to a game of serial regime change by proxy using Jihadi militants. And, it will continue to be a spreading bloody mess until the flow of funding and arms from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Gulf States to ISIS and AQ terrorist groups is cut off, with the biggest funders publicly identified -- and arrested where ever they are -- if need be.

was well done, it's a problem much on my mind lately, the oppressive prevalence of bullshit and invective.

And then about the lack of point or even coherence in our foreign policy, well ...

I think "thrashing around" is a good description, "grabbing at straws". Ms Nuland's screed which I posted is pretty weak tea, for all the bluster.

And I do get the feeling, as he says, that options are being reconsidered, and not just in DC.

But he rambles a bit.

Several recent events in Syria suggest that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies are changing their strategy to focus on retaking more land from the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) in concert with harassment bombing of opposition-held territories in western Syria. By focusing on retaking territory from ISIS, the Assad regime hopes to regain international legitimacy and force the United States (and other countries that back the opposition) into an uneasy position: direct or indirect support for the regime in its fight against ISIS, thereby undermining calls for the regime to step aside and reducing condemnations of the regime’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians.

Three events suggest this change in strategy. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported on June 7 that regime forces had moved against ISIS in Tabqa as part of a campaign that began on June 2 to recapture the self-declared ISIS capital of Raqqa. The city of Tabqa is strategically important because it sits on a crossroads linking three provinces: Raqqa, Aleppo, and Hama. Capturing Tabqa would position the regime 40 km away from Raqqa city, allowing it to sever supply lines and isolate ISIS in northern Aleppo. So far, the regime has largely avoided fighting the extremist group—preferring instead a live-and-let-live strategy and at times even coordinating with it. Assad's June 7 speech, in which he promised to retake “every inch” of Syria, also points to this increased shift toward engaging ISIS. Lastly, in the wake of the breakdown in the cessation of hostilities, Russia’s resumption of full-scale bombing of Aleppo city frees Assad’s forces to engage ISIS units elsewhere.

The regime’s live-and-let-live approach to ISIS began to change when regime forces, dominated by foreign fighters (including Hezbollah and Russian militias), decided to retake Palmyra from ISIS fighters in March 2016. During that time, Russian bombardment of opposition-held territory—predominantly in Aleppo—helped the regime lay a near full siege to the city, surrounding it on three sides and bombing the main access road to rebel held eastern Aleppo. With opposition forces pinned down, Assad appears satisfied that he has succeeded in containing the rebel threat.

Going after ISIS now is an attempt to rebuild the regime’s legitimacy as it demonstrates that its priorities align with the international fight against extremism. It also forces the United States and the anti-ISIS coalition into implicit support for the Syrian regime. International coalition air strikes against ISIS military resources, oil pipelines, and ISIS fighters in Syria weakened ISIS enough for the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to recapture territory From ISIS in northern Syria, but also allowed regime forces and its allies to move against the group. The continued international efforts to uproot ISIS and only rhetorical efforts to hinder its war against the opposition only reinforce Assad’s claim that he can retake every last inch of Syria. The race to uproot ISIS from Raqqa will become a deciding factor in the battle for legitimacy: if the regime can take credit for driving ISIS out of its self-declared capital, it would cast itself as an international hero against terrorism.

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/is-the-assad-regime-switching-gears