markets. Since 2003, various cost estimates for nuclear power rose from about $2,000 per kilowatt to $6,000 or $7,000 per kilowatt.

Forbes magazine in 1985 called nuclear power the “worst managerial disaster in history.” The Economist in 2001 declared nuclear power “too expensive to matter.” Moody’s in 2009 viewed “nuclear generation plants as a ‘bet the farm’ endeavor for most companies … .” After multiple cancellations and delays of nuclear plants, an analyst for the Institute for Energy and Environment said, “2009 was the seventh year of the so-called ‘Nuclear Renaissance,’ but it looks a lot like the U.S. nuclear industry of the 1980s, a decade of no new orders, multiple delays and cancellations, hefty defaults and emerging cheaper alternatives.”

Government warned us too. In 2003, the Congressional Budget Office ...


http://njtoday.net/2012/01/03/solyndra-and-the-real-risk-to-american-taxpayers/
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Solyndra And The Real Risk To American Taxpayers (Original Post) kristopher Jan 2012 OP
CBO estimate on nuclear loan guarantees kristopher Jan 2012 #1
There was a new CBO report in August 2011 FSSF Jan 2012 #3
The program for fast tracking is riddled with hidden subsidies. kristopher Jan 2012 #4
K&R Kolesar Jan 2012 #2

kristopher

(29,798 posts)
1. CBO estimate on nuclear loan guarantees
Tue Jan 3, 2012, 06:45 PM
Jan 2012

CBO estimate on nuclear loan guarantees

For this estimate, CBO assumes that the first nuclear plant built using a federal loan guarantee would have a capacity of 1,100 megawatts and have associated project costs of $2.5 billion. We expect that such a plant would be located at the site of an existing nuclear plant and would employ a reactor design certified by the NRC prior to construction. This plant would be the first to be licensed under the NRC’s new licensing procedures, which have been extensively revised over the past decade.

Based on current industry practices, CBO expects that any new nuclear construction project would be financed with 50 percent equity and 50 percent debt. The high equity participation reflects the current practice of purchasing energy assets using high equity stakes, 100 percent in some cases, used by companies likely to undertake a new nuclear construction project. Thus, we assume that the government loan guarantee would cover half the construction cost of a new plant, or $1.25 billion in 2011.

CBO considers the risk of default on such a loan guarantee to be very high—well above 50 percent. The key factor accounting for this risk is that we expect that the plant would be uneconomic to operate because of its high construction costs, relative to other electricity generation sources. In addition, this project would have significant technical risk because it would be the first of a new generation of nuclear plants, as well as project delay and interruption risk due to licensing and regulatory proceedings.


Note the price - $2.5 billion was to be only for the first plant. Future plants were, according to the assumptions provided by the nuclear industry, expected to have lower costs as economy of scale resulted in savings.

In fact, since the report was written (2003), the estimated cost has risen to an average of about $8 billion.

Wonder what that does to the “risk is that … the plant would be uneconomic to operate because of its high construction costs, relative to other electricity generation sources”?

Does that risk diminish or increase when the price rises from $2.5 billion to $8 billion?

FSSF

(17 posts)
3. There was a new CBO report in August 2011
Tue Jan 3, 2012, 09:42 PM
Jan 2012
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=12238

-The expected cost to the federal government of guaranteeing a nuclear construction loan will vary greatly depending on a project's characteristics and on the economic and regulatory environment in which the project will operate.

-Default rates and recovery rates are likely to vary considerably, both across projects and over the lifetime of a given project.

-When credit ratings are used to assess default probabilities, cost estimates will vary widely with the assigned ratings category, the assumed recovery rate, and whether Treasury interest rates or estimated market interest rates are used for discounting.

-Budgetary estimates of guarantee costs are significantly lower than the corresponding fair-value estimates, which provide a more comprehensive measure of the cost to taxpayers.

-Because of the high degree of uncertainty involved, it may not be possible to charge borrowers the full cost of a loan guarantee.

Here's what the last two items mean:

"As an illustrative example, let’s consider a guarantee for a loan of $8 billion extended to an A-rated company constructing a nuclear power plant ... Assuming a 55% recovery rate, the CBO report calculates the legislatively mandated budget cost to be 1% of the loan, or $80 million. The true cost calculated by the CBO is 9% of the loan, or $720 million. That’s an underestimate of $640 million. In the nuclear loan guarantee program, companies ... must pay a fee to the federal government to cover the budgetary cost of the guarantee. But according to the CBO report, and this example, the fee paid over time would only be $80 million, while the true cost of the guarantee is $720 million, so the company is receiving an unstated subsidy of $640 million."

Stolen from: http://bettingthebusiness.com/2011/09/29/the-true-cost-of-government-guarantees/

kristopher

(29,798 posts)
4. The program for fast tracking is riddled with hidden subsidies.
Wed Jan 4, 2012, 01:02 PM
Jan 2012

For example, even though neither Congress nor the courts can force a stoppage at the plant for any reason, each project also has a half billion dollar Federal backup to pay for cost over-runs caused by regulatory delays. That means that every problem the regulators see must be evaluated primarily by the requirement for the Federal government to pick up the tab for fixing it. So the regulator is forced to adopt the profit perspective of the developer subsequently lowering the public safety priority. With that structure, what is the point of even having a regulator?


Thanks

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