Argentina In the Emerging World Order (with emphasis on ties to China)

In recent years, Buenos Aires has sought stronger ties with China and membership in the BRICS. But with the recent election of far-right president Javier Milei, Argentina’s approach to the world may change.

This article, which examines Argentina’s approach to Ukraine and China, is part of an ongoing series on U.S. statecraft and the Global South developed by the Carnegie Endowment’s American Statecraft Program.

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Argentina strives for a foreign policy of equidistance and generally resents perceived attempts by the United States to “choose sides” between Washington and Beijing. It will continue to deepen relations with both powers—including with other partners, such as the European Union, India, and Japan, as part of its strategy of largely preserving ties to everyone—while remaining wary of the risks associated with strategic competition. On Ukraine, it has leaned more toward the United States than some other emerging powers yet eschewed calls for sanctions on Russia or military aid to Ukraine. Compared to its regional peers, Argentina has not been as pro-Ukraine as Chile, but its stance strongly diverged from that of other left-leaning governments such as Bolivia and Cuba, which side with Russia.

Economic turmoil has made it hard for Argentina to adopt an ambitious foreign policy, but Buenos Aires has long considered the G20 a valuable platform to voice its foreign policy views. Argentina’s economic troubles have also driven it toward newer, Beijing-led platforms, including the BRICS grouping, which offered it formal membership in August 2023. Argentina’s BRICS membership, however, is still up in the air. With the election of far-right presidential candidate Javier Milei, Argentina is likely to alter the course of its policies. Milei, who has been compared to former U.S. president Donald Trump and Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro, vowed to dollarize the Argentine economy, withdraw Argentina’s BRICS application, and downgrade diplomatic ties with China.2 Yet in an effort to attract centrist voters, Milei moderated his rhetoric somewhat during the runoff and since he lacks a majority in Congress, he can be expected to struggle to implement many of his most radical ideas.

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Argentine leaders have looked to China as an alternative source of financing for its crushing debt at a time when Western lenders have already been tapped and recourse to them has been more difficult due to concerns about their impositions on Argentine sovereignty.19 Argentina performs so poorly in the Emerging Markets Bonds Index that the U.S. Treasury and other Western lenders are reluctant to lend. When Buenos Aires does get loans, they usually come with forced austerity policies, which risk generating domestic social unrest. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), on the other hand, is seen as a source of easier long-term financing without conditionalities, even though it remains far smaller than Western-led multilateral banks.20

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Many, but not all, of China’s inroads are economic. China’s presence is evident, for instance, in Patagonia, where the People’s Liberation Army has operated a space research station since 2018, or in Ushuaia, the southernmost tip of Argentina, where China was eyeing the construction of a naval base as recently in 2021.26 That plan seems to have been paused, but it still shows the potential growth of China’s power there.

Read more: https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/22/argentina-in-emerging-world-order-pub-91088

The construction of a naval base in the Tierra del Fuego would provide China access to the Atlantic Ocean and Antarctica, thus expanding China's global influence.