No “aces up the sleeve” left for Russia’s armed forces, says former military officer Frank Ledwidge
Frank Ledwidge
9 июня 2023
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The drone attacks on Moscow which began last week represent a change in the strategic approach of Ukraine to the war. For the first time, it appears to be targeting civilian areas, mirroring – albeit at a far smaller scale – Russia’s current approach. There are two clear reasons behind this. First, to demonstrate to Russians that their vaunted air defenses cannot protect them. Second, here is a closely-connected message to the Putin regime: not only are you not immune from attack, but we are now on the offensive. These operations are part of a much larger campaign, which is commonly known as the “counteroffensive” – Ukraine’s summer operations to retake its territory. Along with the incursions of various evidently Ukrainian-sponsored Russian armed-groups to Belgorod, these are intended to “shape” the informational and military space to assist the offensive – destabilizing and deceiving Russian forces. There has been some comment as to whether Putin’s regime will “escalate.” This raises the next question as to what options are available to do so? The answer is simple – few, if any. Further, the decision to supply effective fighter aircraft to Ukraine represents an inflection point in the balance of military power, from which Russia will find it difficult to recover.

What options are available for Putin's regime to escalate? The answer is simple – few, if any.
Let's start with the ground war. On the battlefront itself, Russia stands on the defensive. The taking of Bakhmut was a classic example of Pyrrhic victory. This relatively insignificant town cost Russia tens of thousands of lives, and consumed vast resources over a period of eight months. More widely, its armored forces are eviscerated, with clear and reliable information available of it having lost over 2000 tanks, about half its original inventory, and as The Insider reported two weeks ago now reduced to drawing from stocks of 1960s vehicles. Tanks captured from the Russian army constitute the largest single supply to the Ukrainian army. Armored vehicles are not being manufactured at anything like the rate required to make good the losses sustained. Efforts to recruit and train men to replace the huge casualties have, not perhaps surprisingly been largely unsuccessful. The consequence is that there can and will be no options available for offensive action on the part of Russian ground forces in the foreseeable future.

Moving into the air domain, Russia is already firing dozens of missiles every day into Ukraine. About 90% of these are shot down by Ukraine’s air defenses. Those few that get through kill and maim hundreds of civilians every month. It has become clear that virtually no Russian missile system is immune from destruction by Ukraine’s western supplied systems, notably the Patriot 3, which regularly shoots down the much-vaunted Kinzhal “hypersonic” missiles. It is clear that Russian supplies of precision-guided missiles are dwindling, with recently assembled missiles now being used – but so are the older Ukrainian-operated Soviet era S-300 and Buk anti-aircraft missiles. It is highly likely that the purpose of recent and frequent attacks on Kyiv have the purpose of using up Ukrainian supplies of this form of defensive weaponry. However, with western-supplied modern systems flowing in, it is unlikely that this particular objective will succeed. In the medium-term (over the next year), Ukraine will transition entirely to western systems such as the successful IRIS-T, NASAMs and, of course, the Kinzhal-killing Patriot 3.